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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA
CASE LAW (December 1973 to February 1975)
Administrative Law-Proceedings Under the North Carolina
Occupational Safety and Health Act
Growing out of increased congressional concern over job injuries
and the economic disincentives to improve working conditions offered
by the worker's compensation programs, the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was enacted by Congress.' Already in the brief three-year existence of the program, the federal
OSHA has generated a vast amount of legal commentary over its legitimacy.2 The Act was designed to unify all existing federal safety programs and to promulgate standards for working safety to meet the hazards of the future. To achieve these goals, federal OSHA directs the
United States Secretary of Labor, with the advice of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the National Advisory Council on Occupational Safety and Health (NACOSH), to
adopt minimum safety standards for various industrial classifications.3
In addition, the United States Department of Labor is responsible for
enforcing these standards.4 This enforcement is accomplished by
safety compliance officers operating out of regional offices. 5
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-76 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Brady, The New Occupational Safety and Health Act-its Impact on
Contractors and Sureties, 8 FORUM (A.B.A.) 114 (1972); Cohen, The Occupational
Safety and Health Act. A Labor Lawyer's Overview, 33 Omo ST. LJ. 788 (1972);
Greenberg, OSHA: More Headaches for the Building Industry, 7 PuB. CONTIACT LJ.
106 (1974); Heath, Implementation and Philosophy of the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 249 (1973); Homberger, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 21 CLEV. ST. L. Rnv. 1 (1972); Moran, A
Critique of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 249
(1973); Moran, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, 86 HARv. L. Ruv. 988 (1973); Moran, How to Obtain Job Safely Justice, 24
LAn. LJ. 387 (19731); Moran, Parties to Proceedings in the Court of Appeals Under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REy. 1089
(1974); Mullins, OSHA-The Federal Government and Job Safety, 19 RocKy MT.
MmrNaJ. L. INSV. 155 (1974); Satter, Shedding Some Light on the Burden of Proof in
Demonstrating a Violation of the General Duty Clause of OSHA: National Realty, 15
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1075 (1974); Spann, The New Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 58 A.B.AJ. 225 (1972); White, Occupational Safety and Health-A New
Area of the Law for the Legal Practitioner,61 ILL. B.I. 522 (1973); Special Section,
The OccupationalSafety and Health Act of 1970, 20 WAYNE L. REv. 987 (1974); Symposium, 9 GONZAOA L. Rav. 317 (1974); Symposium: Occupational Safety and Health,
9 TRIAL, July-Aug. 1973, at 12.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 655-56 (1970).
4. Id. §§ 655-59.
5. See The President'sReport on Occupational Safety and Health for 1972, CCH
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The federal OSHA, however, provides for the development of
state plans, under Department of Labor supervision, to allow local enforcement of health and safety standards.0 During the developmental
phase of these state programs, the United States Department of Labor
and the corresponding state enforcement agencies share concurrent jurisdiction. However, when fully operational, the state agency takes over
all responsibility for enforcement, at least for those standards the state
has chosen to adopt. North Carolina has promulgated a state OSHA
program that is patterned on the federal Act with a few deviations. 7
This program is now in full operation and is functioning under a probationary status until full approval is granted, a step expected within the
next year. The purpose of the State Act is "to assure so far as possible,
every working man and woman in the State of North Carolina safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources."'
North Carolina has chosen to assume enforcement of all of the
federal safety standards except those dealing with maritime or longshoreman operations.' The major areas of regulation are general industry and construction safety and exposure to toxic substances.10
Topics dealt with in these regulations include, among other items, the
shoring of excavations, personal protective equipment in dangerous
areas such as steel-toe shoes and hard-hats, guards for exposed
operating equipment, and the amount of toxic chemicals allowed in the
air of manufacturing plants." Every employer in the State must comply with these standards and keep extensive records on all occupational
injuries and diseases.' 2
EMT. SAFnr & HEALTH GUIDE-SPECIAL REPORT, February 24, 1974, at 59-60. Eleven
regional offices have been set up in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Chicago,
Dallas, Kansas City, Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle. See also 29 U.S.C. § 657
(1970).
6. Id. §§ 667, 672(f)-(g), 673(c). Thirty-six states are presently developing enforcement plans, Nineteen states, including North Carolina, have plans in operation on
a probationary basis. Three states have fully operational plans completely run by the
state.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-126 to -155 (Supp. 1974).
8. Id. § 95-126(b)(2).
9. Id. § 95-131. The Commissioner has adopted the General Industry Standards
and the Construction Standards as a first step in the North Carolina standard program.
10. The North Carolina Department of Labor will automatically adopt all new federal consensus standards as they are promulgated. In addition, special standards may
be adopted by the North Carolina Commissioner of Labor with the advice of the North
Carolina Advisory Council and the approval of the federal area directors. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 95-131 (Supp. 1974).
11. The federal standards are contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1973).
12. Employers with less than 8 employees have recently been exempted from the
record-keeping requirements.
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ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS

Under the North Carolina Act, the State Department of Labor has
the responsibility for enforcing the safety standards in the State.1" A
team of safety compliance officers conducts inspections of premises
looking for violations.14 These officers are given full administrative
search authority by N.C. OSHA, a right that has been constitutionally
upheld at the federal level. 5 If a violation is found, the inspector
points it out to the employer and notes it in his inspection report. If
the condition is considered to present an imminent danger to the safety
of employees, the State Department of Labor can take immediate steps
to halt operations by applying directly to the judiciary for an injunction.1'
In ordinary situations, the safety officer reports any alleged violations to the Director of the Office of Occupational Safety and Health,
who within several days, will issue a formal citation that carries an
abatement date and may carry a proposed penalty.' 7 If the employer
does not contest the citation, abatement date, or penalty, they become
final orders of the Review Board after fifteen working days.' 8 After
the employer has had time to correct the unsafe conditions, a followup inspection is conducted to insure that action has been taken.
The Act provides, however, that a citation may be challenged in
an administrative hearing in three ways. First, the employer may contest the citation, abatement date, or proposed penalty by a simple
letter notice of contest addressed to the Director of OSHA.19
The employer may also initiate a hearing by requesting a modification
of abatement date after the citation has become final. 20 Usually such
a request must be approved by the Director of OSHA; however, if he
denies the request, the employer may appeal administratively."'
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-126(b) (2) (c), (m), -133 (Supp. 1974).
14. Id. § 95-136. The detailed procedures for inspections are contained in OccuPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DmSION, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL (1974) [hereinafter cited as OPERATIONS MANUAL].

15. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970). See Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374 F. Supp.
1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-140 (Supp. 1974).
17. Id. § 95-137. See OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 14, ch. IX, at 1-18.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(b)(1) (Supp. 1974).
19. Id. § 95-137(b)(4). See NoRm CAROLINA OCCUPATIONAL SAFElY AND
HEALTH REVIEW BOARD RULES OF PROCEDURE, rule 32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
REVEw BD. R. -1.

20. RBvmw BD. R. 34.
21. Id.
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Thirdly, the employees affected by unsafe conditions may initiate a
hearing on the appropriateness of the abatement period given their emsafety is threatened
ployer by a letter of contest when they feel their
22
time.
abatement-correction
long
exceedingly
an
by
These administrative hearings are determined before an independent body, the North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Review

Board.23 This agency is charged only with the resolution of disputes
that2 4might arise under N.C. OSHA and has no enforcement author-

ity.

Within the Review Board, there are two levels of adjudication.2

First, the fact-finding hearing is conducted by a hearing examiner who
is empowered to take evidence, rule on motions, and issue final orders
of decision.2 6 Three hearing examiners are located in different regions
Their decisions become final orders of the Review
of the State.
Board unless the Board, within thirty days, directs that the case be

brought before it for review. 28 This may be accomplished by motion
of any one of the three Review Board members upon petition of any
party. 29 Secondly, the Review Board hearing is generally based on the
hearing examiner's findings of fact and additional evidence can be introduced only pursuant to a special motion of the Board. ° The
standard of review has not been definitively defined. Apparently, the
findings of the hearing examiner-will be sustained if supported by the

weight of the evidence.

The legal ruling, however, is open to modifi-

cation if the Review Board decides that it is in error.8 1 A more substantial standard is needed if the review is not to be completely arbi-

trary. Trial decisions are entitled to some validity or they should not
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(11) (Supp. 1974).
23. Compare id. § 93-135 with 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-135 (Supp. 1974). See Cleary, Pleading and Practice
Before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 24 LAB. L.J. 779
(1973); cf. Moran, A Court in the Executive Branch of Government: The Strange Case
of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 20 WAYNE L. Rrv. 999,
1008-13 (1974) and cases cited therein.
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-131(i) (Supp. 1974).
26. See id.
27. They are Hugh M. Wilson (Lenoir, N.C.), Fred Hutchins, Jr. (Winston-Salem,
N.C.), and George Rountree, HI (Wilmington, N.C.).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-135(i) (Supp. 1974).
29. Id. See also REVIEw BD. R. 91. Theoretically, the Review Board could direct
a case for review even if no party requested such, and the federal Review Commission
has done so. E.g., Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 505 F.2d
869 (10th Cir. 1974). However, the appeal does not seem very worthwhile as all real
parties in interest no longer have any stake in the case. But see id. at 871.
30. REvmnwBD. R. 91(d).
31. See Carolina Welds Plant, Docket No. I (OSHANC Review Bd., Jan. 17,
1974) (dissenting opinion).
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be conducted. Based on federal experience, a rule of upholding the
hearing examiner's conclusions of law except where clearly erroneous
would seem to be workable.
A party aggrieved by a ruling of the Review Board then has recourse to the State court system under the provisions of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act. 2 If federal precedents are followed, the aggrieved party will be required to exhaust his administrative remedies by petitioning the Review Board for review before he
may seek judicial relief.3 If a party fails to appeal to the Board within
the thirty-day appeal period, further proceedings would seem to be precluded. 4 Because the Review Board presumptively has expertise in
safety and engineering, their decisions are presumed valid. Thus the
courts, in exercising judicial review in OSHA matters, can set aside
Review Board decisions only if they are found arbitrary and capricious,
unconstitutional, or wholly unsupported by the evidence. 5
PLEADING AND PRACTICE

Pleading and practice before the adjudicatory levels of the Review
Board are governed by internally created Review Board Rules of Procedure. 6 The OSHA Review Board is specifically excluded from the
coverage of the Administrative Procedure Act; 7 however, the Board's
statutorily authorized rules must conform to the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure as closely as possible.38 The Rules of Civil Procedure are directly applicable whenever the Review Board has not
authorized a different rule. 9 Under the Board rules, a complex pleading system has developed which effectively requires more specificity
than the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In practice, after a case is originated by a notice of contest (either
from the employer or the employee), the Department of Labor must
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-1 to -52 (Supp. 1974). See generally Daye, North
Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C.L.
REV.833 (1975).
33. See Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Hodgson, 354 F. Supp. 20, 21 (N.D.W. Va. 1972),
aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1070 (1972).
34. See id.
35. See, e.g., Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 501 F.2d
1196, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 491 F.2d 1340, 1344 (2d Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 487 F.2d 438, 442 (8th Cir. 1973).
36. N.C. GwN. STAT. § 95-135(d), (e) (Supp. 1974).
37. Id.§ 150A-1(a).
38. Id.§ 95-135(d).
39. Id.; RaviEw BD. R. 2.
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respond with a detailed complaint within twenty days.4 0 The respondent •then has fifteen days to answer with specific objections and
defenses.4 1 Such a system, while requiring considerable effort, does
limit the scope of the administrative hearing. Since factual issues are
rarely in dispute, a more limited trial saves time and money. Leave
to amend pleadings to conform to the evidence has not been readily
granted to either party at the federal level and the North Carolina Review Board appears to be following the practice. 2
The Review Board Rules of Procedure make far less use of partyinitiated pretrial procedures than do the Rules of Civil Procedure."
44
Pretrial discovery is discouraged and, in fact, practically eliminated;
however, depositions, subpoenas, and interloctuory orders can be issued by the hearing examiners or any Board member.45 They can then
be enforced in the courts upon petition of any party, much like Industrial Commission or other administrative orders. 40 The Review Board
has not liberally granted such requests.47 The Board's position is that
all fact-finding should occur at the hearing and not independently.
While this position results in voluminous hearings, it does insure that
there will not be a long delay for discovery before the hearing is held.
The Review Board has a vested interest in seeing that no employee
is exposed to an unabated hazard any longer than the minimum time
necessary to resolve all issues. The employer's notice of contest sus40. Ruvmw BD. R. 33, 35.
41. Id. 33(b).
42. See Ames Associates, Inc., Docket No. 10 (OSHANC Review Bd., Aug. 28,
1974) (A construction company was cited for failure to require its employees to wear
life-lines and safety belts while working on an open roof fifty feet in the air. The complainant tried to amend its charge to allege failure to provide construction guardrails and
a repeated violation but after consultation this was refused). See also Gastonia Sheet
Metal, Inc., Docket No. 16 (OSHANC Review Bd., Jan. 7, 1975).
43. See, e.g., Ravinw BD. R. 33, 34, 35, and 53. Two cases have had citations
overturned for failure to comply with the Rules of the Review Board. Gastonia Sheet
Metal Works, Inc., Docket No. 16 (OSHANC Review Bd., Jan. 14, 1975); Herman
Erection Co., Docket No. 13 (OSHANC Review Bd., Dec. 30, 1974). The original January 1974 draft of the rules was considered to be simple guidelines and supplementary to
the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, federal objections to the lack of specificity and
the need for more formalized proceedings led to a comprehensive procedural system
unique to the Review Board. These new rules then went through several subsequent
drafts before the January 1975 version was finalized.
44. REVIEW B. R. 53. Discovery has been allowed in only one case-Dan River,
Inc., Webco Knit Div., Docket No. 18 (OSHANC Review Bd., contest received Dec.
20, 1974, pending).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-135(d) (Supp. 1974); REvmw BD. R. 53.
46. REviw BD. R. 54, 55(d).
47. See International Chem. Workers Union, Docket No. 11 (OSHANC Review
Bd., Nov. 27, 1974).
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pends the running of any abatement period while it is being determined; therefore, the hearing must be held as soon as possible to insure
that a dangerous condition is eliminated in minimum time.48
SETTLEMENT

In keeping with the directive of the federal OSHA director that
abatement and voluntary compliance are the chief goals of all developmental operations,49 settlement of penalties has been very common.50
The decision to carry a citation to a full hearing must be very carefully
weighed by the corporate attorney contemplating contest.51 The cost
of conducting a hearing and obtaining expert and common. testimony
must be compared to the possible benefit to be gained from administrative adjudication. The usual result is only a small reduction in penalties-an outcome more easily obtained through the settlement apparatus.5 2 The Department of Labor will generally reduce a penalty to a
nominal amount when future compliance is assured and abatement
dates are affirmed."
The Review Board, unlike the Labor Department, has been reluctant to allow contested cases to be settled.4 They contend that this
practice circumvents the Review Board's powers of supervision. To retain some control, the Review Board Rules of Procedure divide settlements into two classes. A rule 50 withdrawal of contest is appropriate
when the respondent declines to carry forward his contest.55 The Review Board does not enter the adjudicatory process because the penalty, citation, and abatement date must be fully complied with. If any
of these factors are modified or negotiated in any way, a second form
of approval by the Review Board is required by rule 100.5 This arSTAT. 138(a) (Supp. 1974).
49. Address by Mr. William Stender, Second Annual Conference on Occupational
Safety and Health, Aug. 14, 1974.
50. See Memorandum from Ray Boylston, Director-OSHANC, to W.C. Creel,
N.C. Commissioner of Labor, Jan. 22, 1975, on file in the Review Board cffice. About
sixty percent of contested cases end in settlement. Id.
51. Other factors to consider are the average time for adjudication (currently about
six weeks) and the damage to the public image of a firm.
52. Settlement commonly reduces a serious violation to a non-serious violation as
long as guilt is acknowledged for an assurance of future compliance.
53. See OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 14, for general directives on future compliance efforts (principally ch. I1). See also Peden Steel Co., Docket No. 14
(OSHANC Review Bd., Jan. 15, 1975).
54. See note 60 infra.

48. N.C. GEN.

55. REVIEW BD. R. 50.

56. Id. 100.
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rangement is classified as a settlement and is subject to the simple approval of the Board.
This power of approving settlements appears to be mainly illusory,
however. If the Review Board directs a settlement for review, there
would be no remaining dispute between the parties and the Review
Board would have to take a non-judicial stance. When the federal Review Commission has taken such action and the decision brought before
the United States court of appeals, the court has been generally disapproving.5 7 Dale M. Madden Construction, Inc. v. Hodgson' s held that
enforcement is the primary responsibility of the United States Department of Labor. Penalty settlement, even after the Review Commission
has made another determination, is permissible and cannot be challenged by the Review Board.59 No situation has yet arisen in North
Carolina in which the North Carolina Review Board has refused to approve a settlement. If the Labor Department should refuse to submit
its settlement for review, the Review Board would be left with the task
of adjudicating a non-existent controversy. 60 In practicality, the Director of North Carolina OSHA will be given a free hand in settling penalties and the Review Board will be unable to exercise any supervisory
01
power.
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

Employees under North Carolina OSHA must comply with all
standards. Apparently, failure to do so could be cause for dismissal
of an employee when the employer is cited for a violation. However,
57. See, e.g., Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 502 F.2d
946 (3rd Cir. 1974); Dale M. Madded Constr., Inc. v. Hodgson, 502 F.2d 278 (9th Cir.
1974); Brennan v. Southern Contractors Serv., 492 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan
v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 487 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1973).
58. 502 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1974).
59. Id.
60. Such was the case with W.E. Dansey Co., Docket No. 8 (OSHANC Review
Bd., Aug. 28, 1974), decided before the Rules of Procedure were modified. The administrative law judge refused to dismiss the case even though the respondent failed to
appear and had communicated a desire to withdraw. The representative of the Labor
Department was required to present evidence to justify the citation issued. What would
have occurred if the Director had refused to proceed is uncertain. See also Suburban
Elec. Serv., Docket No. 9 (OSHANC Review Bd., Aug. 28, 1974).
61. The four settlements or withdrawals processed by the Review Board after the
rules were changed have been approved without comment. See Joseph P. Schlitz Brewing Co., Docket No. 23 (OSHANC Review Bd., Jan. 15, 1975); Southworth Constr.
Co., Docket No. 15 (OSHANC Review Bd., Jan. 8, 1975); Peden Steel Co., Docket No.
14 (OSHANC Review Bd., Dec. 6, 1974); Pargo, Inc., Docket No. 12 (OSHANC Re.
view Ed., Nov. 1, 1974).
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employees cannot be directly penalized under the Act.62 The justification for this non-liability of the employee has been stated to be either
that he does not have control over working conditions or that since the
Act is designed to protect the employee, he should not suffer its penalties. Nevertheless, the actual reason for this policy decision is the impossibility of enforcement and the possibility of unconstitutionality.
The employer is in the financial position to purchase safety equipment,
not the employee. Also the direct levy of a fine on a person rather
than a business resembles criminal proceedings requiring procedural
protections. Thus, the best decision is to leave supervision of the employees to the employer and focus the sanctions of the Act on the employer in charge.
In return for this elusive duty to comply with OSHA, employees
are given several rights to proceed under the Act to protect their safety.
Employees can effectively insure that their employer takes action to
bring his plant into compliance with OSHA. They can report any condition that they feel is unsafe directly to the Department of Labor. 3
The Director is then statutorily obligated to investigate and make a full
report on these complaints.6" Such employee complaints have generated most of the inspections made in North Carolina-union representatives often acting as watchdogs of the employer by issuing direct periodic reports. 65
Additionally, the Review Board is commanded by the Act to give
employees or their representatives an opportunity to participate directly
in all proceedings that directly affect their welfare. 66 In contrast to
the federal practice of allowing employees to participate freely in all
proceedings initiated by the employer, the State Review Board Rules
of Procedure require employees to go through formal intervention proceedings under rule 21 . 6 7 In essence, this procedure consists of a petition for leave to intervene that places the burden of proof on the petitioner to demonstrate how his participation will assist in determination
of the issues in dispute. Only one union has tried to utilize this procedure, a fact which places some emphasis on the difficulty an em62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130 (Supp. 1974).
63. Id. §§ 95-130(6), (7).
64. Id. §§ 95-136(d)(1), (2).
65. See Babcock & Wilcox, Inc., Docket No. 22 (OSHANC Review Bd., contest
received Jan. 19, 1975, pending); International Chem. Workers Union, Docket No. 11
(OSHANC Review Bd., Nov. 27, 1974).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-135(e) (Supp. 1974).
67. REvmw BD. R. 21.
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ployee faces in marshalling evidence to substantiate his intervention. 8
Another reason for the lack of union use of the procedure is that the
North Carolina provisions do not provide union representatives with direct notification of OSHA activity by the employer.69
There are two policies supporting this reluctance to give employees free access to employer proceedings. First, employees would
probably have little to add to the evidence that would be competent
in prosecuting the employer. In fact, an employer might coerce
his employees to appear at a hearing with glowing reports of
a safety program in the company that did not exist. Secondly, a
three party proceeding does not seem logically to conform to a criminalstyle trial with accused and accusor. The State OSHA plans were not
set up to give employees a chance to sue their employers or air in-company grievances. Giving employees an opportunity to accuse their employer in an administrative hearing seems to leave the issue of industrial
safety far behind.
A final right given the employee is that of challenging an abatement date. 70 An employee has twenty days after the posting of the
citation or any subsequent amendments to send a notice of contest to
the Department of Labor. 71 The Department of Labor must then
within fifteen days plead a justification of the abatement granted and
the employee has ten days to respond with specific objections.72 Thus
the burden of pleading and going forward is placed on the Department
of Labor, and the employee can force detailed explanations of the Department's actions by a simple challenge. While this procedure may
be burdensome on the Department, the right was granted to give the
employee the same power that the employer has in challenging a citation.73 The situation is not exactly the same, however, because while
the employee is not subject to any penalties for failure to abate, the employer is. A better solution-the one originally imposed by the Review
68. See Babcock & Wilcox, Inc., Docket No. 22 (OSHANC Review Bd., contest
received Jan. 19, 1975, pending).
69. See Rtvmw BD. R. 7(e). The federal practice is to require an employer to
serve notice of all OSHA activity on the employee collective bargaining agent.
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(11) (Supp. 1974).
71. Id. See also Rvmw BD. R. 35.
72. Rxvmw BD. R. 35.
73. In the earlier drafts of the Review Board Rules of Procedure, the employee had
the burden of pleading facts tending to show that the original abatement date was unreasonable. In the January 1975 draft of the Rules, however, that requirement was
changed to place the burden of pleading on the Labor Department to show why its
abatement date is reasonable. This change again came about because of federal pressure
to bring the state plans into conformity with the federal practice.
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Board rules-would be to require the employee to plead evidence sufficient to suggest that the abatement date granted was arbitrary or capricious. The expertise for deciding an appropriate abatement date lies with
the Director not the Review Board. The Review Board should logically
be able only to approve or disapprove an abatement suggested by the
Director. Nevertheless, the job of evaluating all factors that go into
specifying abatement has been given to the Review Board. In the absence of a standard of review, the evidence of the employee is entitled
to equal weight with that of the Director and the abatement date must
be determined de novo.
MODIFICATION OF ABATEMENT

Analogous to the employee challenge to abatement, the employer,
after his fifteen day original contest period has expired, may petition
the Director for a modification of the date or a suspension of the period
altogether when he shows that he will not be able to comply with the
original date for reasons beyond his control. 7- From a denial of this
tequest, the employer may appeal to the Review Board. Clearly, the
employer has the burden of proof under this proceeding to show that
the action taken was arbitrary and capricious."5 He then must show
why his extension is justified. Again, the Review Board has the responsibility of determining an abatement date-a function the Board is
not qualified to perform as they have no access to technical experts.
A better procedure would require the Review Board only to approve
or disapprove the abatement date with the burden of proving that the
action was "unreasonable" on the employer.
PENALTIES

North Carolina OSHA provides for both civil and criminal penalties, 76 but the Review Board has jurisdiction only over civil penalties.
Criminal penalties, which are appropriate only when unsafe conditions
have resulted in a fatality, are imposed by the State superior court upon
petition of the Labor Department."" The civil penalties meted out by
74. REvmw BD. R. 34.
75. Id. 73. This raises the question of whether a procedural rule can shift the burden of proof without a judicial determination.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-138, -139 (Supp. 1974).
77. Id. § 95-139. See NORTH CAROLINA. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD, A GUIDE TO APPEAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH AcT oF NORTH CAROLINA 5

(1975).
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the Review Board range from 10,000 dollars for a willful violation to
less than 100 dollars for a non-serious violation. 78 Violations are classified as willful or repeated when the same violation was cited previously.79 Serious violations that carry an unadjusted penalty of 1000
dollars require the probability of "serious injury"'8 0 and actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition by the supervisor of the
job site. Non-serious violations are all other conditions that carry a
probability of harm but do not present an immediate serious hazard. 81
They require no knowledge on the part of the company and are thus
simple statutory violations.
The amount of the penalty to be assessed, once a contest reaches
the hearing stage, lies in the sole province of the hearing examiner or
Review Board. The Director decides only "proposed penalties." 82
This recommendation is not to be given controlling weight at least in
theory. In practice, the administrative judge, in fixing penalties, relies
heavily on the Director's determination of penalty based on the size of
the cited business, the seriousness of the violation, past safety history,
and the showing of good faith in abatement.8 8 In most cases, the penalty is either affirmed as originally decided or reduced to a nominal
amount s8 This approach appears to be the only practical solution because the Review Board does not have the information to decide differently unless a plea is made by the employer professing economic destruction.85
Some question has arisen about the Review Board's power to increase a proposed penalty when contested. The federal Review Commission has approved several such increases; nonetheless, due process
would appear to preclude an increase because an employer would be
effectively penalized for exercising his right of appeal.80 On the other
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-138 (Supp. 1974).
79. See OPERATONS MANuAL, supranote 14, ch. X, at 1-4, 7, 16-17.
80. Id. See also id., ch. VII, at 6-9.
81.

Id.

82. See id., ch. IX, at 1-17; cf. Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 487 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1973).
83. OPEmATIoNs MANUAL, supra note 14, ch. X, at 2-7.

84. See Carolina Welds Plant, Inc., Docket No. 1 (OSHANO Review Bd., order

of hearing examiner, June 17, 1974).
85. The technical specialists are employed by the Labor Department and not the
Review Board. Economic feasibility is also best left to the Labor Department since the
Review Board can only obtain a vague picture of economic conditions from evidence
presented.
86. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co., CCH 1974-75 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH
DEc. 19,184 (Jan. 7, 1975).
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hand, the penalty-setting process is accomplished de novo by the administrative judge. In the same manner that a criminal conviction in
North Carolina appealed from district to superior court is tried de novo
with the possibility that additional penalties may be levied, there is
some support for the position that the entire amount of the penalty is
challenged by a contest and may thus be increased. 87 A final resolution of this question awaits judicial determination.
DEFENSES TO CITATIONS

While still in the beginning stages, several common defenses have
appeared that eliminate the liability of the employer. The federal Act
and the administrative search provisions have withstood several tests of
constitutionality at the federal appellate level.88 Nevertheless, another
challenge is presently awaiting rehearing en banc before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.89 The United States Supreme Court has not
spoken on the issue and no such challenge has yet been made in North
Carolina. Generally, such a blanket challenge to constitutionality
should not be ruled upon by the administrative court because it would
be deciding its own existence; however, such an issue should be raised
at the administrative level to properly put it in issue before a court of
0
review.
Additionally, some of the civil penalties may be attacked as being
in fact criminal sanctions and thus invalid because due process procedures such as jury trial or arraignment are not provided. Individual
standards are also open to challenge for being unconstitutionally
vague.9 1 Several such challenges have been sustained at the federal
level. Again the argument must be made at the administrative level
to raise it properly on appeal. Here the administrative judge would
seem to have the power to rule on such a defense at the trial.
A second category of defenses stems from the intricate procedural
requirements of the Act and the Rules of Procedure. Very detailed
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-290 (Supp. 1974).
88. See, e.g., McLean Trucking Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 503
F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1974); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.
1974); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,

489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
89. See CCH EMP. SAFETY & HEALTH GumE, BULLETIN No. 192, at 1-2 (Ian. 21,
1975). The case involved is Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Hodgson, 354 F. Supp. 20 (N.D.W.
Va. 1972).
90. See cases cited note 88 aupra.
91. Id.
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procedures must be followed in the promulgation of a standard. 2
These procedures provide for the participation in the adoption process
of the industry being regulated. If all the appropriate regulations are
not followed, the standard is invalid."' Thus a cited employer should
examine the procedural history of the standard deemed violated in
planning a defense.
Additionally, service of the citation must be on an officer of the
company who has the authority to correct the violation and disburse
funds for payment of the penalty.9 4 Thus mere service on a job foreman would probably not be sufficient. Also a very long lag between
the inspection and the issuance of the citation is grounds for dismissal
when some prejudice can be shown. 95 The federal issuance time suggests fifteen to twenty days as a maximum period. In industrial hygiene or toxic substances situations in which extensive laboratory
analysis must be carried out before determination of compliance, this
time limit is rarely observed. While perhaps not in the best interest
of job safety, an improperly issued citation will provide a useful defense
for the employer.
In the same manner, the procedural rules that apply to the Labor
Department must be fully complied with. 9 6 The Rules of Procedure,
which are still in the formative stages, have given rise to numerous
technical dismissals of citations, generally when the Labor Department
has failed to meet its deadlines for forwarding the case to the Review
Board or filing a complaint. 97 This failure commonly occurs when settlement negotiations are being conducted. A respondent need only
show a tenuous possibility of prejudice to avail himself of the complainant's error. s A more liberal interpretation of the rules is needed
92. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970).
93. See, e.g., Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d
Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 502 F.2d 946
(3d Cir. 1974); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
94. See Buckley & Company, Inc., CCH 1973-74 Occup. Safety & Health Dec. 21,
874 (1974).
95. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp., 1974-75 CCH OccuP. SmFTY & HEALTH Duc.
19,272 (Jan. 31, 1975).
96. For example, RBviEw BD. R. 32 requires the Director to transmit the original
citation, abatement times, and notification of proposed penalty to the Board within seven
days of receipt.
97. Gastonia Sheet Metal, Inc., Docket No. 16 (OSHANC Review Bd., March 12,
1975).
98. Id. The Review Board refused to uphold the argument of counsel for the
Labor Department who contended that a showing of prejudice must be made before a
dismissal is appropriate for failure to comply with procedures.
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to stop this practice. Time extensions, which the Review Board frequently denies in keeping with its determination to bring a contested
case to trial in the least possible time, should be more freely given when
settlement is in process, as long as an absolute limit is placed on the
negotiation.
Finally, there is currently developing a substantive defense at the
federal level called the "isolated incident" doctrine. 9 This defense,
which must be pleaded, seems to state that when a violation is shown
to be an isolated disregard of company policy by an employee, a citation
is not justified. If the employer shows that he has an active and effective OSHA safety program and that all employees have been instructed
to comply with the standard allegedly violated, the citation -will be dismissed as an extraordinary incident that is not the fault of the company.
This defense would appear to attach some element of mens rea to statutes that supposedly do not require criminality for a violation. However, logically such an interpretation is often brought into purely
regulatory crimes, 100 and OSHA violations may prove to be no exception. The effect is beneficial because employers now feel that they
will be rewarded for compliance efforts and not just penalized for compliance failures. Good intentions, thus, can be a substantive defense.
Serious and willful violations require a higher degree of culpability
than normal violations.' 01 Actual knowledge or at least constructive
knowledge (management should have known of the condition in the
exercise of normal supervision) is required before these more serious
penalties can be imposed.' 0 2 At the least, the Labor Department must
prove that a representative of the employer was on the job site. For
instance, a team of carpenters working on a sub-contract job could not
cause a citation to be drawn on their employer when he had no reason
to know of the unsafe practice. Failure to prove the presence of the
supervisor will result in the dismissal of the citation.
CONCLUSION

North Carolina OSHA represents a new and expanding area of ad99. See Murphy Pacific Marine Salvage Co., CCH 1974-75 OCCUP. SAFETY &
HEALTH DEc. 19,025 (Nov. 14, 1974).
100. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, HANDBOOK ON CRmvINAL. LAW, ch. 3

(1972); id. § 27, at 192-93.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-127(18) (Supp. 1974).
102. See, e.g., Colorado Fuel & Iron Steel Corp., CCH 1973-74 Occup. Safety &
Health Dec. 21,410 (1973); Ira Holliday Logging Co., CCH 1971-72 Occup. Safety &
Health Dec. 20,981 (1973).
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ministrative law. While still in its infancy, the Act has generated a
sizeable amount of litigation and legislative controversy. Though actual penalties imposed are usually quite small, costs imposed upon manufacturing companies to bring their facilities into compliance can often
run into the millions of dollars. Thus a need exists for new legal expertise in this area. North Carolina practitioners need to familiarize themselves with the provisions of the Act.
While the substance of the Act appears quite solid, some legislative clarification is needed. The respective authority of the Department of Labor and the Review Board needs to be clearly delineated.
The Review Board should be reconstituted to reflect its function as a
purely judicial body. Authority to impose penalties should be vested
entirely in the Board while supervision of abatement should be a function of the Labor Department.
GARY ROBERT CORRELL

Civil Procedure-Appeal and Error-Limiting the Effect of a
Court of Appeals Interlocutory Decision on Subsequent Appeal
to the Supreme Court
Prior to the addition of the court of appeals to the North Carolina appellate structure in 1965,1 the procedural doctrine of law of
the case was ostensibly followed in the State courts.' In Spartan
Leasing, Inc. v. Browns the North Carolina Supreme Court dealt for
the first time with the law-of-the-case effect of an interlocutory decision by the court of appeals on a subsequent appeal to the highest
court. The court took a distinctly modern, flexible approach to the
old doctrine in finding law of the case inapplicable to supreme court
review, 4 even when there had been no petition for certiorari from the
interlocutory decision.5
Spartan Leasing, Inc., a North Carolina concern, sought damages
for violations of an equipment lease. A question of personal jurisdic1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (originally enacted as Law of
March 29, 1967, ch. 108, § 1, [1967] N.C. Sess. Laws 144).
2. Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 91 S.E.2d 673 (1956).
3. 285 N.C. 689, 208 S.E.2d 649 (1974).
4. Id. at 693, 208 S.E.2d at 652.
5. Id. at 699, 208 S.E.2d at 655.
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tion arose, and the trial court ruled that the defendant had waived
any right to object to jurisdiction by making a general appearance to
request an enlargement of time. However, the court of appeals reversed and neither party petitioned for supreme court review. On remand, the trial court dismissed the action for want of sufficient instate contact to bring North Carolina's long-arm statute into play, and
the court of appeals affirmed the decision. Nevertheless, pursuant -to
a petition for certiorari, the supreme court reversed 6 and ini so doing
the court clarified two significant aspects of procedural law: (1)
the status of -the law of the case doctrine after the creation of the
court of appeals 7 and (2) the effect of failure to seek supreme court
review at the time of the interlocutory decision.8
The doctrine of law of the case is totally an American development in procedural law.9 It is similar in form and rationale to the
other precedential guides for courts, stare decisis and res judicata.
It is a more definable standard than stare decisis in that no consideration of precedent is necessary; yet it is weaker than res judicata
because it controls only the particular case in its appellate journey
and has no effect on other cases involving the same issues. -0 In general, the doctrine dictates that, when a ruling of law is made by an
appellate court in remanding a case for further proceedings, that ruling is binding in all subsequent stages of litigation, including a sec12
ond appeal. 1 In earlier days, the doctrine was adhered to strictly,
but present-day application is generally more flexible with exceptions
recognized in cases of "palpable error" or "manifest injustice."' 13
Courts may also refuse to be bound if the ruling in question were dicta
or were handed down by a divided court.' In addition, the doctrine
generally applies only to questions that were decided, and not to those
questions that could have been but were not decided. 15 The North
Carolina Supreme Court itself, in approving the doctrine int 1956, ac6.
7.
8.
9.

(1948).

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Note,

700, 208 S.E.2d at
691-93, 208 S.E.2d
694-99, 208 S.E.2d
Successive Appeals

656.
at 650-52.
at 652-55.
and the Law of the Case, 62 HAv. L. REv. 286

10. 1B J.MOORE, FEDERAL PRACCmE 0.404[1l], at 403 n.12 (2d ed. 1974).
11. Note, 62 HARv. L. REv., supranote 9, at 286.
12. Id. at 287.
13. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata,65 HA.v. L. REv. 818, 822 (1952).
14. Note, Law of the Case, 5 STAN. L. Rnv. 751, 758 (1953).
110.25[2], at 275. Contra, Not, 5 STAN. L.
15. 9 J.MOOEB, supra note 10,
REV., supra note 14, at 758.

1022

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

cepted the dicta qualification and characterized law of the case as a
flexible rule of procedure. 16
The practical reason for -the existence of law of the case is to
"expedit[e] final decision between the parties.' 7 There are various theories justifying its application. One theory often used by courts
is similar to estoppel and applies especially if the decision below were
not challenged at that time or if no appeal were sought."' Because
of the identity of parties, another rationale is associated with res judicata and looks to preventing harassment of one party by the repeated
suits of another19 and to the state's interest in relieving judicial burden. These policies may be fulfilled by "prohibiting matter-of-course
reargument of issues already decided, preventing speculation on
changes in the membership of the court, a necessary regard for the
morale of the trial court which abided by the decision on the first appeal, and fairness to the parties who shaped their case on -the second
trial in conformity with the rulings on the first appeal."20 No one
basis applies to all situations, but they all point to one chief reason
for the doctrine-"a quicker end to litigation. 21
The rule's utility is realized best when a court is in doubt but is
not convinced of its error on earlier appeal or when the rule enables
a court to dispose of a question of the sufficiency of evidence.22 It is
useful in these situations primarily because it allows the court to act
quickly in resolving an appeal, thus achieving the chief goal of the
doctrine. 23 There are deficiencies in law of the case in such circumstances, however. To begin with, it is too indefinite to be a reliable
guide for either application by courts or prediction by counsel. In
fa&, it cannot be applied without a reconsideration of the merits of the
16. Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 537,91 S.E.2d 673, 682 (1956).
17. Developments in the Law, 65 Hiv. L. REv., supranote 13, at 822.
18. This reasoning assumes that it is unfair later to complain when the other party
has relied on the earlier acquiescense. See Note, 5 STAN. L. 1Ev., supra note 14, at
756. Application of this theory could lead to a trial court binding an appellate court.
See Hurtig v. Bjork, 258 Iowa 155, 157, 138 N.W.2d 62, 64 (1965).
19. This is not a strong rationale because the suit has not ended and is still within

the control of the trial court. Note, 62 HARv. L. Rnv., supra note 9, at 289.
20. Id.
21. Note, 5 STAN . REv., supra note 14, at 757.
22. E.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Foreman, 196 Ark. 636, 119 S.W.2d 747 (1938),
where the question on first appeal was whether there was sufficient evidence of liability
to reach the jury. The same evidence was presented at the second trial and the
Arkansas Supreme Court relied on law of the case to rule that there was no error in
submitting the case to the jury at the second trial.
23. Note, 62 -ARv.L. Rn.., supra note 9, at 292.
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prior determination, that is, an ascertainment of whether there is
manifest injustice or palpable error-time-consuming determinations
that the doctrine purports to prevent. 24 Secondly, briefing and considrequire as much time as a consideration of
eration of the rule often
25
the merits themselves.
Treatment of law of the case in various jurisdictions reflects
these policies, particularly the fairness aspect. A major factor is the
appealability of the interlocutory decision. State case law that rejects
law of the case on supreme court review also indicates the absence of
an appeal of right from the interlocutory decision.2 6 Several courts
characterize this. factor as "flexibility. '27 While the same intermediate appellate court may be bound, the supreme court is not."' Still
other jurisdictions refuse to apply law of the case even when there
was a motion to certify that was denied. 9 Others do not appear to
distinguish between review by right of appeal and by certiorari at
all.80
Often courts refer to state procedural statutes to support their
rejection of the doctrine. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court
cited rules of civil procedure that authorized review of any stage of litigation as long as appeal was properly perfected.81 The Illnois court,
referring to a procedural rule authorizing immediate appeal from
interlocutory orders involving injunctions and receivers, reasoned that
the grant of an immediate right to appeal did not make the decision
any less interlocutory. Accordingly, the court determined that the de24. Id.
25. Id. at 292-93.
26. See City of Pueblo v. Shutt Inv. Co., 28 Colo. 524, 530, 67 P. 162, 164 (1901);
Weiner v. Pictorial Paper Package Corp., 303 Mass. 123, 126-27, 20 N.E.2d 459, 460
(1939); Walker Memorial Baptist Church, Inc. v. Saunders, 285 N.Y. 462, 474, 35
N.E.2d 42, 47 (1941); Pengelly v. Thomas, 151 Ohio St. 51, 60, 84 N.E.2d 265, 26970 (1949).
27. See Weiner v. Pictorial Paper Package Corp., 303 Mass. 123, 125, 20 N.E.2d
458, 460 (1939); Roach v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R., 74 Utah 545, 572, 280 P. 1053,
1063 (1929).
28. See Weiner v. Pictorial Paper Package Corp., 303 Mass. 123, 127-28, 20
N.E.2d 458, 460 (1939); Grant v. Kansas City S. Ry., 190 S.W. 586, 589' (Mo. 1916);
New Amsterdam Cas. Co.v. Popovich, 18 N.J. 218, 224, 113 A.2d 666, 669 (1959).
29. See, e.g., Pengelly v. Thomas, 151 Ohio St. 51, 60, 84 N.E.2d 265, 269-70
(1949).
30. See Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 756, 146 P.2d 905, 906 (1944)
2d 40i 41, 210 N.E.2d 209, 210 (1965)
(Traynor, J.); Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill.
(Schaefer, J.); Grant v. Kansas City S. Ry., 190 S.W. 586, 589 (Mo. 1916).
31. Jones v. Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 175-76, 200 N.W.2d 227, 233 (1972). The
writer for the majority here is outraged at the very idea of binding the supreme court
by an appeals court decision. Id. at 170 n.2, 200 N.W.2d at 230 n.2.
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cision was not final and reviewed the entire proceeding even though
earlier review was not sought.8 2 More recently -the Illinois court stated
flatly that law of the case is "not applicable to this court in reviewing
the judgment of the appellate court."38,
The federal system has long differentiated between application
of law of the case in the same appellate court and on supreme court
review. Generally, a federal appellate court will not reopen its own
prior decision, 4 but the rule is not "inexorable." Factors considered
are justice, possibility of error, and also the possibility of United States
Supreme Court review that might overturn that court's holding. Regardless of the factors considered by the court below, the Supreme
Court is not bound by any lower court decision. 5 The Court articulated this concept in United States v. United States Smelting, Refining
& Mining Co., 8 a case in which permissible appeal was not taken
from an interlocutory order. The possibility of appeal did not change
the non-final character of the interlocutory decision, according to the
Supreme Court, and the entire proceeding was reviewed. The Court
''
noted that law of the case "is only a discretionary rule of practice. 13
In Spartan Leasing the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted
the approach of the United States Supreme Court, holding that interlocutory decisions of the court of appeals do not constitute law of
the case on subsequent appeal to the supreme court. 8 After disposing of the pure law of the case issue, the court clearly indicated that
the failure to petition for certiorari was the more important problem.3 9 It first looked at the effect of a denial of certiorari to determine what had been foregone by the failure.40 In the federal system,
denial of certiorari has no precedential value whatsoever. 4 1 In
Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co.42 the North Carolina court
itself had held that a denial of certiorari implied no judgment on

3.).

32. Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 511. 2d 135, 147-48, 125 N.E.2d 77, 84 (1955).
33. Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill. 2d 40, 41, 210 N.E.2d 209, 210 (1965) (Schaefer,

34. 9 J. MOORE, supra note 10, 110.25[2], at 274.
35. Id. at 275.
36. 339 U.S. 186 (1950).
37. Id. at 199.
38. 285 N.C. at 693, 208 S.E.2d at 652.
39. Id. at 694, 208 S.E.2d at 652.
40. Id. at 695-96, 208 S.E.2d at 653-54.
41. 1B J. MOORE, supra note 10, 1 0.404[5.-1], at 471.
this is wasteful judicial administration. Id.
42. 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E.2d 133 (1973).

Professor Moore thinks
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the merits and thus could not preclude later review "provided the
parties have taken the proper steps to preserve the questions for appellate review."4 Arguably the emphasized language refers to all
steps a party might take concerning appeal including petitioning for
certiorari; however, it might also refer to the technicalities of objecting at certain stages of the trial in order to preserve the question. The
latter interpretation is in accord with the North Carolina court's reference elsewhere to "proper questions on appeal" as those assigned
as error and preserved by argument or citation of authorities in the
brief."1 The court has previously ruled that petitions on interlocutory decisions would be granted only when the decision affects a substantive right and would work harm to the applicant if the case proceeded to final judgment below.4 5 Otherwise, the court said, a petition would be dismissed as fragmentary and premature. 46 Considering the unlikelihood of a grant of certiorari before a final resolution
of the issue, one may conclude that petitioning only after resolution
of all facts, as was done in Spartan Leasing, was in fact the "proper
step" to obtain supreme court review. Indeed, the federal courts
quite clearly do not penalize a party for failure to petition at the interlocutory stage, 47 and several state courts agree.48 Referring to the
policy of discouraging fragmentary appeals, the North Carolina Supreme Court accepted the federal view that a petition for certiorari
is not necessary to preserve later supreme court review. 49
Thus the court has clarified its position on law of the case without totally breaking with precedent, and in the process, has made the
decision of whether to make an immediate appeal easier for lawyers.
Its holding in Spartan Leasing is consistent with its "proper steps" language in Peaseley5 0 and with the emphasis on law of the case as a
flexible doctrine in Hayes v. Wilmington.5 ' Moreover, the court has
43. Jd. at 595, 194 S.E.2d at 141 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 594, 194 S.E.2d at 140.
45. Steele v. Moore-Flesher Hauling Co., 260 N.C. 486, 491, 133 S.E.2d 197, 201
(1963). An obvious case of such harm would be, as Illinois recognizes, injunctions and
receiverships. See Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 147-48, 125 N.E.2d 77,

84 (1955).

46. Steele v. Moore-Flesher Hauling Co., 260 N.C. 486, 491, 133 S.E.2d 197, 201
(1963).
47. C. WhiGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDmRAL CotDTs § 106, at 477 (2d
ed. 1970).
48. See McLaughlin v. Hahn, 333 Ill. 83, 87, 164 N.E. 148, 149 (1928); Weiner
v. Pictorial Paper Package Corp., 303 Mass. 123, 127, 20 N.E.2d 458, 460 (1939).
49. 285 N.C. at 698, 208 S.E.2d at 655.
50. 282 N.C. at 595, 194 S.E.2d at 141.
51. 243 N.C. 525, 537, 91 S.E.2d 673, 682 (1956).
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chosen not to penalize a party for either an inadvertent failure to petition or a wish to avoid the cost of appeal. Formerly, counsel for a
potential appellant had to balance the possibility of winning on other
grounds (if any) on remand in the trial court against the extra cost
of an early appeal.52 In Spartan Leasing the supreme court has
contributed to -the possibility of justice by eliminating the necessity for
guessing games at the interlocutory decision level.
PHYLLIS C. JOHNSON

Civil Procedure-Resurrection of General Appearance Waiver
North Carolina's adoption of a version of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure1 in 1969 appeared to presage the demise of the general appearance-waiver doctrine. Nevertheless, in Simms v. Mason's
Stores, Inc.2 the North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously revived
this doctrine that has been dormant in recent years. Although Simms
does not firmly establish the extent of the general appearance-waiver
resurrection, it does contain practical implications of importance to every North Carolina practitioner.
Simms was an action for assault initiated by a North Carolina
plaintiff against a domestic corporation. After obtaining a thirty-day
enlargement of time in which to answer or otherwise plead pursuant
to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b),8 defendant filed an
answer in which he moved to dismiss. 4 Defendant's motion alleged
52. See Note, 5 STAN. L. Rnv., supra note 14, at 763-64.
1. N.C.R. Cirv. P. 1-84.
2. 285 N.C. 145, 203 S.E.2d 769 (1974).
3. Enlargement.-When by these rules or by notice given thereunder or
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within
a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended
by a previous order.
N.C.R. Civ. P. 6(b). This portion of the rule is essentially identical to the FED. R.
Cirv. P. 6(b) counterpart.
4. The dismissal motion was pursuant to N.C.R. Crv. P. 12 that provides in pertinent part:
Defenses and objections-when and how presented-by pleading or motion-motion for judgment on pleading.
(b) How presented.-Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief

GENERAL APPEARANCE WAIVER

1975]

1027

that service of process was insufficient 5 and that the court had therefore failed to acquire in personam jurisdiction. 6 Plaintiff, relying on
section 1-75.7 of the North Carolina General Statutes, 7 contended that
defendant's right to attack the court's jurisdiction under rule 12(b) had
been waived by a voluntary appearance. The trial court rejected plaintiff's argument and ordered dismissal. The decision was affirmed by
in any pleading .. . shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one
is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader
be made by motion:
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Lack of jurisdiction over the person,
Improper venue or division,
Insufficiency of process,
Insufficiency of service of process,

A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a
further pleading is permitted. The consequences of failure to make such a motion shall be as provided in sections (g) and (h). No defense or objection
is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion ....
(g) Consolidation of defenses in motion.-A party who makes a motion
under this rule may join with it any other motions herein provided for and then
available to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule but omits therefrom any defense or objection then available to him which this rule permits
to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on the
defense or objection so omitted, except a motion as provided in section (h) (2)
hereof on any of the grounds there stated.
(h) Waiver or preservation of certain defenses.(1) A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived (i) if
omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in section (g), or (ii)
if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive
pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a
matter of course.
5. Upon the hearing of defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that
the Buncombe County deputy sheriff who purported to serve the summons upon defendant left the summons and complaint with a security officer employed by a firm under
a contract to furnish security services for defendant's property. The officer was neither
an employee nor an agent of defendant. She delivered the copy of summons and complaint to the defendant's manager the next morning. The supreme court agreed with
the trial and appellate court that service was insufficient under the requirements of
rule 4(j) (6), which governs the service of process upon a domestic or foreign corporation. 285 N.C. at 147, 203 S.E.2d at 771.
6. The defendant did not challenge the existence of proper grounds for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction but simply alleged, in effect, that jurisdiction could not
be exercised until proper service of process was achieved. A distinction between the
mechanical procedures by which jurisdiction is exercised, as involved in Simms, and the
substantive issue of whether proper grounds exist for the exercise of in plrsonam jurisdiction is important in exploring the broader ramifications of Simms.
7. Section 1-75.7 is a sub-section of a subchapter on Turisdiction, which was enacted simultaneously with the rules and in pertinent part provides: "A court of this
State having jurisdiction of the subject matter may, without serving a summons upon
him, exercise jurisdiction in an action over a person: (1) who makes a general appearance in an action . . . ." (emphasis added). Section 1-75.2 defines "person" to include
"corporation."
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the court of appeals," but the plaintiff obtained supreme court review.
Writing for the court, Justice Sharp acknowledged that the pertinent provisions of rule 12(b) were substantially equivalent to their federal rule counterparts and that "under the federal decisions, nothing
else appearing, a defendant's motion for an enlargement of time to
plead will not waive lack of jurisdiction over the person if the defense
is timely presented thereafter in accordance with Rule 12 requirements."
However, the court recognized that -the issue had to be
viewed in light of section 1-75.7 that has no statutory counterpart in
federal practice. The court construed section 1-75.710 as reflecting a
legislative policy decision that "any act which constitutes a general appearance obviates the necessity of service of summons."'"
The court
perceived "sound reasons" to support this policy in that
courts should conserve judicial time and effort by disposing of preliminary defenses relating to personal jurisdiction before considering
the merits of a controversy, [and] to allow a party to delay raising
the defense of insufficiency of service of process by securing an
extension of time to plead may permit ,the staturtes of limitations
to bar a claim for relief by a plaintiff who, through no fault of his,
is ignorant of the defense. 12

Consequently, in a decision admittedly inconsistent with federal practice, it held that "by securing an extension of time in which to plead
or otherwise answer defendant made a general appearance which rendered the service of summons upon it unnecessary."'
8. 18 N.C. App. 188, 196 S.E.2d 545 (1973).
9. 285 N.C. at 156, 203 S.E.2d at 777.
10. Rule 12 and section 1-75.7 were construed together because they were part of
the same enactment. When these statutes were enacted there was a "well established
rule" in North Carolina that "a voluntary appearance whereby a defendant obtains an
extension of time in which to plead is a general appearance which waives any defect
in the jurisdiction of the court for want of valid summons or proper service thereof."
Id. at 157, 203 S.E.2d at 778. The General Assembly was presumed to have used the
term "general appearance" in section 1-75.7 in its judicially established meaning "[iln
the absence of anything which clearly indicates a contrary intent .... " Id. This construction leads to the court's conclusion that the adoption of the rules did not abolish
the concept of a general appearance. "On the contrary ... Rule 12 eliminated the
special appearance and, in lieu thereof, gave a defendant the option of making the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person by pre-answer motion or by answer even
though a defendant makes a general appearance when he files an answer." Id. at 157,
203 S.E.2d at 777. But if, before the motion or answer is filed, a defendant engages
in conduct that constitutes a general appearance he has "submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. . . ." and may not assert the jurisdictional defense "either by motion or answer under Rule 12(b)." Id. at 157, 203 S.E.2d at 777-78.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 157-58, 203 S.E.2d at 777-78.
13. Id. at 158, 203 S.E.2d at 778.
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Prior to the adoption of the rules, defendant's request for an extension would clearly have constituted a general appearance with the
effect of waiving defects in the jurisdiction of the court. 14 The waiver
of various defenses by general appearance has had a venerable history
in North Carolina,' 5 widespread support in other states, 6 and general
endorsement in the federal courts before the adoption of the federal
rules. 1
The motivation underlying the original use of the general appearance-waiver doctrine' s was a desire by courts to overcome the severe
territorial due process restrictions on jurisdiction embodied in Pennoyer
v. Neff.' 9 The death knell to the general appearance-waiver doctrine
was sounded in the federal courts by the much-quoted case of Orange
Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp. 0 in which the Third
Circuit held that federal rule 12 abolished "the age-old distinction between general and special appearances. ' ' 21 A year later, the United
14. The previously controlling statutes were both repealed by ch. 954, [1967] N.C.
Sess. Laws 1353, the same chapter that enacted the rules. Former section 1-103, 1905
N.C. Rev. Stat. § 447, provided that "[a] voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent to personal service of the summons upon him." Former section 1-134.1, ch. 245,
[1951] N.C. Sess. Laws 202, eliminated the necessity for special appearances by permitting the objection that the court lacked jurisdiction to be presented either by motion or
answer and allowed the making of other motions or the pleading of other defenses simultaneously with the jurisdictional objection but provided that "the making of any motion
or the filing of answer prior to the presentation of such objection shall waive it." In
the leading case of Youngblood v. Bright, 243 N.C. 599, 91 S.E.2d 559 (1956), the court
held that this provision had no application when objection to the court's jurisdiction was
not made until after defendant had applied for and obtained an extension of time in
which to plead. Youngblood stated that "[a] voluntary appearance whereby a defendant
obtains an extension of time in which to plead is a general appearance .... " and "[a]
general appearance waives any defects in the jurisdiction of the court for want of valid
summons or of proper service thereof." Id. at 602, 91 S.E.2d at 561.
15. E.g., In re Blalock, 233 N.C. 493, 64 S.E.2d 848 (1951); Wilson v. Thaggard,
225 N.C. 348, 34 S.E.2d 140 (1945); Moseley v. Deans, 222 N.C. 731, 24 S.E.2d 630
(1943).
16. E.g., Stanley v. Jones, 197 La. 627, 2 So. 2d 45 (1941); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. State, 136 Mont. 148, 345 P.2d 734 (1959). Contra, e.g., Davenport
v. Superior Ct., 183 Cal. 506, 191 P. 911 (1920); Bell v. Good, 19 N.Y.S. 693 (City
Ct. N.Y. 1892).
17. E.g., Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469 (1920); Placek v. American Life Ins.
Co., 288 F. 987 (W.D. Wash. 1923).
18. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personata Jurisdictionof State Courts,25 U. Cm. L. Rav. 569 (1958).
19. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
20. 139 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 740 (1944). A defendant
"is no longer required at the door of the federal court house to intone that ancient abracadabra of the law, de bene esse, in order by its magic power to enable himself to remain outside even while he steps within." If the defense of lack of jurisdiction is
waived, it is "not because of the defendant's voluntary appearance but because of his
failure to assert the defense within the time prescribed by [rule 12]." Id. at 874.
21. Id.
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States Supreme Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington22 eliminated the rationale underlying the general appearance-waiver doctrine.
The Court rejected the territorial view of due procss, holding that a
non-resident defendant could be summoned to a jurisdiction whenever
his activities there reasonably justified requiring his presence. 3
Of course, strict compliance in federal practice with rule 12 will
not always protect a defendant against waiver of his objection to jurisdiction of the court. 24 The limitations of Orange Theatre are well illustrated in Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Laboratories,Inc.,2" ex-

tensively cited by Justice Sharp. 26 The waiver in Wyrough, however,
rested not upon the ancient distinction between general and special appearances, but upon a flexible balancing of competing policies on a
case-by-case basis to identify situations in which conduct of defendants
was sufficiently dilatory or misleading to be inconsistent with the later
assertion of a preliminary defense or motion.
Other states that have adopted versions of the federal rules appear
to follow the federal practice with respect to the general appearancewaiver doctrine. 7 A comparison of Simms with the practice of other
22. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
23. Id. at 320. See Louis, Modern Statutory Approaches to Service of Process outside the State-Comparingthe North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure with the Uniform Interstate and InternationalProcedureAct, 49 N.C.L. REv. 235, 236-37 (1971).
24. 2 H. KOOMAN, FEDERAL CrVL PRAT rcE, § 12.23, at 121 (1969).
25. 376 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1967). Seven days after defendant received notice of
plaintiff's action, the district court began four days of hearings upon the question of issuing a preliminary injunction and these hearings indirectly reached the merits of the controversy. Defendant actively participated without objection to the court's jurisdiction.
After issuance of the preliminary injunction but still within the time for answering, defendant filed a motion to dismiss that included the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
defendant's person. The court of appeals rejected defendant's reliance upon its earlier
decision in Orange Theatre in affirming the district court holding that defendant had
waived the defense of laok of jurisdiction. The court noted the "countervailing policies"
that:
The whole philosophy behind the Federal Rules militates against placing
parties in a procedural strait jacket by requiring them to possibly forego valid
defenses by hurried and premature pleading . . . . On the other hand, there
also exists a strong policy to conserve judicial time and effort; preliminary matters such as defective service, personal jurisdiction and venue should be raised
and disposed of before the court considers the merits or quasi-merits of a controversy.
Id. at 547. The court stated that "the process of deciding which is superior must necessarily depend on a case-by-case approach" but held in favor of waiver in the instant case
because the defendant, having had sufficient time to apprise itself of the jurisdictional
questions, should have alerted the court to them. Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
26. 285 N.C. at 155-56, 203 S.E.2d at 776-77.
27. Ohio, with civil procedure provisions similar to the federal rules, follows the
federal practice despite a prior history of adherence to the general appearance-waiver
practice. "'A voluntary appearance does not waive the objection of lack of jurisdiction
over the person.'" Browne, Preserving Objections to In Personam Jurisdiction-Ohto's

19751

GENERAL APPEARANCE WAIVER

1031

states is difficult, however, because of the influence of section 1-75.7

and because of the paucity of decisions in other states based on similar facts. Nevertheless, one might conclude that support for the Simms
departure from federal practice is not to be found in the practice of
sister states with similar versions of the federal rules.
After the adoption of the North Carolina rules, the North Caro-

lina Court of Appeals, in Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown, ' 8 resolved
the general appearance issue in favor of uniformity with the federal

practice. Yet, Simms did not mention Spartan Leasing, in which the
appellate court construed section 1-75.7 for the first time29 and rejected the allegation that a defendant's request for an enlargement of
time represented a waiver of objection to jurisdiction. Three appellate
cases after Spartan Leasing dealt specifically with whether requests for
enlargements of time were waivers of lack of jurisdiction for want of
either valid service of process or insufficiency of process and followed
Spartan Leasing.80 Thus, Simms represents a distinct departure from
both the federal practice and prior North Carolina cases under the
rules.
Limited to its specific holding, 81 the Simms decision, on the surPersistent Shibboleth, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REy., Sept., 1972, 141 at 160, quoting W. MILLIG;AN, OHIO FoRMs op PAcncE AND PLEADING 12-18 (1971). Similarly, Note, Special
Appearances Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, 70 W. VA. L. REV. 64, 73 (1967),

contains a well-reasoned prediction, uncontradicted by subsequent decisions, that the pre-

viously prevailing practice with respect to special appearance and waiver "should become
extinct under the [new] West Virginia Rules."
28. 14 N.C. App. 383, 188 S.E.2d 574 (1972). This case involved a North Carolina corporate plaintiff suing a South Carolina resident for damages under a lease. The
summons and complaint were personally served. Defendant secured an enlargement of
time and subsequently moved to dismiss, alleging lack of jurisdiction. The trial court
rejected plaintiff's general appearance-waiver contention in granting dismissal. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court on this issue but reversed and remanded for
a determination of whether alternative statutory grounds existed for the exercise of jurisdiction.
29. The court of appeals in Spartan Leasing reasoned that rule 12 governs when
rule 12 defenses are waived. Plaintiff's argument that section 1-75.7 revealed a legislative intent to retain the rule that a general appearance waives objection to jurisdiction
was expressly rejected by the court, which stated that section 1-75.7
codifies the long standing rule that a person making a voluntary appearance
is subject to the court's jurisdiction irrespective of whether jurisdiction over his
person has been acquired previously . . . . This statute does not, however,
purport to set forth the time in which an objection to personal jurisdiction must
be made, or how the objection is to be waived. . . . Were the right to assert
the objection waived in every instance where there was a general appearance,
the provisions of Rule 12. . .would be of no effect.
id. at 386, 188 S.E.2d at 576 (emphasis added). '
30. Philpott v. Kerns, 18 N.C. App. 663, 197 S.E.2d 595 (1973); Simms v.
Mason's Stores, Inc., 18 N.C. App. 188, 196 S.E.2d 545 (1973); Williams v. Hartis, 18
N.C. App. 89, 195 S.E.2d 806 (1973).
31. Only a request for an enlargement of time in which to plead or otherwise
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face, seems to offer certain advantages. Defendant obviously received
actual notice thus achieving the dominant objective of service of process. Permitting subsequent "technical" objections by defendants in
such circumstances may realistically be viewed as a procedural luxury
that courts with crowded dockets can ill afford. Furthermore, Justice
Sharp's concern for the protection of unwary plaintiffs against a statue
of limitation bar to an otherwise meritorious claim by a defendant who
delays proceedings by a request for an enlargement of time seems
32
laudable.
On the other hand, Simms will thwart the objective of achieving
uniformity in practice among jurisdictions, a policy that underlies the
enactment of "model" legislation such as the federal rules. More importantly, the absoluteness of the holding may have the effect of violating "[tihe whole philosophy behind the Federal Rules [that] militates against placing parties in a procedural strait jacket by requiring
them to possibly forgo valid defenses by hurried and premature plead3
ings.",
The balance of pros and cons could legitimately be viewed as
in equipoise if analysis terminated at this point. Although the logical
validity of the court's construction of section 1-75.7 is not persuasive, 4
answer under N.C.R. Civ. P. 6(b) was held to constitute a general appearance, and only
lack of jurisdiction for want of valid summons or proper service thereof was waived.
285 N.C. at 158, 203 S.E.2d at 778.
32. See text accompanying note 12 supra. The apparent significance of this consideration with respect to the court's construction of section 1-75.7 is particularly interesting because plaintiff in Simms was not faced with a statute of limitations problem
when the defendant moved for dismissal. It appears that defendant's motion for dismissal was filed within thirty days of the 11 August 1971 order allowing an enlargement.
The assault for which plaintiff sought recovery allegedly took place on 24 December
1970. The statute of limitations on an action for assault is one year. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-54 (1969).
33. Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Laboratories, Inc., 376 F.2d 543, 547 (3d
Cir. 1967). The possibility of violating the philosophy behind the federal rules adds
poignancy to Justice Sharp's earlier statement that case law under the rules was examined for "enlightenment and guidance as* we develop 'the philosophy of the new
rules.'" Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 101, 176 S.E.2d 161, 165 (1970). This orientation toward construction is even more explicit in. the general rule stated in Fiske v.
Buder, 125 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1942). "[W]hen a statute is adopted from another jurisdiction, in substantially the same language, the provisions so adopted are to be construed
in the sense in which they were understood at the time in the jurisdiction from which
they were taken." Id. at 844.
34. See note 10 supra. The court did not discuss the legislative use of the permis.
sive word "may" in section 1-75.7 in relation to the more explicit direction of rule 12(b)
that "every defense . . . shall be asserted in the responsive pleading . . . except that
the following defense may at the option of the pleader be made by motion . .. .
N.C.R. Crv. P. 12(b) (emphasis added). Consideration of these provisions may have
provided a "clear indication" of the sense in which "general appearance" was used in
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the result achieved in this particular factual context 5 seems desirable.
Once the impact of this decision is widely disseminated, however, its
apparent advantages may be largely illusory. For example, a defendant desirous of lulling a plaintiff into inaction until a statute of limitations expired could file an answer containing all the rule 12 motions
stated in very general terms. This ploy would avoid waiver but still
would accomplish the "evil" at which Simms was directed-plaintiff effectively would be deprived of notice of the specific grounds upon
which the objecton to jurisdiction were based. Common sense also
suggests that attorneys actually in need of an extension of time will
section 1-75.7. In this regard the construction of section 1-75.7 by the court of appeals
is a much more probable expression of legislative intent. See note 29 supra.
35. Simms, however, has not been limited to this particular factual context. Philpott v. Kerns, 285 N.C. 225, 203 S.E.2d 778 (1974), decided contemporaneously with
Simms, involved an out of state motorist defendant upon whom patently defective summons had been served. After securing an enlargement of time, the defendant moved
for dismissal, alleging lack of jurisdiction for want of sufficiency of'process. The trial
court dismissed and the court of appeals affirmed. Philpott v. Kerns, 18 N.C. App. 663,
197 S.E.2d 595 (1973). The supreme court summarily reversed, relying on Simms,
without any discussion of the potential complications introduced in the Philpott case by
the out of state status of the defendant.
Philpott illustrates a substantial question raised by the language in Simms. Justice
Sharp construed rule 12 as allowing an exception to waiver of jurisdiction over the person by the filing of an answer. 285 N.C. at 157, 203 S.E.2d at 777. This construction
could imply that other pre-rules forms of general appearance not specifically "saved" by
rule 12 such as acceptance of service of process, entering appearance of record, or any
other overt act which will constitute a general appearance, would have the same effect
as the request for an enlargement of time had in Simms. Similarly, the court discussed
language from other decisions related to the raising of "preliminary matters such as defective service, personal jurisdiction, and venue . . . ." that might suggest a willingness
to extend the scope of the general appearance waiver far beyond the limited scope of
sufficiency of process and sufficiency of service revealed in Philpott and Simms. Id.
at 155, 203 S.E.2d at 776.
The possibility of an expansion of Simms was soon confirmed. In Spartan Leasing
the trial court on remand again dismissed plaintiff's action after finding insufficient
minimum contacts by defendant with North Carolina to establish in personan jurisdiction. The court of appeals again confirmed. 19 N.C. App. 295, 198 S.E.2d 583
(1973). Upon certiorari the supreme court, again unanimously (with Chief Justice Bobbitt not sitting) reversed. 285 N.C. 689, 208 S.E.2d 649 (1974). Justice Branch
quoted Simms and then stated: "In light of the holding in Simms, it is not necessary
to consider the question of whether defendant had minimum contacts .. . to confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of this State. Under that holding defendant clearly became
subject to the jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts when he obtained an extension
of time to answer or otherwise plead." Id. at 699, 208 S.E.2d at 656. Thus, without
any balancing of countervailing considerations, the Simms waiver has been extended
from service or sufficiency of process to the actual existence of personal jurisdiction,
even in the face of a determination by the lower courts that defendant lacked sufficient
minimum contact with North Carolina otherwise to justify requiring him to defend in
this state. This and other potential expansions of Simms present several complex and
troublesome issues beyond the scope of this note. The limits of such expansion may
well be tested, however, by a due process challenge raised by an out-of-state defendant
through either direct or collateral attack upon a judgment secured by a North Carolina
plaintiff.
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first defensively file a pro forma rule 12 motion. This motion, which
n~ay be based on superficial analysis, will undoubtedly include all defenses and objections that might otherwise be waived, limited only by
the certification required by rule 11.36 Consequently, the only "judicial time and energy" conserved will probably be at the expense of

an occasional unwary defendant who does not realize that rule 12 no
longer means what it seems to say. 87 Paradoxically, Simms may actually waste judicial time and energy through hearings on preliminary
motions that would not have been filed had the pleader been able to
utilize the extension of time granted for a more thorough analysis of
the merits of the preliminary motions. 8
If the legal community adjusts itself to Simms as suggested above,
the "unwary plaintiff' will at least know what defenses have been put
forth before the extension of time is granted and thus have an opportunity to protect himself against a possible interim statute of limitations
bar. There are, however, other alternatives available to a plaintiff and
the court for providing the desired protection that achieve the Simms
objective of conserving judicial time without the disadvantages discussed above.3 9 The plaintiff, for example, when confronted with a
soundly based motion for dismissal could take a voluntary dismissal by
giving notice under rule 41(a)(1)(i) and gain up to an additional year
under the applicable statute of limitations.40 Similarly, the court could
36. The pressure placed on an attorney in this situation may well lead to an undesirable "stretching" of the already cloudy "good grounds to support" certification of
N.C.R. Crv. P. 11.
37. The "surprise" consequence of Simms will be particularly adverse to out-ofstate defendants not conversant with the North Carolina rules who routinely request an
enlargement of time to facilitate the remediation of their uninformed status.
38. Of course, defenses and objections revealed by closer examination to be totally
without merit will undoubtedly be withdrawn prior to hearing.
39. See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
40. (a) Voluntary Dismissal; effect thereof.(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation.-Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c) and of any statute of this State, an action or any claim therein
may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of the court (i) by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the plaintiff rests his
case, or; (ii) ...
If an action commenced within the time prescribed
therefor . . . is dismissed without prejudice under this subsection, a
new action based on the same claim may be commenced within one
year after such dismissal unless ....
N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). See Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
This procedure may be used only once and has the disadvantage under rule 41(d) of
plaintiff being taxed with the costs of the action up to the point of dismissal.
Another possible problem related to the use of rule 41(a) is revealed by the decision in Hodges v. Home Ins. Co., 233 N.C. 289, 63 S.E.2d 819 (1951), which held,
in interpreting a predecessor statute, that a second action commenced within the extended period was barred when the first action was dismissed for want of service of
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order a voluntary dismissal under rule 41(a)(2) with the same effect
upon the statute of limitations.41 This procedure would allow the trial
court judge to exercise discretion in protecting unwary plaintiffs from
a statute of limitations bar.42
Perhaps a more direct and effective procedure would be the issuance of additional summons or the amendment of process through utilization of rules 4(a)43 and (i). 44 Although these provisions have been
largely ignored 45 in North Carolina, federal practice reveals precedent

for utilizing rule 4(a) for the granting of an additional summons to cure
defects in the service of a prior summons. 4 There is similarly ample
support in federal practice for the position that an amendment of process (with respect to insufficiency of process) under rule 4(h) [4(i)
under the North Carolina rules] shall be freely granted and that when

granted the amendment relates back so that the action is not barred
by the expiration of the statute of limitations between the -time of service and the time of amendment. 47 In C.J. Wieland & Son Dairy Prodprocess. In Gower v. Aetna Ins. Co., 281 N.C. 577, 189 S.E.2d 165 (1972), however,
there is a strong inference that this limitation will not be imposed on actions under rule
41(a) or (b).
41. (a) Voluntary Dismissal; effect thereof.(2) By Order of Judge.-Except as provided in subsection (1) of this
section, an action or any claim therein shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the judge and upon-such terms
and conditions as justice requires. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this subsection is without prejudice. If an
action commenced within the time prescribed therefor, or any claim
therein, is dismissed without prejudice under this subsection, a new
action based on the same claim may be commenced within one year
after such dismissal unless the judge shall specify in his order a
shorter time.
N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a) (2).
42. "The obvious purpose of Rule 41(a) (2) is to permit a superior court judge in
the exercise of his discretion to dismiss an action without prejudice if in his opinion
an adverse judgment with prejudice would defeat justice." King v. Lee, 279 N.C. 100,
107, 181 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1971).
43. "[UJ]pon request of the plaintiff separate or additional summons shall be issued
against any defendants." N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(a).
44. "At any time, before or after judgment, in its discretion and upon such terms
as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be
amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to substantial
rights of the party against whom the process issued." Id. 4(i); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h).
45. The North Carolina Supreme Court has construed rule 4(a) only once. Sink
v. Easter, 284 N.C. 555, 202 S.E.2d 138 (1974). Sink did not concern the provision
of 4(a) considered here. The supreme court has not yet construed 4(i), and only one
court of appeals decision has dealt with 4(i) in perfunctorily concluding, without discussion, that an amendment of process would "prejudice substantial rights of the defendants." Philpott v. Kerns, 18 N.C. App. 663, 665, 197 S.E.2d 595, 596 (1973).
46. Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1972); 4 C. WNRiGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1085, at 340 n.67 (1969).
47. See Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 439
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ucts Co. v. Wickard,48 commented upon with approval by Professors
Wright and Miller,4 9 the court granted an ameidment under rule 4(h)
even though the defect was in the manner of service rather than in
the documents themselves.
Adoption of these approaches in the use of rule 4(a). and (i)
would provide plaintiffs with statute of limitations protection and avoid
"material prejudice to substantial rights" of defendants. Additionally,
judicial time and energy would be conserved by, in effect, rendering
futile technical and non-substantive objections to lack of valid summons
or insufficiency of service thereof by defendants who had received actual notice of pendency of a suit.
Simms seems to have been motivated by the realistic objectives
of conserving judicial time and protecting unwary plaintiffs. On the
narrow facts of that case, these objectives were achieved, but at the
expense of a violation of the philosophy behind the Rules of Civil Procedure under which North Carolina operates. On a broader scale, the
achievement of conserving judicial time by the Simms general appearance-waiver approach is questionable. There are more effective alternatives available to -the court for the conservation of judicial time
that will also protect plaintiffs from a statute of limitations bar in the
occasional situation where such protection is needed. The acceptance
of these preferred alternatives would provide a sound basis for either
reconsidering Simms or narrowly restricting its scope. Such restriction
could be accomplished by holding Simms applicable only when there
were no other means available to protect a plaintiff from a statute of
limitations bar interposed by a defendant who objected to service or
sufficiency of process after obtaining an extension of time. Hopefully,
the resurrection of the general appearance-waiver doctrine will be short
lived.
WENDELL HARRELL OTT
F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1947); United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber Co., 162 F.2d 872
(4th Cir. 1947). See generally 4 C. Wuorr & A. MILLER,' supra note 46, §§ 113132 at 547-53.
48. 4 F.R.D. 250 (E.D. Wis. 1945).
49. 'This decision seems to go a step beyond the correction of a misnomer or technical defect but nevertheless seems correct since the basic requisite of giving notice of
the suit before the running of the statute was met." 4 C. WairoT & A. MiLLER, supra
n0te 46, § 1131 At55, n.2,
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Criminal Law-North Carolina's Sodomy Statute: A Need For
Revision
More than two decades have passed since the publication of
Alfred Kinsey's study on human sexual behavior that made clear the
wide disparity between conservative sexual behavior permitted by law
and the liberal sexual practices that Kinsey found actually to occur
in society. Dr. Kinsey stated that "'[s]ex laws are so far at variance with general sex practices that they could not conceivably be rigorously enforced.' "I
The North Carolina sodomy statute is an example of an antiquated law in need of reform.2 The statute provides that "[i]f any
person shall commit the crime against nature, with mankind or beast,
he shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be fined or imprisoned in the
discretion of the court."' In light of recent state and federal court decisions concerning the void-for-vagueness and right to privacy concepts, 4 the statute is vulnerable to constitutional attack.
VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS
The North Carolina sodomy statute contains the terminology
"the crime against nature," and "with mankind or beast." This language tells the citizen nothing about the nature of the crime prohibited
by the statute, nor does it define those persons who come within the
purview of the statute. According to the United States Supreme Court:
1. Burling, Book Review, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 540, 541 (1948), quoting A.
KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR iN Tm HUMAN MALE (1948).

2. A few jurisdictions have already updated their statutes in response to the need
for change. E.g., ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 38, art. 11-2 (1962); N.Y. PENAL L&w § 130.00
(1967). These states have made recent changes in their sodomy statutes to exclude sexual conduct by consenting married adults carried out in private. Kansas, Connecticut
and Minnesota have repealed their sodomy statutes. Approximately one-half of the
states have statutes that, like North Carolina's, remain antiquated. W. Barnett, SEXUAL
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTrrtUToN 23 (1973).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969).
4. This note will discuss only the "void-for-vagueness" and the general right to
privacy arguments because they seem most pertinent to North Carolina's sodomy statute.
Other arguments include (i) cruel and unusual punishment, see Note, Sodomy StatutesA Need for Change, 13 S.D.L. REv. 384, 394-95 (1968), which analogizes Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), to sodomy cases in which a person may carry'the
"status" of a homosexual; (ii) establishment of religion principle, see D. BALEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WEsTERN CHSrN TRADITIONS 33, 58, 64-70 (1955), in which it
is contended that sodomy is a crime according to the Bible and Judeo-Christian tradition, and therefore, sodomy statutes violate the establishment clause of the first amendment; and (iii) equal protection of the law, see W. BARNBTr, SEXUAL FmoM AND THa
CoNs'rrrunON 260-68 (1973), which concerns the discrimination shown by the enforcement of sodomy statutes against unmarried persons and male homosexuals more often
than against married persons or female homosexuals.
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[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public
uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors
free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. 5
A myriad of cases have held that the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments are violated by statutes drawn so vaguely
that they fail to give clear warning to citizens. 0 In short, a law
7
must be understandable or it is no law at all.
The North Carolina sodomy statute has its roots in the original
English sodomy statute dating from 1533 that addressed the "detestable and abominable vice of buggery committed with mankind or
beast."8 In England the term 'buggery" was interpreted to include
both sodomy and bestiality. Under the common law, bestiality was
generally understood to mean carnal copulation between man and
animal, and the term "sodomy" had its basis in the biblical story of
Sodom and Gomorrah where sexual acts between man and man per
anum10 were believed to have been prevalent.11 A case in England in
181712 set the precedent for the definition of sodomy in law to mean
acts per anum and not acts per os.13
The North Carolina legislature adopted the English sodomy
statute in 1837, but substituted for "the vice of buggery" the phraseology "the crime against nature. 1 4 The exact nature of the act involved caused a reluctance to require a detailed description in the
statute. Consequently, when the formulators of the law sought to
describe sodomy in moral terms rather than to define it as a crime,
the language of the statute necessarily became vague. While the
5. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 383 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966).
6. E.g., Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
7. The ancient maxim ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum has been passed down

through common law.
8. Stat., 25 Hen. 8 c. 6 (1533).

9. Ausman v. Veal, 10 Ind. 355 (1858).
10. "By or through the anus." STEDMAN'S
1961).
11. Genesis 19:5-8, 24-26.

MEDICAL DICnONARY

1132 (lawyers cd.

12. Rex v. Jacobs, 168 Eng. Rep. 830 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1817).
13. "By or through the mouth." STDMAN's MEDICAL DTIoNARY 1140 (lawyers
ed. 1961).
14. "Any person who shall commit the abominable and detestable crime against
nature, not to be named among Christians, with either mankind or beast, shall be adjudged guilty of a felony, and shall suffer death without the benefit of clergy." N.C.
Rev. Stat. c. 34, § 6 (1837).
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term "buggery" had a precise definition at common law, a 1914 North
Carolina Supreme Court decision15 held that, since the statute did not
use the specific word "sodomy," the phrase "the crime against nature" must be broader than "sodomy" and included acts per os.' 6
The breadth of the North Carolina sodomy statute was established
through the courts' broad interpretation of legislative intention, changing English terminology, and extending precedents.' 7 Given the
courts' expansive interpretation, the statute fails to protect the citizen
whose only warning of behavior proscribed by the North Carolina
sodomy statute must come from his understanding of the ambiguous
phrase "the crime against nature."
In 1964 the validity of the North Carolina sodomy statute was
challenged for vagueness. In Perkins v. North Carolina'1 a case involving two homosexuals charged with oral copulation, a federal district court upheld the statute, while at the same time admitting -that
"[i]f the statute were a new one, it would be obviously unconstitutional for vagueness. The former concern for -the feelings .of those
reading the statute has yielded to the necessity that an indicted person know of what he is charged. Euphemisms have no place in criminal statutes."'" In an attempt to rectify this apparent incongruity,
the court stated that prior judicial interpretations of the statute's meaning remedied its vagueness.20 Perkins, by acknowledging vagueness,
has added impetus to a void-for-vagueness attack.
Significantly, in Franklin v. State, 2' a Florida court had to determine the validity of a sodomy statute that was virtually identical to
15. State v. Fenner, 166 N.C. 247, 80 S.E. 970 (1914). A few years later in State
v. Griffin, 175 N.C. 767, 94 S.E. 678 (1917), the court commented on the legislative
intent behind the North Carolina sodomy statute by stating: "[Olur statute is broad
enough to include in the crime against nature other forms of the offenses than sodomy
and buggery. It includes all kindred acts of a bestial nature whereby degraded and perverted sexual desires are sought to be gratified." Id. at 769, 94 S.E. at 679.
16. As precedent, the court cited Herring v. State, 119 Ga. 709, 46 S.E. 876
(1904). Herring held that the Georgia sodomy statute included both acts per anum and
per os, ignoring Rex v. Jacobs, 168 Eng. Rep. 830 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1817) (sodomy defined as acts per anum).
17. State v. Walston, 259 N.C. 385, 130 S.E.2d 636 (1963) (per curiam); State
v. Williams, 247 N.C. 272, 100 S.E.2d 500 (1957) (per curiam); State v. Griffin, 175
N.C. 767, 94 S.E. 678 (1917); State v. Fenner, 166 N.C. 247, 80 S.E. 970 (1914). See
also Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333, 336 n.8 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
18. 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
19. Id. at 336.
20. Id.
21. 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971) (per curiam).
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that of North Carolina.2 2 Two individuals were observed committing
a "crime against nature. '23 The Florida Supreme Court held the
statute "void on its face as unconstitutional for vagueness and uncertainty in the language, violating constitutional due process of the defendants. ' 24 Following the precedent set in Franklin, the North Carolina statute would probably succumb to another constitutional attack
on its vagueness.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The North Carolina sodomy statute is also subject to attack as being violative of the constitutionally protected right to privacy established in Griswold v. Connecticut.2 5 The United States Supreme Court
reversed convictions under a Connecticut statute2 6 prohibiting the use
of contraceptives, holding that the statute violated the general right to
privacy by attempting to regulate and control acts within the marriage relationship. Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion, stressed
the fundamental importance of marital privacy. "We deal with a
right older than the Bill of Rights, older than our political parties,
older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred." 7 Even a narrow interpretation of Griswold compels
acknowledgment of a constitutional right of marital privacy that
comes within the "penumbras" of the first, third, fourth, fifth and
ninth amendments and that is protected against state interference by
the fourteenth amendment.2 s If Griswold protects married couples
from state prohibition of acts that express marital love but prevent
unwanted children, then, arguably, all private consensual sexual acts
of married persons should be similarly protected.
22. "Whoever commits the abominable and detestable crime against nature, either
with mankind or with beast, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not
exceeding twenty years." Ch. 1637, subc. 8, § 17, [1868] FLA. LAWS 98 (repealed
1974).
23. The record of the case did not reveal what activities were observed by the policeman.
24. 257 So. 2d at 24. Franklin was effective prospectively only. In Stone v.
Wainwright, 478 F.2d 390, 397 (5th Cir. 1973), a federal court struck down the Florida
sodomy statute both prospectively and retroactively as unconstitutionally vague.
25. 381 U.S.479 (1965).
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958).
27. 381 U.S.at 486.
28. Id. at 483-85. Also note that the fifth amendment gives the same protection
against federal invasion.
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Cases following Griswold appear to have accepted this broadened interpretation as applied to sodomy statutes. First, in Cotner v.
Henry,2 9 defendant had been convicted of sodomy with his wife. The
petitioners used the Griswold decision as a defense .against application
of the state sodomy statute to married persons. While the Seventh Circuit did not declare the Indiana sodomy statute unconstitutional, it
suggested that the Indiana courts should construe the statute to exCotclude private sexual acts between consenting married persons."
ner stated that "the import of the Griswold decision is that private, consensual, marital relations are protected from regulation by the state
through the use of a criminal penalty.""1
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 2 a federal district court case, went a
step beyond Cotner. The petitioner had been arrested and charged
with sodomy upon another individual in a public restroom in Dallas.
Michael and Janet Gibson, a married couple, intervened, alleging that
the defendant did not represent the interests of married persons subThe court
ject to prosecution under the Texas sodomy statute."
ruled that under Griswold the Texas statute was void on its face 4
for unconstitutional overbreadth-the wording allowed prosecution of
persons engaging in acts within the privacy of the marriage relationship.
The above cases indicate the development of a trend that demands a broadening of the scope of activities afforded constitutional
protection under the right to privacy. Stanley v. Georgia 5 provides
a basis for extending this right beyong the marital relationship to
encompass the activities of unmarried individuals. The defendant in
Stanley was charged with having in his possession certain materials
that were deemed indecent or obscene. The materials had been discovered during a search of the defendant's home conducted under a
warrant issued for evidence of bookmaking activity. Voicing the
opinion of the Court, Justice Marshall stated:
29. 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
30. Id. at 875.
31. Id.
32. 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401
U.S. 989 (1971) (mem.).
33. TEx. PENAL CODE art. 524 (1952).
34. The significance of Buchanan is twofold. The case affirmed the constitutional protection of private consensual sexual expression by married persons and, while
the judgment was later vacated for lack of standing on appeals to the Supreme Court,
a Texas court has never since denied such protection to married persons.
35. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of a man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life ate to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
rights most valued by civilized man."3' 6
Eisenstadt v. Bairds" continued the extension of the Griswold
privacy protection to single persons. In Eisenstadt, a case which arose
from a violation of the Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, the Supreme Court held:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold
the right to privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship.
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with
a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child. 88
If Griswold can be interpreted to protect married couples from enforcement of statutes that violate their right to privacy, Eisenstadt
would seem to compel the same protection for single persons.
CONCLUSION

A new sodomy statute -for North Carolina should be enacted that
would eliminate vagueness and possible violations of the general right
to privacy. The statute should protect citizens from harm and disturbing
public conduct, yet reflect a modem tone by restraining itself to considerations within the law, leaving individual morality to individual
conscience. Such a statute might read:3 9
36. Id. at 564, quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J. Dissenting).
37. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
38. Id. at 453.
39. This statute was modeled after several recently redrafted state statutes as well
as the Model Penal Code. See CONN. GEN. STAT. AN. § 53A-65 (Supp. 1969); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, H§ 11-2 to -5 (1962); N.Y. PENAL .Aw § 130.40 (1967); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.5.
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§ 14-177. Deviate Sexual Behavior
(A) "Deviate Sexual Behavior" means
(1) any wilful act of sexual contact between any person,
consisting of contact between the penis and the anus,
the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, the
mouth and the anus, or
(2) any form of sexual conduct with an animal.
03) Deviate Sexual Behavior is committed only when:
(1) it is perpetrated with force or threat of force, or when
any person compels any other person to perform such
acts of deviate sexual behavior;
(2) it is perpetrated upon any person under the age of sixteen or any mentally incompetent person regardless of
age;
(3) it is perpetrated in any place where the conduct may
reasonably be expected to be viewed by others.
(C) Any person found guilty of committing an offense under this
statute shall be deemed guilty of a felony.
JOHN PARKER HUGGARD

Damages-Retail Prices for Damaged Goods-A Double
Recovery?
In Kaplan v. City of Winston-Salem' -the North Carolina Supreme Court recently opened the door for recovery of the retail value
of goods damaged while awaiting sale. In so doing, the court differed
with the majority of jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue and apparently overlooked several significant deficiencies in such a measure
of damages.
In 1966 the City of Winston-Salem replaced the sidewalk in
front of a toy store operated by Leon and Renee Kaplan. Pieces of
the old sidewalk dropped into a vault below the sidewalk, causing
dust and debris to permeate the store, permanently damaging many
of the toys. 2 The trial court judge instructed the jury that,
should damages be awarded, their measure would be "the difference
1. 286 N.C. 80, 209 S.E.2d 743 (1974).
2. Id. at 80-81, 209 S.E.2d at 743-45; Record at 1-2, 7, 22, 4043.

1044

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

in the reasonable market value of the merchandise before and after it
was damaged."' After first defining "reasonable market value" to be
"the amount which, the owner . . . would accept for it and . . . a
buyer. . would pay for it," the trial judge added:
[Y]ou may, in arriving at the fair market value of the items, take
into consideration the replacement cost of the items which would be
the wholesale price of the goods. You may consider but are not
bound by the retail prices of the damaged items because that
price would include profits which may or may not be realized and
4
therefore would be a speculative value.
The jury found defendant negligent and awarded damages to
plaintiffs. 5 The North Carolina Court of Appeals found the judge's
instruction erroneous and granted a new trial,0 but the Supreme Court
of North Carolina reversed, holding that the trial judge's instruction
was correct. 7 The court based its conclusion upon the principle, enun3. 286 N.C. at 82, 85, 209 S.E.2d at 745, 747; Record at 90.
4. 286 N.C. at 82-83, 85-86, 209 S.E.2d at 745, 747; Record at 90-91. The full
text of this portion of the instructions was as follows:
In the event you have reached this issue and find by the greater weight of the
evidence that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover of the defendant for damages
to the plaintiffs' merchandise, I instruct you that you will take into consideration the description of and the evidence of the damages to the merchandise
which the witnesses have given you. You may consider for the purpose of illustrating the testimony of the witnesses the pictures that you have seen of the
merchandise and you will award to the plaintiffs, if you award anything on
this issue, the amount which you find represents the difference in the reasonable market value of the merchandise before and after it was damaged. The
reasonable market value of any article being the amount which, the owner
wanting to sell but not having to, would accept for it and the amount which
a buyer who wanted the article but didn't have to have it would pay for it in
a free, fair trade in which there is no compulsion on either side. In this case,
that amount may be anywhere from one cent to forty-nine thousand nine
hundred and seven dollars and seven cents.
Now, in a case of this type involving the stock of merchandise, you may,
in arriving at the fair market value of the items, take into consideration the
replacement cost of the items which would be the wholesale price of the goods.
You may consider but are not bound by the retail prices of the damaged items
because that price would include profits which may or may not be realized and
therefore would be a speculative value. In considering the cost of the merchandise to the plaintiff, you may also consider reasonable delivery charges
and unpacking expenses involved in the goods or merchandise reaching the
stage at which they were at the time that this damage was done to it. In other
words, you will try by your verdict to put the plaintiffs in the same position
they were in prior to the damage to their merchandise insofar as money can
do so. If you reach this issue and decide the plaintiffs are entitled to recover
anything as a result of the actionable negligence of the defendant, you will
award them the amount you find will fully compensate them for their loss according to the rules I have given you with regard to damages in this kind of
a case and you will base your verdict on the evidence in the case.
Id.
5. 286 N.C. at 81, 209 S.E.2d at 745; Record at 93.
6. 21 N.C. App. 168, 172-73, 203 S.E.2d 653, 656-57 (1974).
7. 286 N.C. 80, 83, 209 S.E.2d 743, 746 (1974).
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ciated in earlier North Carolina cases, that "the measure of damages

[for injury to personal property] is the difference between the market
value . . . immediately before and immediately after the injury.""

Unfortunately, the court overlooked the ramifications of its approval
of the trial judge's instructions. Justice Sharp pointed out this oversight in her dissent, in which she stated that, when the damage is to a

stock of goods held for sale, the measure of damages should be the
wholesale value less the salvage value and that the judge's instructions

allowed the jury to measure the damages according to retail value,
which included the "profit of resale."9
Few cases in North Carolina have considered the value of a

seller's stock of goods for purposes of measuring the damages incurred as a result of injury to such goods. In Jones v. Call,'0 in
which a manufacturer was forced to cease production, the court held
that the measure of damages would be limited to loss of profits on
existing orders and could not include loss of profits on other predicted
sales. In Johnson v. Railroad Co." defendant negligently caused the
burning of plaintiff's crates and baskets that were for sale, and plain-

tiff was unable to replace the material from which these were made.
The court allowed recovery of anticipated profits only to the extent
of sales from existing contracts and disallowed, as "speculative,"

profits not represented by existing contracts."

In other cases, goods

have been denied a retail seller through breach of contract.'3

There,

profits were recoverable, but only when the retail seller was unable
to obtain replacements from other suppliers, and then only to the extent that evidence of profit from past sales' 4 or actual demand'15 was
8. id., citing Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Paul, 261 N.C. 710, 136 S.E.2d 103
(1964); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. P. & F. Motor Express, Inc., 220 N.C.
721, 18 S.E.2d 116 (1942); West Constr. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 185 N.C. 43,
116 S.E. 3 (1923).
9. 286 N.C. at 86-89, 209 S.E.2d at 747-49.
10. 96 N.C. 337, 2 S.E. 647 (1887).
11. 140 N.C. 574, 53 S.E. 362 (1906).
12. In Hart v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 144 N.C. 91, 56 S.E. 559 (1907), the
court said that the measure of damages where cord-wood was destroyed by sparks from
defendant's engine was the value of the wood in the locality where it was damaged, and
not the value of the wood standing in the woods plus the cost of cutting. However,
there was no evidence that plaintiff was in the business of selling wood.
13. Davidson Hardware Co. v. Delker Buggy Co., 167 N.C. 423, 83 S.E. 557
(1914); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Copeland, 159 N.C. 556, 75 S.E. 1002 (1912).
14. Davidson Hardware C. v. Delker Buggy Co., 167 N.C. 423, 83 S.E. 557
(1914).
15. American Steel & Wire Co. v. Copeland, 159 N.C. 556, 559, 75 S.E. 1002,
1003 (1912).
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presented. Furthermore, in cases involving injuries not caused by
damage to or withholding of the seller's stock of goods, the North
Carolina courts have moved toward allowing profits when shown to
be probable. Recovery has been allowed for profit loss that resulted
from loss of a motor vehicle, 1 6 from personal injury, 17 or from loss
of customers caused by unclean water coming through the ceiling of
a restaurant.' 8
A common thread running through most of these cases is plaintiff's inability -to mitigate damages. Consequently, the supreme court
has stated that a plaintiff may not recover damages for loss of profits
resulting from loss of use of a vehicle if he fails to show 'that he
made a reasonable but unsuccessful effort to obtain a substitute.19
Furthermore, the North Carolina courts have continued to deny recovery for lost profits that are too speculative.20
The issue of whether a retail seller should be allowed to recover
the retail value or the wholesale value for his damaged or destroyed
merchandise has been discussed in detail by courts in a small number
of jurisdictions. 2 In circumstances similar to Kaplan, these cases
have specifically declined to measure damages in terms of retail value,22 except in one case in which the goods were antiques.28 Numerous
16. Overnite Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 257 N.C. 18, 125
S.E.2d 277 (1962); Reliable Trucking Co. v. Payne, 233 N.C. 637, 65 S.E.2d
132 (1951); Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d 894
(1943); Wilson v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 207 N.C. 263, 176 S.E. 750 (1934).
17. Jernigan v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 12 N.C. App. 241,182 S.E.2d 847
(1971).
18. Steffan v. Meiselman, 223 N.C. 154, 25 S.E.2d 626 (1943).
19. Roberts v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 273 N.C. 600, 607-08, 160 S.E.2d 712,
718 (1968).
20. Meares v. Nixon Constr. Co., 7 N.C. App. 614, 173 S.E.2d 593 (1970); Bradley v. Texaco, Inc., 7 N.C. App. 300, 172 S.E.2d 87 (1970).
21. See cases cited note 22 infra. One court has stated, "There are comparatively
few cases in other states determinative of this question." Chicago Title & Trust Co.
v. W.T. Grant Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 483, 486, 275 N.E.2d 670, 673 (1971).
22. Whaley v. Crutchfield, 226 Ark. 921, 294 S.W.2d 775 (1956); Skaggs Drug
Centers, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 407 P.2d 695 (1965); Sears v. Lydon,
5 Idaho 358, 49 P. 122 (1897); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. W.T. Grant Co., 2 Ill.
App. 3d 483, 27.5 N.E.2d 670 (1971); Lubin v. City of Iowa City, 257 Iowa 383, 131
N.W.2d 765 (1964); International Harvester Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 186 Iowa
86, 172 N.W. 471 (1919); Millison v. Ades of Lexington, Inc., 262 Md. 319, 277 A.2d
579 (1971); Dubiner's Bootery, Inc. v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 10 App. Div.
2d 923, 200 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1960) (per curiam); accord Wehle v. Haviland, 69 N.Y.
448 (1877) (Where goods wrongfully taken). See also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Crail, 281
U.S. 57 (1930) (where coal dealer sued rail carrier for shortage in coal shipment).
23. Penrose v. Arrow Constr. Co., 15 Misc. 2d 512, 182 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct.
1958).
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commentators have stated that, generally, retailers are not allowed to

recover the retail value of damaged goods.24
Unfortunately, the precedential value of Kaplan is limited because
of the ambiguous nature of the trial judge's instructions.

The in-

structions did not require the jury to use the retail value, and indeed
the jury was told that they were not bound by -the retail value.

How-

ever, the instructions did seem earlier to define market value in terms
of the retail value. 25 Given this ambiguity, it is not certain whether
the supreme court approved (1) setting the retail value as the correct
measure of damages, (2) leaving the method of measuring damages
solely to the jury's discretion, or (3) suggesting, but not requiring,
the use of the retail value as a possible measure of damages. This
last appears to be the best interpretation of Kaplan. There are sev-

eral problems with this result.
First of all, the jury arguably should have more explicit directions about the proper method of measuring damages.2 6

Yet the

court's opinion did not clearly distinguish between wholesale and retail values, thus leaving to the State's trial judges and juries the task

of attempting to discern which measurement is to be preferred.

In

24. 1 J. BoNBIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 293 (1937); D. Dons, HANDBOOK ON THE Lkw oFoREmEDmS § 5.10, at 376 (1973); C. McConMfc, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 44, at 168 (1935); 1 T. SEDGwICK, A TREATISE ON Tim MEASURE OF DAAGES § 248a, at 500-01 (9th ed. 1912); 4 J. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON
THE LAw OF DAMAGES § 1098, at 4178-79 (4th ed. 1916).
25. See text accompanying note 4 supra. The difference between the retail price
and the salvage value was $48,349.07. The plaintiffs also claimed a loss of profits of
$900.00 and cleaning and repairing costs of $658.00, totaling $49,907.07, the specifically
allowed maximum amount in the judge's instructions. 286 N.C. at 81-82, 209 S.E.2d
at 744-45; Record at 3, 10, 11, 90. The difference between the wholesale price and
the salvage value was $21,676.00 (if the wholesale price was 60% of the retail price).
286 N.C. at 81, 88, 209 S.E.2d at 744-45, 749. The jury awarded only $21,752.00. Id.
at 81, 209 S.E.2d at 745; Record at 93. Thus the jury may have used the wholesale
prices in this case. However, the reduction in damages may be due to the facts that
some toys were made of metal, Record at 32, some toys were wrapped in cellophane,
id. at 35-36, some toys were in sealed boxes, id. at 36-37, defendant offered evidence
that there was very little dust on the goods, id. at 72, identical merchandise was on sale
at plaintiff's other two stores, id. at 38-39, and defendant offered evidence that some
merchandise was returned to stock at the regular price, id. at 71.
26. Generally, the court has said that determination of damages is in the province
of the jury. Williams v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C. 514, 519, 114 S.E.2d 340,
343 (1960); Lowe v. Hall, 227 N.C. 541, 546, 42 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1947). However,
some guidelines are apparently necessary since it is error for the judge to fail to instruct
the jury as to the rule for measuring damages. Godwin v. Vinson, 254 N.C. 582, 58687, 119 S.E.2d 616, 619-20 (1961); Adams v. Beaty Serv. Co., 237 N.C. 136, 142-43,
74 S.E.2d 332, 337 (1953). But cf. Crouse v. Vernon, 232 N.C. 24, 34-35, 59 S.E.2d
185, 192 (1950) (It is not error for the judge to instruct the jury in terms of "market
value," without explaining its meaning, unless specifically requested to do so.).
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the course of its opinion, the court cited only three cases, all for the
proposition that the measure of damages is the difference in market
value before and after the injury.27 The court's failure to explain
"which market" should have been used oversimplified the issue and
left a nagging ambiguity unanswered.
To the extent that the court's holding allows measurement of
damages by the retail value, it is subject to two major criticisms.
First, to award retail value assumes that all of the goods could be
sold at retail without additional costs. As the New York Court of
Appeals noted:
The retail value . . . supposes no damage to or depreciation in

the value of the goods, and is dependent upon the contingency of
finding purchasers . . .within a reasonable time, the sale of the

entire stock without the loss by unsaleable remnants, and the closing out of a stock of goods as none28ever was, or ever will be closed
out, by sales at retail at full prices.
Even if all goods could be sold at retail price, the seller would normally have such expenses as rent and labor during the time necessary to sell the goods.29 Thus, the retail value measure of damages
still awards gross rather than net profits, unless the overhead costs
are subtracted.80 It can be argued that the court, by allowing the
jury to award the difference in retail value before and after the damage, dispensed with the necessity of proving profits. It is questionable
whether any modem tendency to award profits l should be so extended. Some evidence that the goods would be actually sold should
be required. 2 Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the mere existence of
marked prices guarantees that all the goods will be sold at those
27. 286 N.C. at 83, 209 S.E.2d at 746. In fact, one of the cases cited, Carolina
Power & Light Co. v. Paul, 261 N.C. 710, 136 S.E.2d 103 (1964), found the general
market value rule inapplicable and held that the measure of damages for damage to a
power pole to be the cost of replacement.
28. Wehle v. Haviland, 69 N.Y. 448, 451 (1877); accord, Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. W.T. Grant Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 483, 486, 275 N.E.2d 670, 672-73 (1971) ("No
consideration is given to damage to the merchandise that might be caused by customers

of the store, shoplifting, obsolescence, or a mark down on merchandise that the store
might be unable to sell at the regular retail price.").
29. Millison v. Ades of Lexington, Inc., 262 Md. 319, 326-27, 277 A.2d 579, 58384 (1971).
30. For what period of time should the overhead costs be measured when the turnover rate is unknown?
31. Reliable Trucking Co. v. Payne, 233 N.C. 637, 639, 65 S.E.2d 132, 133
(1951); D. DOBBS, supra note 24, § 3.3, at 154-55.

32. See cases cited note 13 supra; D. DOBBS, supra note 24, § 3.3, at 154; C. Mc-

CoRMCK, supra note 24, § 44, at 168 n.27.
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prices.33 In Kaplan the toy store had been operated for fifteen years,'
ample time in which to establish the rate of inventory turnover, 'but no
such evidence was required.

In fact, no evidence specifically related

to lost profits was offered,35 although the fact that the plaintiffs had
made a separate claim for lost profits

6

indicates that they them-

selves considered that profits should be treated separately from the
87

value of the goods.

A more fundamental flaw in using the difference in the retail
value as the measure of damages is that such measurement dispenses
with the doctrine of avoidable consequences.

Presumably, absent

contrary evidence, a seller could replace the damaged goods and make
the same profit from the replacements as from the original goods. 8

If the seller promptly replaced the goods, awarding him the retail value
of the damaged goods would permit him to receive a windfall double
profit.89 On the other hand, assuming a fixed number of customers,
the seller's purchase of replacement goods may decrease the number
of customers willing to buy the damaged goods. Moreover, if he
tries to salvage -the damaged goods, he may incur additional storage
costs, which might well be prohibitive. Nevertheless, before the plaintiff recovers the difference in retail value, he should at least be required to show either his inability to replace the goods promptly or
the unreasonableness, for the reasons just mentioned, of prompt re40
placement.
33. This conclusion does not seem changed because the goods were marked at fair
trade prices in Kaplan. Record at 34. However, the argument in International Harvester Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 186 Iowa 86, 119, 172 N.W. 471, 484 (1919),
that the prices were fixed by the seller, and so could be any amount however unreasonable, is not present in Kaplan.
34. Record at 17.
35. 286 N.C. at 85, 209 S.E.2d at 747.
36. Id. at 81, 209 S.E.2d at 745; Record at 3.
37. Of course, the supreme court's decision does have the advantage of allowing
a convenient measure of damages that the jury can use if it feels future sales likely.
Future sales may have been likely in Kaplan, as the damage (to toys) came at the beginning of the Christmas buying season, according to the complaint. Record at 3.
38. 1 J. BoNBxGi-rr, supra note 24, at 294; cf. D. DOBBS, supra note 24, § 5.11,
at 388.
39. The opportunity for a double profit is much more realistic in a case such as
Kaplan than in a situation where a customer breaks one article in a store (and is often
requested to pay the retail price).
40. Generally, in North Carolina, the plaintiff must show his inability to replace
the item(s) of which he is deprived before recovering loss of profits, although it is impossible to say that this is a universal requirement. See Roberts v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 273 N.C. 600, 607-08, 160 S.E.2d 712, 718 (1968); Reliable Trucking Co.
v. Payne, 233 N.C. 637, 638, 65 S.E.2d 132, 132 (1951); Davidson Hardware Co. v.
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To measure damages by the wholesale value, as advocated by
the dissent in Kaplan, also creates problems, but these do not appear
insurmountable. First, given a fluctuating wholesale market, the accuracy of the wholesale value used as a measure of damages will be
uncertain.41 Since the wholesale value may increase before the plaintiff has an opportunity to replace damaged merchandise, the measure of damages should 'be the wholesale value at the time of replacement, rather than the wholesale value immediately before the damage as suggested by the dissent in Kaplan.4 2 Secondly, if, as one wellknown case held, 48 -the measure of damages is the wholesale value before damage less the wholesale market value after damage, there is a
problem in discovering the wholesale value of a damaged article."
Thus, reducing the award by the price at which the damaged articles
could actually be sold to retail customers 45 seems the more workable
rule. Thirdly, measurement by wholesale costs should not preclude
additional recovery for transportation costs in bringing the replacement goods to the store, 46 and extra labor costs occasioned by the
entire event.47 Fourthly, even recovery of the wholesale cost by the
merchant may overcompensate him, since he might not have sold
some, or any, of the goods.4 8 Finally, rejection of the retail value as
a measure of damages should not necessarily exclude evidence of the
retail value since the average markup might be subtracted therefrom
to determine the wholesale value.49 Likewise, the amount of damages might be subtracted to determine -thesalvage value. 0
Delker Buggy Co., 167 N.C. 423, 426, 83 S.E. 557, 559 (1914); Johnson v. Railroad
Co., 140 N.C. 574, 575, 53 S.E. 362, 362-63 (1906).
41. See Wehle v. Haviland, 69 N.Y. 448, 450 (1877).
42. The New York Court of Appeals has said, "The plaintiff was entitled to recover . . . the price at which [the goods] could be replaced for money in the market ... ." Id.
43. Whaley v. Crutchfield, 226 Ark. 921, 927, 294 S.W.2d 775, 779 (1956).
44. Id. at 928, 294 S.W.2d at 780 (Ward, J., dissenting).
45. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 10-11, 407 P.2d
695, 699-700 (1965).
46. Sears v. Lydon, 5 Idaho 358, 364, 49 P. 122, 123 (1897); Millison v. Ades
of Lexington, Inc., 262 Md. 319, 327, 277 A.2d 579, 584 (1971).
47. Millison v. Ades of Lexington, Inc., 262 Md. 319, 327, 277 A.2d 579, 584
(1971). See also Wehle v. Haviland, 69 N.Y. 448, 451 (1877), where the court allowed
interest on the wholesale value to "tak[e] the place of the uncertain and indefinite
profits which the plaintiff might have made."
48. D. DOBBS, supra note 24, § 5.10, at 376.
49. See Lubin v. City of Iowa City, 257 Iowa 383, 394, 131 N.W.2d 765, 772
(1964),
50. See Kaplan v. City of Winston-Salem, 21 N.C. App. 168, 173, 203 S.E.2d 653,

657 (1974).
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In conclusion, the decision in Kaplan in effect will permit juries
to award the retail seller damages based upon gross profits, without

proof of likely net profits, overhead expenses actually paid, or inability to replace the goods promptly. Therefore, a more equitable approach would involve awarding damages based upon wholesale cost,

less salvage value, plus "demonstrably proven
period necessary to replace the

goods,52

51

net profits for the

plus overhead costs which

necessarily continued after the damage,53 plus any other necessarily
incurred costs. 54 Such a measurement might result in awarding retail

prices on many goods, plus some other costs, but it would place the
burden of proving sales figures, demand, and replacement data on
the retail seller, who is more likely to know them. For the present,

however, Kaplan will allow juries to guess at these factors and will
make it possible for a retail seller to recover an unjustified windfall
profit.
DURANT M. GLOVER

Disability Insurance-Too Disabled to Come Within the Coverage
of One's Policy
In Duke v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.' the Supreme Court of
North Carolina construed a physician's-care clause in a disability

insurance policy.

Rather than looking behind the provision to its

purpose, the court read the clause literally and joined a small minor-

ity of jurisdictions that would deny recovery to a claimant whose disability has stabilized to the point of requiring no further medical care.
Plaintiff Raymond L. Duke sued the Mutual Life Insurance Com51. Id. at 173, 203 S.E.2d at 656.
52. Cf. Cranston Print Works Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 291 F.2d 638 (4th Cir.
1961), a case from North Carolina, in which a cloth printing and dyeing plant was damaged by an explosion of gas. The court said it would not have been error to admit evidence of actual past production compared to actual production from the time of damage
to the time of repair as a basis for recovering lost profits.
53. Of course, continuing overhead costs attributable to undamaged goods should
not be recovered.
54. In Dubiner's Bootery, Inc. v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 10 App. Div.
2d 923, 200 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1960) (per curiam), the court held the measure of damages
to be "replacement cost and any damages actually sustained by reason of the absence
of the articles while in the process of replacement." Id. at 923, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
1. 286 N.C. 244, 210 S.E.2d 187 (1974).
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pany of New York (MONY) on a disability insurance policy he procured in 1961. The policy provided for payments of 400 dollars
monthly for twenty-four months if the insured became totally disabled
before reaching age sixty-five and a continuation of payments provided, among other things, that "'(a) such disability requires the Insured to be under the regular care and attendance of a legally qualified physician other than himself.' "I
In response to questions presented to it by the trial court, the
jury found that plaintiff was totally disabled and within the terms of
the policy except that his disability did not require him to remain under
a physician's care after April 12, 1970, the last date on which MONY
had made a payment on the policy to Duke. The trial judge entered
judgment for MONY and Duke appealed. 3 The North Carolina
Court of Appeals unanimously reversed and required a new trial. Noting that "the courts are reluctant to require the performance of futile
acts, ' 4 Judge Baley declined to follow literally the clause calling for
care of a physician when such care would be useless.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, ,granted certiorari
and reinstated the trial judge's verdict for MONY. The opinion of
Justice Higgins rested on two grounds. First, the wording of the policy
was in no way ambiguous; thus, the medical-care term had to be enforced as it was written. Secondly, there was a "lack of need" since
Duke no longer required "the regular care and attendance by his doctor."5
Clauses in disability policies requiring medical care are standard, and the purposes for their inclusion are several--the prevention
of fraudulent claims, the establishment of the good faith of the claimant, and the requirement that the claimant minimize his damages.
2. Id. at 245, 210 S.E.2d at 188.
3. The trial was held in Wake County Superior Court, Judge Hobgood presiding.
Id. at 244-45, 210 S.E.2d at 187.
4. 22 N.C. App. 392, 397, 206 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1974).
5. 286 N.C. at 247, 210 S.E.2d at 189.
6. S. IiuEBN &K. BLACK, LiFB INsuRANCE 260 (7th ed. 1969). Frequently the
clauses require a particular number of doctor visits per week or month. E.g., 15 G.
Couch, CYCLOPEDrA oF INsuRANcE LAw § 53:163 (2d ed. 1966). Whatever particular
form the clause might take, "[t]he requirement of the attendance of a physician under
a health and accident policy has been generally held to be a valid and enforceable provision . . . ." Knipmeyer, Requirements of Confinement and Medical Care Under
Health and Accident Policies, 24 INS. CoUNsEL J. 149, 152 (1957), updated in 33 INS.
COUNsEL J. 405 (1966).
7. See, e.g., Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 22 N.C. App. 392, 397, 206 S.E.2d
796, 799, rev'd, 286 N.C. 244," 210 S.E.2d 187 (1974); 15 G. CoucH, supra note 6, §
53:155, at 156; Knipmeyer, supra note 6.
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The jurisdictions are not uniform in their interpretation of the clauses.8
The minority have construed the terms literally, reasoning that an unambiguous term should be read literally,9 that the term limits coverage, 10 and that there is no reason for recovery since there are no longer
medical expenses to pay. 1 In contrast, the majority of jurisdictions base
a more liberal construction on the view that the term serves merely an
evidentiary purpose 2 and strict enforcement would frequently require
the performance of useless acts.' 8
The first argument of the literal constructionist-the lack of
ambiguity-is shortsighted. When a court considers the purpose behind the provision, the term is ambiguous about when and how it
should be applied. "[T]his provision [physician's-care] is to guard
against fraudulent claims and the provision should be construed from
the point of view of such a purpose." 4 The Idaho Supreme Court,
considering the argument of no ambiguity, reasoned as follows:
,It is urged by appellant that the contract of insurance is unambiguous and that there is no room for interpretation; that being
unambiguous it will be construed as any other contract. This
court has so held. ..

. On the other hand, this court has also com-

mitted itself to the rule with reference to insurance policies that in
instances where a clause therein is susceptible to more than one
construction the one most favorable to insured will be adopted,
and such contracts will be construed in view of their general objects and conditions prescribed by the insurer rather than based
upon a strict and technical interpretation.' 5
8. See, e.g., Annot., 84 A.LR.2d 375 (1962). Although several states have conflicting cases so that exact figures are difficult to ascertain, the proportion of liberal to
literal interpretation jurisdictions is about two to one.
9. E.g., United Am. Ins. Co. v. Selby, 161 Tex. 162, 33,9 S.W.2d 160 (1960).
10. Mills v. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co., 127 W. Va. 400, 33 S.E.2d 90 (1945).
11. Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 N.C. 244, 210 S.E.2d 187 (1974.).
12. E.g., Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho 524, 275 P.2d 969
(1954).
13. E.g., Brown v. Continental Cas. Co., 209 Kan. 632, 498 P.2d 26 (1972); Music
v. United Ins. Co., 59 Wash. 2d 765, 370 P.2d 603 (1962). Duke did not require the
doing of a useless act. The clause provided that the "'disability require . . . regular
care and attendance of a ... physician . . . ."' 286 N.C. at 245, 210 S.E.2d at 188.
Thus the clause completely foreclosed recovery by Duke. However, some policies are
worded such that, if a court followed the decision in Duke, there would be a requirement
of useless doctor visits in order to recover under the policy. See, e.g., Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho 524, 275 P.2d 969 (1954), in which the clause read
as follows: "'Provided that benefits . . . shall not be paid in excess of the time the
Insured is under the regular attendance of a. . . physician or surgeon ...
Id. at
528, 275 P.2d at 971.
14. Knipmeyer, supranote 6, at 152 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
15. Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho 524, 532, 275 P.2d 969,
973 (1954).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the rule followed by Idaho of construing insurance policies against the insurer, 10
but in Duke the court's failure to look at the purpose precluded recognition of the ambiguity in the clause. In Evans v. TransportationInsurance Co.17 the court did recognize an ambiguity in an analogous
situation. Evans involved a confinement clause of a disability policy.
Rather than remaining in his home all the time as a literal reading
of the clause required, the claimant went to the post office, drove
to a barber, and was in other ways able to make limited trips out of
his house. The supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Sharp,
adopted a liberal reading of the clause and allowed recovery.

The

court held that the clause should be treated "as descriptive of the extent of the illness or injury rather than as a limitation upon insured's
conduct." 8
The second argument for a literal reading of the physician's-care
clause, that it limits coverage and therefore should be construed
strictly, begs the question of interpretation. By making -the conclusory statement that the clause limits coverage, the courts completely
ignore any inquiry into the purpose of the clause.19
Duke offered the third justification for a literal reading of a
physician's-care clause. Once medical expenses are no longer necessary, there is a "lack of need" for recovery on the policy. 20 The court
reasoned that "[¢]he purpose of the coverage was to reimburse the in16. E.g., Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 N.C. 244, 247, 210 S.E.2d 187, 189
(1974); Note, The Insurance Contract and Policy in General as it Relates to North
Carolina, 3 N.C. CENT. LJ. 259, 265-66 (1972).
17. 269 N.C. 271, 152 S.E.2d 82 (1967).
18. Id. at 274, 152 S.E.2d at 84. But see Walsh v. United Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 634,
144 S.E.2d 817 (1965), in which recovery was denied because the policy itself contained
an explicit definition of "confinement." The liberal interpretation of confinement
clauses is the overwhelming majority view. See, e.g., J. APPLEMAN &J. APPLEMAN, IA
INSURANcE LAw mqD PRACTCE § 652 (1965); 15 G. CoucH, supra note 6, §§ 53:14142.
19. In this respect this argument suffers from the same faults as the argument that
the clause is not ambiguous. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra. The justification given by the minority jurisdictions for these two arguments is that since the two
parties have reached an agreement and their intent is embodied in the terms of that
agreement, there is no need to look behind the language of the contract. See, e.g., Duke
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 N.C. 244, 247, 210 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1974). This justification ignores the unequal bargaining positions of the parties to an insurance policy. See,
e.g., Barker v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 397, 85 S.E.2d 305 (1955), discussing the
unlikelihood of an applicant having anything to do with drawing up a fire insurance
policy.
20. 286 N.C. at 247, 210 S.E.2d at 189. Duke apparently is the only case to have
made this argument.
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sured to the extent of the medical expenses incurred in the course
of the regular care and attendance by his doctor.""1 The propriety
of this statement is particularly difficult to understand since the claimant was suing to collect on a disability policy, not a health or medical
expenses policy. While the purpose of the latter is to cover the medical expenses, a disability policy has as its purpose income protection,
i.e. a person takes out a disability policy so that if he ever becomes
disabled, he will not lose all sources of income.22 Thus, to deny
Duke recovery on his disability policy claim, not because of a lack of
a disability but because of a lack of medical expenses, seems to be
judicial interference into the very purpose of disability insurance.
The reasoning of the majority of jurisdictions is sounder. Compliance with the clause serves merely as evidence of disability.23 Since
the basic purposes of -the clause relate to prevention of fraudulent or
bad faith claims,24 once an actual disability is proved and good faith
by the claimant is established, the clause has no function. 25 If a refusal to minimize damages is alleged by the insurance company, the
clause may again be used, but only as evidence of the claimant's bad
faith and not necessarily as an absolute bar.2
The argument of the majority is strongest in fact situations like
that presented in Duke.27 When the claimant has a disability that
21. Id.

22. See generally Glenn v. Gate City Life Ins. Co., 220 N.C. 672, 18 S.E.2d 113
(1942).
23. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
24. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
25. See Knipmeyer, supra note 6.

26. Cf. Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 22 N.C. App. 392, 206 S.E.2d 796, rev'd,
286 N.C. 244, 210 S.E.2d 187 (1974).
27. Most courts that have adopted the literal interpretation rule have done so in
cases in which the dispute was over matters such as the definition of a physician or
a definite schedule of visits. E.g., Bruzas v. Peerless Cas. Co., 111 Me. 308, 89 A. 199
(1913) (court required literal compliance with a clause requiring a physician's visit at
least once every seven days); United Am. Ins. Co. v. Selby, 161 Tex. 162, 338 S.W.2d
160 (1960) (court strictly construed the clause not to include a naturopath); Isaacson
v. Wisconsin Cas. Ass'n, 187 Wis. 25, 203 N.W. 918 (1925) (court's literal interpretation excluded a chiropractor from the clause). But in a fact situation similar to Duke,
the case seems so overwhelming to allow recovery that one writer claimed "courts invariably hold that such requirement will not be permitted to defeat recovery when the evidence shows that regular medical care will not improve the insured's condition." Siebert, The Insured Event: Disability Insurance, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 382, 400 (footnote

omitted). Language from several cases makes this statement of doubtful validity even
in 1964. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Cohen, 194 F.2d 232 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952); Lustenberger v. Boston Cas. Co., 300 Mass. 130, 14
N.E.2d 148 (1938). But see Shaw v. Commercial Ins. Co., 359 Mass. 601, 270 N.E.2d
817 (1971) (seriously questioning Lustenberger'scontinuing validity in Massachusetts).
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doctors say is stable and cannot be helped by further medical care,
the purposes of the clause are satisfied. The doctors' statements that
medical care cannot improve the claimant's condition verify that neither a fraudulent claim nor bad faith is involved. A literal reading
of the clause would in many cases advocate waste of the physician's
and claimant's time and the claimant's money28 by requiring useless
visits in order to continue eligibility under the policy. 20 'Furthermore,
minimization of damages would not be an issue because of the stability
of the claimant's condition.
Due to a failure to consider the purpose of the clause, the North
Carolina Supreme Court followed the minority of jurisdictions in giving a literal reading to the physician's-care clause in Duke. In so doing, the court defeated an important purpose of disability policies.3 0
Contrary -to the expectations of the insured,31 Duke held that one
who is so disabled that medical care can no longer help him is beyond the limits of his policy's coverage.
A. W.

TuRNER, JR.

28. One might argue that if the claimant recovers on the policy he is not wasting
his money because he can use the proceeds of the policy to pay for the useless doctor
visits. However, the proceeds of a disability policy are not intended to cover medical
bills but are a substitute income. Thus to spend those proceeds on useless doctor visits
would be the same as spending one's income in that manner. See text accompanying
notes 20-22 supra.
29. See note 14 supra. The Kansas Supreme Court once answered the question
of whether a physician's-care clause required useless doctor visits with another question:
"Suppose a policyholder is totally and permanently disabled through the loss of sight
in both eyes--would any court require the weekly attention of a physician in order to
secure continuing benefits provided by the policy?" Hodgson v. Mutual Benefit Health
& Accident Ass'n, 153 Kan. 511, 518, 112 P.2d 121, 126 (1941).
30. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Springston, 283 P.2d 819 (Okla.
1955); text accompanying note 22 supra.
31. See R. KEnTON, BAsic Txr oN INSuRANCE LAW § 6.3 (1971). Professor
Keeton argues that since insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, the following principle should be followed: 'The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations." Id. at 351. Keeton says "this principle points in the direction insurance law
appears to be moving." Id.
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Domestic Relations-The Ineffective Use of Blood-Grouping
Tests in North Carolina
In State v. Camp1 the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld defendant's conviction for refusing to support an illegitimate child who
could not possibly have been the defendant's offspring. The court
reached its conclusion by holding that the results of blood-grouping
tests, which showed that the defendant could not have fathered the
child, were entitled to no more weight than other evidence offered on
the issue of paternity. By refusing to follow the court of appeals in
taking judicial notice of a widely accepted scientific principle, the court
displayed a narrow perception of the advances in blood-grouping technology made during the past twenty-five years.
In Camp the State charged defendant with willful neglect and refusal to support his minor illegitimate child. 2 The State's case rested
entirely on the testimony of the complaining witness, the mother, Mary
Hamnes. She testified that she was unmarried and the mother of Timothy Hames who was born on July 12, 1973, a full-term baby. She
further testified that in October 1972 she became pregnant and that
she had sexual intercourse with the defendant a number of times in
October and November and with no one else. Before the trial, defendant moved for a blood-grouping test pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes section 8-50.13 to determine whether or not he could possibly be the biological father of the child. Consequently, blood tests
involving defendant, mother and child were conducted on three separate days, and revealed that both the mother and the defendant were
1. 286 N.C. 148, 209 S.E.2d 754 (1974).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-2 (1966). This section specifies that one who willfully
neglects or who refuses to support and maintain his or her illegitimate child shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
3. Id. § 8-50.1 (1969), provides:
Competency of evidence of blood tests-In the trial of any criminal
action or proceedings in any court in which the question of paternity arises,
regardless of any presumptions with respect to paternity, the court before
whom the matter may be brought, upon motion of the defendant, shall direct
and order that the defendant, the mother and the child shall submit to a blood
grouping test. . . . The results of such blood grouping tests shall be admitted
in evidence when offered by a duly licensed practicing physician or other qualified person. Such evidence shall be competent to rebut any presumptions of
paternity.
In the trial of any civil action, the court before whom the matter may be
brought, upon motion of either party, shall direct and order that the defendant,
the plaintiff, the mother and the child shall submit to a blood grouping test
. The results of such blood grouping tests shall be admitted in evidence
when offered by a duly licensed practicing physician or other duly qualified
person.
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of blood-group 0, while the child was of blood-group A. The medical
expert who performed the tests testified that from his study of medicine
he had an opinion that defendant could not be the father of the child
because a male and female with group 0 blood cannot produce an infant with group A blood. The trial judge charged the jury that according to North Carolina law blood-grouping tests are not conclusive on
the issue of paternity, and that they should consider the test results with
all the other evidence in reaching a decision. The jury found the defendant guilty of refusing to support his illegitimate child. 4 The court
of appeals found error in the instruction given by the trial judge and
ordered a new trial.5 The court ordered the trial judge, in formulating
his instructions, to take judicial notice that a man and woman of bloodgroup 0 cannot have a child of group A. After recognizing the laws
of heredity, the court of appeals would then require the trial judge to
instruct the jury that, if they believed the testimony of the Doctor and
that the tests were properly administered, it would be their duty to return a verdict of not guilty. The supreme court reversed, holding that
the legislature had not given the test results conclusive weight and thus,
they should be considered on a par with all other testimony.
The A-B-0 blood-grouping test was discovered in 1901 by Landsteiner.7 By examining an individual's red blood cells, the test is used
to determine whether either or both of two substances known as agglutinogen A and agglutinogen B 'are present. An individual's bloodgroup is identified by the presence or absence of these two substances.
If both substances are present, the individual's blood is classified as
4. According to the facts as recited by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, defendant "was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, suspended on condition that he pay
$15.00 per week for the support of the child, plus $620.00 for expenses already incurred." State v. Camp, 22 N.C. App. 109, 110, 205- S.E.2d 800, 801 (1974). Since
N.C. GEN. Si-AT. § 49-2 (1966) defines "child" aa one under the age of eighteen, the
defendant's total liability is equal to approximately $14,660.
5. 22 N.C. App. 109, 205 S.E.2d 800 (1974).
6. 286 N.C. 148, 209 S.E.2d 754 (1974) (two judges dissented).
7. Comment, The Use of Blood Grouping Tests in Disputed ParentageProceedings-A Scientific Basis for Discussion, 50 Micr. L. Rnv. 582, 583 (1952). There are
more complex tests now available for testing for blood groups, however the basic A-B-O
test is reliable for proof of nonpaternity in this case. For a more complete discussion
of blood-grouping tests see S. SCHAurKN, Disptrram PA'r
m PRoCEMINoS (3d ed.
1953); Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HAI. L.
Rav. 466 (1958); Whitlatch & Marsters, Contributionsof Blood Tests in 734 Disputed
Paternity Cases: Acceptance by the Law of Blood Tests as Scientific Evidence, 14 W.
Ras. L. Rv. 115 (1962); Comment, California'sConclusive Presumption of Legitimacy,
35 S. CAL. L R v. 437 (1962); California's Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. Ray. 754 (1968); Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d
1000 (1956); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 939 (1946).
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group AB; if neither is present, the blood is classified as group 0. If
only agglutinogen A is present or if only agglutinogen B is present the
blood is classified as group A or B respectively.8
Blood-group testing has proved to be a valuable tool in determining
the identity of a child's parents. In this respect medical experts agree
that an individual's blood-group can be determined at birth, that it remains the same throughout his lifetime, unaffected by age, disease, or
medication, and more importantly, that a child inherits his blood group
from his parents." Furthermore, as explained by Menders laws of genetics, an individual cannot possess a blood-group factor which is absent in both of his true parents. Therefore, when the blood types of
the mother and child are known, medical experts can determine scientifically what the blood type of the father may be and what it cannot
be. 10
In addition to their scientific reliability as proof of non-paternity,
the use of blood-grouping tests in paternity suits is especially valuable
since contradictory testimony is unusually self-serving." As an Ohio
court in State ex rel. Steiger v. Gray observed:
The alleged intercourse between the woman and the putative father
is almost always carried on clandestinely and secretly. Seldom if
ever is there any reliable corroborating eyewitness testimony. Circumstantial evidence must be relied upon to a great extent. In
other words, such testimony in such cases may be as reliable or
as unreliable as the persons giving it.12

The dubious value of the mother's testimony in paternity suits has been
confirmed by two studies demonstrating that when the defendant's non8. Note, Blood-Grouping Tests and the Presumption of Legitimacy, 50 N.C.L.
See also C. McConmucr, HANDBoo OF THM LAw OF EVIDENCE
§ 211 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); 1 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 165b (3d ed. 1940).
9. Note, 50 N.C.L. Ray., supra note 8, at 165.
10. Comment, Blood Grouping Test Results: Evidential Fact or Conclusions of
Law?, 23 WAsH. & LEE L REv. 411, 416 (1966) (Medical experts agree that the test
results are conclusive only in excluding the putative father). The medical profession
apparently admits that, theoretically due to possible mutation of the genes, two parents
with type 0 blood might produce a child with type A blood in one out of 50,000 to
100,000 cases. Comment, Conclusiveness of Blood Tests in Paternity Suits, 22 MD. L.
REV. 333 (1962).
11. See, State ex rel. Steiger v. Gray, 3 Ohio Op. 2d 394, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 393,
145 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Juv. Ct. Cuyahoga County 1957). The fact that the medical expert testifying in the case is a disinterested third person should make his testimony more
credible than that of the parties. Comment, 23 WAsH. & Lmn L Rnv., supra note 10,
at 420-21.
12. 3 Ohio Op. 2d 394, 397, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 393, 397, 145 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Juv.
Ct. Cuyahoga County 1957). See also Jordon v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 355, 69 A.2d 670,
672 (1949).

REv. 163, 165 (1971).
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paternity is established by blood-grouping tests, the mother usually admits that the man charged was not the only one who could have been
the father.' 8
Despite the evidentiary value of blood-grouping tests, until recently courts have been reluctant to admit them as evidence and, once
admitted, to give them conclusive weight. Assumption of risk by a
putative father 1 4 and the State's concern that the child will be its
charge 15 are sometimes given or assumed as possible explanations for
courts' refusals to hear or give conclusive weight to the test evidence.'
However, when the issue of paternity does not involve the
17
risk of bastardization, these reasons are not substantial.
In the last twenty years state legislatures have increasingly responded to the courts' lethargy with statutes according conclusive
13. S. SCHATmKN, supra note 7; Whitlatch & Marsters, supra note 7.
14. C. McCoRMcK, supra note 8,§ 211, at 521-22 (possible explanation for a
jury's disregarding blood-grouping tests when the court does not instruct the jury to give
test results conclusive weight).
15. Britt, Blood Grouping Tests and the Law: The Problem of "CulturalLag", 21
Mn-N. L. RnV. 671, 681 (1937), where Britt comments on the court's decision in Com
monwealth v. Morris, 22 Pa. D. & C. 111, 113 (Q.S. Luzerne County 1934): "Since
the court gave the shop-worn argument that proper authority must come from the legis.
lature, it apparently preferred to let the defendant bear the burden of supporting the
child, regardless of the fact that he might be innocent, rather than to transfer liability
for the child's support to the poor district or some charitable agency." In his article,
Britt offers several reasons for the courts' reluctance to hear and give conclusive weight
to blood-grouping tests, which he labels the courts' "cultural lag." Britt, supra at 696702.
16. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court did not articulate any policy basis
for its decision not to give conclusive weight to blood-grouping tests in Camp, North
Carolina courts and the North Carolina legislature have attempted to place support responsibilities for illegitimate children on the natural parents when they are known. The
present statute, N.C. GEN. S-rAT. § 49-2 (1966), is a criminal statute designed to require
support of an illegitimate child by the natural father. Its predecessors are ch. 15 § 1,
[1851] N.C. Sess. Laws 44, N.C. Code ch. 5 § 32 (1883), and N.C. Rev. Stat. ch. 12
§§ 1, 4 (1837). Chapter 15, section 1 of the 1851 North Carolina Sessions Laws provided that testimony by the mother of the illegitimate child shall be presumptive evidence against the person accused of being the father. Prior to this statute the law of
North Carolina as later reflected in the N.C. Code of 1883 provided that when a single
woman "big with child" was brought to the attention of a justice of the peace in the
county in which the woman resides, she would be brought to him to be examined upon
oath respecting the father; if she refused to name the father, "she shall pay a fine of
five dollars, and give a bond payable to the state, with sufficient surety, to keep such
child or children from being chargeable to the county, otherwise she shall be committed
to prison until she shall declare the same [the father], or pay the fine aforesaid and
give such bond.. " N.C. Code ch. 5 § 32 (1883). This law is almost verbatim N.C.
Rev. Stat. ch. 12 §§ 1, 4 (1837). For a discussion of ch. 15 § 1, [1851] N.C. Sess.
Laws 44 see 2 STANsBURY's NoaR CAROLINA EVIDENcE § 247 (Brandis rev. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as STANSBURY] and cases cited therein.
17. Comment, 23 WASH. & LEE L. RPv., supra note 10, at 412.
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weight to the test results."" In jurisdictions in which there is no statute
regarding blood-grouping test results or a statute that does not define
the weight to be given such tests, many courts have taken judicial notice of the immutable laws of genetics and have instructed juries that

properly administered tests establishing nonpaternity are conclusive on
that issue.' 9 In several jurisdictions in which test results are admitted
into evidence by a statute that is silent with respect to their evidentiary
weight, courts purport to be following the purpose and intent of the

legislature by taking judicial notice of the conclusive nature of the
tests.20 These courts reason that the legislature intended the "light of

science to be brought to bear ' 21' on a case in which nonpaternity is established by the statutorily approved tests. Permitting juries to disregard this scientific proof countermands the legislature's intent.

Only

a few jurisdictions still refuse to recognize the "universal negative
truth ' 2 of heredity by excluding blood-grouping test results or by al-

lowing juries to disregard test results which establish nonpaternity. 3
North Carolina, as revealed in Camp,24 regrettably remains in that
small minority of states in which nonpaternity established by bloodgrouping tests is not given conclusive evidentiary weight, The supreme court places the blame for this apparent miscarriage of justice
on the legislature's failure to specify the weight to be given the test
results. But the court should not be allowed to absolve itself so easily.
In its decision the court relied partly on two California cases. In
Arais v. Kalensnikoff25 a seventy-year-old impotent defendant was
found to be the father of the complainant's child despite blood-group-

ing tests that established nonpaternity.

A similar result was reached

18. Several states have adopted in whole or in part the UxwoRM Acr ON PATmwhich gives conclusive weight to blood-grouping tests which establish nonpaternity.
Id. § 10. Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, and Utah are states
which have adopted the Act.
19. See, e.g., Jordon v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949); Shanks v. State,
185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945); Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H. 481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954);
Cortese v. Cortese, 10 NJ. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (App. Div. 1950); Clark v. Rysedorph, 281 App. Div. 121, 118 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1952); Houston v. Houston, 199 Misc.
469, 99 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1950). See also cases cited in Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1956).
20. Jordon v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949); State ex rel. Steiger v.
Gray, 3 Ohio Op. 2d 394, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 393, 145 N.E.2d 162 (Juv. Ct. Cuyahoga
Nrrv

County 1957).

21. Jordon v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949).
22. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 165b.
23. Ross v. Marx, 24 NJ. Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597 (App. Div. 1952).
jurisdictions see Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1956).
24. 286 N.C. 148, 209 S.E.2d 754 (1974).
25. 10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043 (1937).

For other
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in Berry v. Chaplin26 in which the court refused to take judicial notice
of the reliability of blood-grouping tests because "the conclusions
reached by the examiner are based upon medical research, and involve
questions of chemistry and biology with which a layman is entirely unfamiliar. ' 27 In both of these cases, the Supreme Court of California
characterized the test results as "expert testimony," but stated that they
were not entitled to conclusive weight unless "so declared by -this
'
code."28
Thus, in 1937 the California courts were unwilling to give
conclusive weight to blood-grouping tests or to judicially recognize any
medical evidence with which the layman was unfamiliar, regardless of
its acceptance by the scientific community. Even though these cases
were decided over thirty years ago when there was perhaps more concern regarding the reliability of blood-grouping tests, the legal community was outraged. As one commentator, referring to the supreme
court's opinion in Arais, stated:
It remained, however, for the Supreme Court, highest judicial tribunal in the State, -to render a decision that has evoked the
most bitter and critical comment. It has been called "a striking
miscarriage of justice." The facts in that case have been described
as "standing
in a niche all of their own in the judicial hall of
29
fame."

Shortly after these cases were decided the California legislature
adopted the Uniform Act on Paternity that gave conclusive weight to
blood-grouping tests that establish nonpaternity. 80 Thus, the cases cited
by the North Carolina Supreme Court have been overruled by legislative fiat and no longer have controlling effect in California. Because
of subsequent technological advances, they should not be persuasive
in other states.
The supreme court's opinion in Camp8 makes no mention of the
court of appeals' eloquent argument in favor of taking judicial notice
of scientific laws as well recognized and established as the laws of genetics. The court of appeals in Camp82 was ready to judicially recognize as scientific fact the laws of genetics as they relate to blood-group26. 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946).
27. Id. at -, 169 P.2d at 451.
28. 10 Cal. 2d 428, 432, 74 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1937).
29. S. ScHArKiN, supra note 7, at 250.
30. CAL. EviD. CODE § 895 (West 1966) (originally enacted in 1953).
31. 286 N.C. at 153, 209 S.E.2d at 757. The court simply characterizes the court
of appeals decision as favoring a conclusive finding when blood-grouping tests establish
nonpaternity.

32. 22 N.C. App. 109, 205 S.E.2d 800 (1974).
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ing tests in establishing nonpaternity. The lower court apparently believed such scientific proof worthy of judicial notice as it was not merely
"an expression of opinion but the statement of facts generally known!"3
-the test for judicial notice as stated by the North Carolina Supreme
Court. As recognized by the court of appeals, judicial notice is not
new to North Carolina courts. In fact, it has often been utilized when
a fact is within the common knowledge of those within the jurisdiction
or when a scientific fact is generally accepted by the scientific community.14 Although our court system requires objectivity in an effort to
ascertain the truth, "justice does not require that courts profess to be
more ignorant than the rest of mankind. 3 5 As Professor Strong
pointed out, judges should inform themselves of scientific facts by "reference to standard works on the subject. '36 Likewise, Professor Stansbury stated: "'If in this day of rapidly advancing scientific progress
the courts are to keep pace with science, they must take judicial notice
of that which is generally accepted as true by those learned in the scientific fields in question.' ,
In an effort to keep pace with science
North Carolina courts have taken judicial notice of the normal term of
pregnancy, 8 the principle of electrical conduction, 9 the normal causes
of phlebitis 40 as well as other scientific facts.41 Unfortunately, instead
of keeping pace with advances in the field of blood-grouping tests, the
court has merely passed the baton to the legislature.
In Camp the blood-groups of defendant and the mother were type
O whereas the child was type A. The laws of genetics undisputably
showed that the child's natural father could not have been of type 0,
thus excluding the defendant. The legislature in passing "the bloodgrouping statute42 undoubtedly intended that scientific methods as
33. Starr v. Telephone Co., 156 N.C. 435, 438, 72 S.E. 484, 485 (1911). See also
Comment, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV., supra note 10. "Mhe pathologist whose report
excludes paternity is not giving 'opinion' evidence,. . . but is testifying to a fact of life
and nature." Id. at 420, citing R. GRADwouL, LEGAL MEDIclNn 576 (1954).
34. 1 STrANSBRY § 11; 3 J. SrmONo, N.C. INDEx Evidence §§ 1-3 (1967). See
also 9 J. WioMoR, supra note 8, § 2580.
35. State v. Vick, 213 N.C. 235, 238, 195 S.E. 779, 781 (1938).
36. 3 J. SmONo, supra note 34, § 3; see also Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355,
90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
37. 1 STANSBuRY § 86, at 277, quoting Baer, Radar Goew to Court, 33 N.C.L. REv.
355, 359 (1955).
38. State v. Key, 248 N.C. 246, 247-48, 102 S.E.2d 844, 845-46 (1958).
39. Starr v. Telephone Co., 156 N.C. 435, 72 S.E. 484 (1911).
40. Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
41. For a more complete discussion of the use of judicial notice in North Carolina
see 1 STANSBURY §§ 11-14 and cases cited.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (1969).
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were known and accepted in 1949 apply in such cases. But the supreme court should not have closed its eyes to the advances in science
since the adoption of the blood-grouping statute, nor should it have disregarded the near unanimity of medical and legal authorities regarding
the reliability of blood-grouping tests.43 To disregard such scientific
proof was to participate in a miscarriage of justice. As aptly stated
by one justice who questioned the result reached in the Chaplin case
in 1937:
Ascertainment of the factual truth in -the adjudication of any
controversy is a consummation devoutly to be wished. Time was
when the courts could rely only upon human testimony. But modem
science brought new aids. The microscope, electricity, X-ray,
psychology, psychiatry, chemistry and many other scientific means
end instrumentalities have revised the judicial guessing game of the
past into an institution approaching accuracy in portraying the truth
as -tothe actual fact where, in the pursuit of which, scientific devices
may be applied. .

.

. If the courts do not utilize these unimpeach-

able methods for acquiring accurate knowledge of pertinent facts
they will neglect the employment of available,
-potent agencies which
44
serve to avoid miscarriages of justice.
CHARLOTTE

A. CUNNINGHAM

Environmental Law-Municipal Immunity--Springer v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Company: Placing the Burden on Industry
In recent years, increasing demands have been made on the judicial system to resolve the often conflicting claims between environmentalists and industry. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
faced such a problem in Springer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.' which
involved the liability of an industry to downstream riparian owners
when sewage from its plant overloaded the municipal sewage treatment
facility. The district court held in Schlitz's favor on the basis of North
43. In response to the court's decision in Camp, on March 14, 1975 a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives that would give conclusive weight to bloodgrouping tests that established nonpaternity. As of April 1, 1975, the bill has not been
reported out of committee. House Bill 443, 1975 N.C. General Assembly.
44. 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, -, 169 P.2d 442, 453 (1946).
1. No. 73-2360 (4th Cir., Jan. 14, 1975).
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Carolina's grant of immunity to a sewage system user whose waste is

not adequately treated by the city. However, the court of appeals recognized two exceptions to the State's general rule of immunity2 and
used them as the basis for its reversal of the lower court.
Plaintiffs, David and Diana Springer, owned an interest in a large
farm on the Yadkin River, downstream from the Schlitz brewery and
the Winston-Salem sewage plant. After inadequately treated waste
from the overloaded sewage facility caused six unprecedented fish kills
and polluted the river in mid-1970, plaintiffs brought a diversity action
against Schlitz3 seeking an injunction and damages. They alleged that
the waste from the Schlitz brewery had overloaded the sewage plant
thereby causing the pollution of the Yadkin and the infringement of
plaintiffs' riparian rights. The Springers contended that North Carolina's general rule of immunity for sewage system users could not shelter Schlitz if the court found that the brewery had "violated the city
sewage ordinance, or if Schlitz knew, or should have known of the inability of the city to adequately treat the brewery's wastes."4 In response, Schlitz denied liability, claiming protection under the State
rule of immunity for users of municipal sewage facilities.
The court of appeals did not deny the existence of a general rule
2. See text accompanying note 14 infra.
3. Since an action against the municipality is standard in cases such as this one
and since the courts readily find liability, the question arises as to why the Springers
did not sue Winston-Salem instead of Schlitz. According to Norman B. Smith, counsel
for the plaintiff, the Springers and their attorneys were anxious to get at the real offending cause of the pollution rather than adding to the burden of the taxpayer. The suit
was apparently more in the nature of a private attorney-general action than a suit for
damages.
4. No. 73-2360 at 4. See WINSTON-SALEM, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCEs § 23
(1970). Winston-Salem had passed a sewage ordinance to deal with problems such as
this in February 1970 to become effective in May of that year. The ordinance set up
a permit system, established a limit on the BOD content (a measure of the polluting
strength of wastes) of wastes discharged into the system, and prohibited the discharge
of certain dangerous or hard-to-treat materials. The relevant portion of section 23-2(2)
states:
(2) Except as hereinafter provided, it shall be unlawful for any person to
discharge or cause to be discharged any of the following described materials,
waters, liquids, or wastes into any public sanitary sewer:
(g) Liquid wastes containing any toxic or poisonous substances
in sufficient quantities to (i) interfere with the biological
processes used in a sewage treatment plant, or (ii) which, in
combination with other liquid wastes, upon passing through
a sewage treatment plant will be harmful to persons, livestock, or aquatic life utilizing the receiving streams into
which water from a sewage treatment plant is discharged.
No. 73-2360 at 9, quoting WiNsTON-SALEM, N.C., CODE OF ORDIN~AcEs § 23-2(2)
(1970).
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of immunity for sewage system users in North Carolina and agreed that
"an industry that uses a municipal sewage system to dispose of its waste
is not liable to a riparian landowner for the pollution caused by the city's
failure to provide adequate treatment."5 However, the court also recognized the possibility of exceptions to this rule. After noting that
the North Carolina courts had not yet ruled on these exceptions, the
court turned -to the "rationale for the established rule, developments
on this point in other states, and analogous areas of the state's common
law' 6 and found support for both exceptions alleged by plaintiffs. Consequently, the court ruled that violation of a municipal sewage ordinance enacted to protect downstream riparian owners can be the basis
for finding an industrial sewage source liable. 7 Regarding plaintiffs'
second alleged exception, the court analogized the relationship between
a municipal sewage treatment plant and its users to that between an
independent contractor and his employer.8 Just as an employer must
exercise reasonable care in selecting a contractor qualified to do the
work, so must a corporation exercise reasonable care in selecting a
sewer system capable of handling its waste." Thus, if Schlitz were
found to be negligent in selecting Winston-Salem to -treat its sewage,
it would be liable on this theory also.' 0
In general, North Carolina recognizes a cause of action in a riparian landowner whose riparian rights have been violated, and has
adopted the rule of reasonable use"1 which states that: "'[a] riparian
proprietor is entitled to the natural flow of a stream running through
or along his land in its accustomed channel, undiminished in quantity
and unimpaired in quality except as may be occasioned by the reasonable use of the water by other like proprietors.' "12 However, two
5. No. 73-2360 at 3.
6. Id. at 4. The court examined these factors to determine North Carolina law
in the absence of specific rulings on the issue.
7. Id. at 7.

8. Id. at 14-15.
9. According to the court, the corporation is in the best position to know the
characteristics of its sewage and to exercise control over plant location and the sewage

system to dispose of its waste. "Schlitz knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have ascertained, that the city could not adequately treat its brewery wastes." id.
at 18.
10. Id. at 18-19.
11. Aycock, Introduction to Water Use Law in North Carolina, 46 N.C.L. Rnv.
1, 6 (1967).
12. Id., quoting Smith v. Town of Morganton, 187 N.C. 801, 802-03, 123 S.E.
88, 89 (1924). Citing Professor Aycock's article on North Carolina water use law, the
court ruled that "interference with riparian rights is an actionable tort." No. 732360
at 3. While the court uses the Aycock article to establish this point, they do not mention that Aycock discusses the general rule of immunity without noting any exceptions.
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North Carolina cases clearly establish a general rule of immunity for
municipal sewage systems users. In Hampton v. Spindale,"3 manufacturing plants owned by defendants discharged waste into the municipal

sewage system. A downstream riparian owner sued the town, a manufacturer, and a power company to recover damages for the pollution of
the stream. The court held:
[The inhabitants of a city who invoke its power to construct
and control a sewer and who use the sewer after its completion
for the purpose and in the way prescribed by law are not liable
jointly with the city for damages which result to third persons from
the negligence of the city in the construction, management, or opera4
tion of the sewer.'

In Clinardv. Town of Kernersville'5 the court again held that plaintiff
could maintain an action against the town, but not against a manufacturer.
The scope of the immunity established by -these cases, however,
is not unlimited. For example, Hampton limited immunity "to those
persons who use the sewers 'in the way prescribed by law.' "16 Consistent with this exception the court of appeals reasoned thait while an
industry can normally expect adequate treatment of sewage, "it is not
reasonable for an industry to expect a city to safely treat prohibited
sewage."'11 Thus, if Schlitz violated the Winston-Salem sewage ordinance, thereby using the sewers unlawfully,' 8 it could be held liable
13.
14.
15.
16.
775, 776
17.

210 N.C. 546, 187 S.E. 775 (1936).
Id. at 548, 187 S.E. at 776 (emphasis added).
215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939).
No. 73-2360 at 7, quoting Hampton v. Spindale, 210 N.C. 546, 548, 187 S.E.
(1936).
No. 73-2360 at 7.

18. Violation of a city ordinance is a misdemeanor. N.C. GEN. &rAT. § 14-4
(1969). In defense, Schlitz pointed out that the city's officials did not require compliance with the ordinance until a year after the sewage ordinance became effective. However, the court ruled that while the ordinance "recognized that compliance was not instantly attainable and allowed city officials to furnish technical assistance and advice,
its terms gave them no power to affect the rights of third parties." No. 73-2360 at 1011.
The following is a time table of key events:
July 1, 1969-Brewery began production. At that time, there was no sewage ordinance
or limitation placed by the city on the quality or quantity of water.
February 2, 1970---Sewage ordinance was enacted.
May 1970-Sewage ordinance became effective and city started billing and Schlitz paying BOD surcharges.
June 11, 1970-Schlitz was first advised of ordinance and of the necessity of obtaining
a permit.
Spring and Summer, 1970--The six unprecedented fish kills occurred on the Yadkin

River.
April 1971-At this point Schlitz's waste stopped containing more than 250 ppm0
BOD
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for damages caused to downstream riparian owners.19
In addition, the court felt that this liability for violation of the ordinance was mandated by State law and held the violator of a statute "designed to protect persons or property" liable for damage proximately
caused by such violation."° The court's position appears to be adequately supported by North Carolina case law.
In Carr v. Murrows Transfer, Inc.2" the North Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that "violation of a statute enacted for the safety and protection of the public constitutes negligence per se. . . [W] here a
. . . municipal ordinance imposes..

.

a specific duty for the protec-

tion or benefit of others," failure to perform that duty creates a'22cause
of action in "those whose protection or benefit it was imposed for."
Moreover, the court, in Town of Shelby v. Cleveland Mill & Power
z
Co., 3 held that the State could not divest itself of the right to exercise
its police power for the general good. Therefore, the court concluded
that the defendant corporation could not acquire a prescriptive right
to dump its untreated sewage into a river. In this same vein, the
Fourth Circuit held that the city's desire to mitigate potential
economic losses caused by closing the brewery could not override private rights.24 Thus, if Schlitz were allowed to continue
operation, it would have to bear the responsibility for damages
caused by extension of the compliance schedule.2 5 The court's position
is strengthened by a 1972 amendment to the ordinance authorizing the
city 'to suspend -the requirements of section 23-2(2).26 If such action
(the limit set by the city ordinance).
May 1971--Schlitz received permit.
1972-Winston-Salem Ordinance was amended explicitly to authorize the city to suspend
its requirements.
19. No. 73-2360 at 7.
20. Id. at 8, citing Murray v. Bensen Aircraft, 259 N.C. 638, 642, 131 S.E.2d 367,
370 (1963).
21. 262 N.C. 550, 138 S.E.2d 228 (1964).
22. Id. at 554, 138 S.E.2d at 231.
23. 155 N.C. 196, 71 S.E. 218 (1911).
24. No. 73-2360 at 11.
25. Id. at 11-12.
26. This point was the main basis of Judge Widener's dissent. He felt that "no
violation of the sewer use ordinance was shown because of the construction placed on
the ordinance by the city." Id. at 23. He supports his position by citing the general
rule that "when dealing with the interpretation of an ambiguous city ordinance one must
consider contemporaneous interpretation of the ordinance by city officials. . . ." Id. at
27. The problem with this theory is that section 23-2(2), the ordinance in question,
is quite clear and unambiguous on its face. See note 4 supra. North Carolina generally
holds that where the terms of a statute are clear, no interpretation is required. Peelo
v. Finch, 284 N.C. 375, 200 S.E.2d 635 (1973); Lutz v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ.,
282 N.C. 208, 192 S.E.2d 463 (1972).
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arguably, there would have been no need
had been possible earlier,
7
amendment.
the
for
Evaluating the second exception, 28 the court resorted to "an anal29
ysis of the underlying reasons for the general rule of immunity.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Hampton and Clinard, had
looked to the leading case in the area, Carmichael v. Texarkana. 0 In
Carmichael, a riparian landowner sued the city and its inhabitants for
polluting water adjacent to his property. In ruling that the inhabitants
were not liable for the damage caused by the sewage system, the Eighth
Circuit had compared the relationship of the user of a sewage system
and the city to that of an employer and an independent contractor:
If [the inhabitants] had taken their own sewage to the creek,
and poured it into its waters above the premises of the complainOn
ants, -they would undoubtedly . . . have been liable ....
the other hand, if they had made an agreement with an .independent contractor . .. to remove all their sewage from their premises
to a place where, and in a manner in which, it could do no unnecessary injury to any one, and their contractor had carelessly
deposited it ... in the stream above [complainants'] property,
the [inhabitants] would not have been liable for these wrongful
acts of their contractor. Their relation to the city and its negligence is not of a different character.3 1
Thus, the court concluded that if one has the power to command or
control the performance of the action in question, then one is liable
Although no North Carolina case has emfor resulting damage."
ployed the analogy made by Carmichael, the idea of control as a test
for liability has been accepted.33
The Fourth Circuit next examined North Carolina law governing
the relationship between employer and independent contractor. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals has stated that:
27. No. 73-2360 at 11 & n.11.
28. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
29. No. 73-2360 at 13.
30. Carmichael v. Texarkana, 116 F. 845 (8th Cir. 1902). Springer likewise focused on Carmichael. No. 73-2360 at 14.
31. No. 73-2360 at 14, quoting Carmichael v. Texarkana, 116 F. 845, 849 (8th
Cir. 1902).
32. 116 F. at 850.
33. In Clinard the court said, 'The [polluter] has no control over the disposition
of the water. It is disposed of under the sole supervision and control of the defendant
town. Under such circumstances no liability is imposed upon [the polluter] for any
damage caused to the property of the plaintiffs on account of the emptying of such dye
water . . . ." 215 N.C. at 748, 3 S.E.2d at 270, citing Carmichael v. Texarkana, 116
F. 845 (8th Cir. 1902).
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[Generally,] an employer . . . is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor committed in the performance of the contracted
work. However, a condition prescribed to relieve an employer
from liability for the negligent acts of an independent contractor
employed by him is that he shall have exercised due care to secure a competent contractor for the work. Therefore, if it appears that the employer either knew or by the exercise of reasonable care might have ascertained that the contractor was not properly qualified to undertake the work, he may be held liable for
the negligent acts of the contractor.3 4
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that industrial sewage sources, being
"similarly situated, '85 must likewise exercise due care in selecting a
municipal disposal system.20 Thus, since Schlltz controlled the "selection of a site and of the sewage system which would dispose of its
waste' and since it knew, or should have known, that Winston-Salem
could not treat its sewage, the court concluded that Schlitz was not im37
mune.
The impact of Springer can be fully appreciated only after a consideration of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972.- s Although prior legislation had dealt with the problem of water
pollution the situation was not improving, and Congress passed
the amendments to alleviate this problem. 9 In this new Act, "for the
first time, Congress has declared water pollution illegal. ' ' 40 "T]he regulatory core of the new . . . program consists of the discharge permit
. . . [that] in turn is based upon compliance with various effluent
standards promulgated by EPA."41 Section 1317, Toxic and Pretreatment Effluent Standards, has a provision dealing specifically with discharges by persons and corporations into municipal sewage treatment
34. Page v. Sloan, 12 N.C. App. 433, 439, 183 SE.2d 813, 817 (1971), aff'd, 281
N.C. 697, 190 S.E.2d 189 (1972).
35. No. 73-2360 at 16.
36. The corporation is in the best position to know potential sewage production
and to investigate the capability of the city system. Id. at 17.
37. Id. at 18-19.
38. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II 1972).
39. The new legislation, "although technically amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1965, for all practical purposes replaced all federal water pollution
control statutes." MeThenia, An Examination of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 30 WASH. & LEE L REv. 195, 202 (1973).

40. Id. at 196. "[In order to implement this basic decision that the nation's
waters are not to be used for waste disposal, Congress established (a) a regulatory and
enforcement strategy in the traditional administrative agency mold and (b) a system of
subsidies to localities to permit them to achieve the goals of the Act." Id. at 197.
41. Comment, Judicial Review and the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act: And Who Shall Guard the Guards?, 68 Nw. U.L Re. 770,

776 (1973).
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facilities. 42 Section 1319, Enforcement, provides a remedy for violation of effluent limitations, 48 pretreatment standards, or permit conditions.44 The provision limits the administrator to seeking an injunction4 5 or a civil penalty in the form of a specified series of fines.48

The

Act makes no provision for damages. In section 1365, the Act also
allows any citizen to commence a civil action against anyone allegedly
in violation of an effluent standard or limitation or an order issued by
the administrator or a state regarding that standard or limitation.4"
District courts are given jurisdiction over such actions and can issue an
injunction enforcing the effluent standard or limitation or order and can
allow recovery of civil penalties available under section 13119(d).48 In
addition, the court "may award costs of litigation to any party whenever
the court determines such award is appropriate. 49 There is, however,
42. Section 1317 provides for establishment of specific effluent limitations and pretreatment standards and makes it unlawful to operate in violation of such standards.
The pertinent provisions of section 1317 are as follows:
(b) (1) The Administrator shall... publish proposed regulations establishing

pretreatment standards for introduction of pollutants into treatment works. .
which are publicly owned for those pollutants which are determined not to be
susceptible to treatment by such treatment works or which would interfere with
the operation of such treatment works. Not later than 90 days after publication, and after opportunity for public hearing, the Administrator shall promulgate such pretreatment standards. Pretreatment standards. .. shall be established to prevent the discharge of any pollutant through treatment works which
are publicly owned, which pollutant interferes with, passes -through, or otherwise is incompatible with such works.
(d) After the effective date of any effluent standard or prohibition or pretreatment standard promulgated under this section, it shall be unlawful for any
owner or operator of any source to operate any source in violation of any such
effluent standard or prohibition or pretreatment standard.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(b) (1), (d)(Supp.1972).
43. Effluent limitations are defined by section 1362(11) as "any restriction established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point sources
into navigable waters,. . . including schedules of compliance." Id. § 1362(11).
44. The pertinent provisions of section 1319 are as follows:
(a) (3) Whenever. . .the Administrator finds that any person is in.violation
of section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, or 1318 of this title or is in violation of
this title
any permit condition or limitation. . . issued under section 134Z o.l
• . he shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such section

or requirement, or he shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsection
(b) . ..
(b) The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation for
which he is authorized to issue a compliance order ....
id.§ 1319 (emphasis added).
45. Id.§ 1319(b).
46. Id.§ 1319(c)(1), (d). "MIlf the state does not act with dispatch, the Administrator is compelled to seek injunctive relief." McThenia, supra note 31, at 204.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (Supp. 1972).
48. Id. § 1365(a).
49. Id. § 1365(d).
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no mention of damages.50

The existence of -this legislation diminishes the impact of Springer
because the Act allows a private individual to sue the polluting corporation. Therefore, that portion of the decision allowing such a cause of
action is insignificant if there is a violation of the federal Act. Springer
does, however, fill numerous gaps in the federal legislation. First, in
diversity actions governed by North Carolina law, Springer provides for
damages as an alternative to the federal remedies of injunction and civil
penalties. The significance of this distinction becomes .clearer when
one considers the reluctance of most courts to issue injunctions, especially those which might cause factory closings. r1 Hopefully, the courts
will not be as reluctant to force industrial polluters to pay for the damage they have caused.52 More significantly, Springer offers a remedy
for persons damaged by industrial polluters not in violation of the federal Act.

This is notable because of the likelihood that there will be

numerous cases of pollution without violation of the federal Act.5"
Finally, Springer is significant in revealing the Fourth Circuit's determination to enforce water pollution legislation and to place the burden
of responsibility for pollution on those who create it.
The strength of pollution legislation lies in the attitude of those

enforcing it.54 There have been problems in the past, not with the
availability of the legislation, but with its enforcement. " Even if the
EPA forces compliance, it could be in the form of a compliance sched50. Nothing in section 1365 cuts off any other cause of action available under any
statute or common law to get enforcement or any other relief. Id. § 1365(e).
51. See D. Donas, HANDBOOK ON nm LAw OF RBMEDIES § 5.7, at 360-61 (1973).
52. Although the federal Act does provide civil penalties, it seems that these will
go to the federal government, not the private litigants. In addition, damages would bear
a closer relation to the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff.
53. Because the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] will undoubtedly
want to minimize the number of plants forced to close by the application of
federal effluent standards, these standards will be sufficiently lenient so that
only the most inefficient and polluting facilities will be unable to meet
them.... Nothing on the face of the 1972 Amendments compels the EPA
to require an individual plant to exceed the effluent standards, even in the
event that the water into which the plant discharges will remain polluted.
Comment, 68 Nw. U.L. Rsv., supra note 43, at 781.
54. "'The key to an effective regulatory system is that there be firm, specific reThe exact requirements ... must . .. be
quirements imposed on all parties....
uniformly and strictly enforced." Comment, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 672, 707-08 (1973), quoting Statement of John Quarles, Jr.
55. As one commentator observed:
[I]f past federal water pollution control efforts are any guide, there is reason
to believe that the EPA will fall significantly short of the goals set by ConMTlhe Executive has consistently avoided strict enforcement of exgress ....
isting pollution law. Comment, 68 Nw. U.L. REv., supra note 43, at 786.
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ule such as the one in Springer. The industry, although in compliance
with the federal Act and the EPA, could still pollute the water for several years, causing damage to riparian landowners. In such situations,
Springer provides a solution by requiring the polluter to pay damages
while also allowing the company to continue operation.5 Thus, Springer acts as an additional deterrent to industrial pollution. Finally,
Springer provides an important incentive to citizen action. Although
the federal Act provides for injunction and costs of litigation in some
cases, there is no provision for compensation of damages suffered by
plaintiffs. Citizens who know they can recover damages hopefully will
be encouraged to sue polluters. With these factors in mind, it becomes
obvious that Springer will play an important role in control of water pollution.
Of course, the attitude of the North Carolina courts will be critical.
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently observed that:
Beyond any doubt air and water pollution have become two of
Regardless of where
modem society's most urgent problems ....
it occurs, the abatement and control of environmental pollution
are immediately necessary to public health, safety, and general
welfare; and, in the exercise of the State's police power, the legislaplenary authority to abate and control pollution of all
ture has
kinds.57
This statement is dicta, but it does show a willingness on the part of
the court to consider environmental factors. In a case such as Springer,
the ultimate question is whether to place the cost of damages on the
taxpayers or the polluting industry and its consumers. In keeping with
the national policy exhibited in the federal amendments of 1972, it
would seem that the polluter should pay. If the North Carolina Supreme Court follows the lead of Springer, the case will become a viable legal instrument to be used in deterring water pollution.
KATHERINE

McKEE

HOLEMAN

56. No. 73-2360 at 12.
57. Stanley v. Department of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 36-37, 199 S.P.2d
641, 655 (1973).
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Fair Trade-Resale Price Maintenance: North Carolina Fair
Trade Act Held Unconstitutional As Applied to Nonsigners
The North Carolina Fair Trade Act1 permits certain retail price
fixing by manufacturers and retailers and eliminates intrabrand competition in the retail market. A fair trade agreement between a manufacturer and retailer typically states that the retailer will not sell or offer
for sale certain products at prices below those set by the manufacturer,
who in turn reserves the right to change list prices at will. 2 The manufacturer agrees to enforce the agreement against anyone who sells such
products below the set price levels.8 North Carolina's Fair Trade Act
not only provides that such agreements are enforceable as between the
parties to the contract, but also permits these fixed retail prices to be
enforced against sellers who have never agreed to "fair trade" the
goods and who obtained their inventory from persons likewise free of
any such obligation. 4 This nonsigner clause is generally regarded as
the key to effective fair trade enforcement due to the enormous expense involved in executing fair trade contracts with every retailer in
1. N.C. Gm. STAT. §§ 66-50 to -57 (1965). Section 66-52 provides:
No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or the
label or container of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and which commodity is in free and
open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others, shall be deemed in violation of any law of the State of
North Carolina by reason of any of the following provisions which may be
contained in such contract:
(1) That the buyer will not resell such commodity at less than the minimum price stipulated by the seller.
(2) That the buyer will require of any dealer to whom he may resell such
commodity an agreement that he will not, in turn, resell at less than
the minimum price stipulated by the seller.
(3) That the seller will not sell such commodity:
a. To any wholesaler, unless such wholesaler will agree not to resell
the same to any retailer unless the retailer will in turn agree not
to resell the same except to consumers for use and at not less than
the stipulated minimum price, and such wholesaler will likewise
agree not to resell the same to any other wholesaler unless such
other wholesaler will make the same agreement with any wholesaler or retailer to whom he may resell; or
b. To any retailer, unless the retailer will agree not to resell the
same except to consumers for use and at not less than the stipulated minimum price.
6051-52 (suggested model manufacturer/
2. See, e.g., 2 T"n REG. REP.
retailer and manufacturer/wholesaler contracts).
3. Id.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-56 (1965). This section reads: "Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of this article, whether the
person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract,
is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby." Id.
(emphasis added).
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the State.5 This controversial nonsigner clause, however, was recently
struck down by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Bulova Watch

Co. v. Brand Distributors,Inc."
In reaching its conclusion the court was compelled to reverse an
earlier long-standing decision,7 overcoming the inertia of its traditional
and deeply-rooted commitment to stare decisis8 The Court's turnabout
on virtually indistinguishable facts is somewhat perplexing, and perhaps

can be explained only as a definitive judicial response to an almost irresistible shift in policy on both the national and local levels.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE LAW

In 1911 express fair trade contracts to maintain the resale price

of goods in interstate commerce were declared unenforceable by the
United States Supreme Court as violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.'

In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.' °

the

Court held that such contracts amounted to illegal price-fixing by manufacturers, that they were unenforceable restraints upon trade, and were

void as against public policy as manifested both by the common law
and by federal statutes." This decision, however, did not prevent the
States from enacting fair trade legislation applicable to purely intrastate
transactions, and, beginning with California in 1931, the vast majority
of States eventually enacted fair trade acts. 12 The fair trade movement
gained considerable impetus in 1936 when the United States Supreme
5. See Shearin, North Carolina Fair Trade Act, 8 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 45, 51
(1971).
6. 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
7. Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939).
8. "This Court has never overruled its decisions lightly. No court has been more
faithful to stare decisis." Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., 269 N.C. 1, 20, 152 S.E.2d
485, 498 (1967) (Sharp, J.).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26
Stat. 209).
10. 220U.S. 373 (1911).
11. Whatever right the manufacturer may have to project his control beyond
his own sales must depend, not upon an inherent power incident to production
and original ownership, but upon agreement.
But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to
the public interest and void. ...
:

• •

*The complainant having sold its product at prices satisfactory to it-

self, the public is entitled to whatever advantage may be derived from competition in the subsequent traffic.
Id. at 405-09.
12. 2 TRADE REG. R. 1 6017.
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Court upheld the nonsigner provisions of fair trade acts in California and

Illinois.'" In 1937 North Carolina enacted a Fair Trade Act that included a nonsigner clause.' 4
In the meantime, developments at the federal level reflected the
popular trend. In 1937 Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Amendment' 5 to section 1 of the Sherman Act,'0 in effect overruling Dr.

Miles'17 and thereby legalizing resale price maintenance contracts on
products sold in interstate commerce.' 8 In 1951, however, the Supreme Court in Schwegman Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp."" construed the Miller-Tydings Amendment narrowly to exclude from its
protection the popular nonsigner provisions of state fair trade laws.2 0
Congress responded in 1952 with the McGuire Act,2" which specifically
allows enforcement of resale price agreements against nonsigners when
permitted by state law. The result of these two acts has been to grant
13. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
This decision meant that fair trade contracts were valid under the federal antitrust laws
as applied to goods moving strictly in commerce within a state, providing of course that
such contracts were enforceable under state law. Goods moving across state lines could
not be subjected to fair trade contracts under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Sherman Act in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911). See also excerpts from Report by the Federal Trade Commission on Resale
Price Maintenance (Dec. 13, 1945), reprinted in 2 TRADE REG. REP.
6017.75.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-50 to -57 (1965). See also A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolinain 1937, 15 N.C.L. REv. 321, 367 (1937).
15. Ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26
Stat. 209).
17. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
18. 'The Miller-Tydings Amendment . . . is a federal enabling statute which legalizes vertical minimum resale price maintenance contracts or agreements for trademarked commodities sold in any state which legalizes such contracts with respect to intrastate sales." S. OPPENnEIm & G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER
PROTECTON: CASES AND COMMENTS 752 (3d ed. 1974).
19. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
20. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas held that, when Congress exempted
fair trade "contracts" from the antitrust laws with the Miller-Tydings Amendment, the
word "contract" must be construed to presume a consensual agreement between the parties thereto. Id. at 388. The Louisiana statute under attack, however, contained the
usual nonsigner clause. Id. Justice Douglas reasoned that "certainly the words used
[in the Miller-Tydings Amendment] connote a voluntary scheme . . . not a program
whereby recalcitrants are dragged in by the heels and compelled to submit to price fixing." Id. at 390. Where a fixed retail price is sought to be enforced against nonsigners,
Douglas continued, there is lacking the important "contractual" relationship essential to
the Miller-Tydings exemption. Had Congress intended to include nonsigner provisions,
Douglas concluded, it would have done so expressly. Id.
21. Ch. 754, 66 Stat. 632 (1952). "Like the Miller-Tydings Amendment, [the
McGuire Act] is merely a federal enabling statute which does not represent federal approval, or disapproval, of resale price maintenance." S. OPPENHEIM & G. WnsroN,
supra note 18, at 752.
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effective federal antitrust exemptions to fair trade practices under state
or local laws. 2
In the 1950's popular sentiment began to turn against fair trade.23
A number of state courts have held fair trade acts invalid on state, not
federal, constitutional grounds.24 Nonsigner clauses have been particularly vulnerable to constitutional attack, primarily on three gounds: (a)
that the clauses represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power, 25 (b) that they deny nonsigners due process of law, 26 and (c)
that they are an improper exercise of a state's police power for the
benefit of solely private interests. Latest available statistics show that
nonsigner clauses in thirty-two states have been either held nconstitu22. 2 TmAnn REo. REP. I7 6025-27.
23. id. at 6021.
24. Id. See also Note, Restraint of Trade-FairTrade Acts-Constitutionality, 31
N.C.L. REv. 509 (1953).
25. See, e.g., Dr. G.H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegman. Brothers Giant
Super Markets, 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956):
It is fundamental "that legislative power, conferred under constitutional
provisions, cannot be delegated by the Legislature either to the people or to
any other body or authority." . . . [C]ourts will not hesitate to strike down
legislation vesting in private persons the right to determine the state of things
upon which the effect of the law depends as this is legislative delegation in
its most obnoxious form....
: : [Under the Fair Trade Act], there is an unlawful delegation of power
because it is the manufacturer or producer who fixes minimum price and not
the Legislature itself ....
Id. at 63-66, 90 So. 2d at 347-48. See also 2 TRADE REo. REP. 11 6021.01-.54.
26. See, e.g., Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139
(1956)i
The right to contract is a property right, protected by the due-process clause
of the constitution ....
To the extent that the Colorado Act is coercive it is lacking in due
process, is confiscatory, and tends to establish a monopoly ....
Any act of the General Assembly which arbitrarily destroys or impairs the
right of the individual to the free use and enjoyment of his property, lawfully
acquired, and permits the fixing of prices for the benefit of a special group,
is opposed to the constitutional concept of a free people and should not be allowed to stand.
Id. at 176-86, 301 P.2d 147-52. See also 2 TRADE REG. Rm,.
6021.01-.54.
27. See, e.g., Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334
Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952):
The consideration of whether the price fixing be vertical, horizontal, or even
diagonal, or whether the regulation relates to all of a certain type of commodity . . . . although relevant when the question of monopoly needs to be determined, is of no consequence in determining.. whether the statute in question, as applied to nonsigners, bears any reasonable relation to public health,
safety, morals or the general welfare... . If the act does not bear the mentioned relationship, . . . it cannot be sustained as a lawful exercise of the
state's police power, . . . and it is our duty to deny such enforcement and
brand the act for what it is, unconstitutional.
Id. at 114-115, 54 N.W.2d at 270. See also 2 TRADE Ruo. REP. 77f 6021.01-.54.
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tional by state courts or repealed by the legislatures. 28 At present only
thirteen states have fair trade acts with nonsigner provisions valid under
state law.29 As one observer has noted, "the passage of time has shown
[resale price maintenance] to, be of little value to anyone except retailers who desire to fix prices in order to pad their profit margins."' 0
NORTH CAROLINA FAIR TRADE AND THE COURTS

Prior to Bulova Watch the constitutionality of North Carolina's Fair
Trade Act had been challenged in only three reported cases.81 In the
landmark case of Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders 2 the decision was clear
and unequivocal: the Act, including the nonsigner clause was held
valid under the North Carolina constitution. In that case defendant
had sold goods manufactured by plaintiff at less than the fair trade
price. While plaintiff had executed contracts with a number of retailers, defendant was in all respects a nonsigner. Plaintiff sought an
injunction under the nonsigner clause to prevent further price-cutting
by defendant. Finding for plaintiff, the supreme court rejected
defendant's claims that the statute tended to create a monopoly, that
the law deprived him of his property rights in the goods sold without
due process of law, that the law was an improper delegation of legislative power to private persons, and that the statute was an illegal special
or local law regulating trade, all in violation of various sections of the
State constitution. 3
On the eve of Bulova Watch, then, the matter seemed settled.
Nonsigners were well-advised to address their complaints to the General Assembly in hopes that the law might be changed, rather than
wasting their time litigating a foregone conclusion. Two nonsigners
28.
29.
30.
31.

2 TRADE R o. REP. 6041.
Id.
Shearin, supra note 5, at 62-63.
Subsequent to Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939),

the constitutionality of the nonsigner clause of the Fair Trade Act was challenged in
Union Carbide Corp. v. Davis, 253 N.C. 324, 116 S.E.2d 792 (1960). There the State
attorney general filed an amicus curiae brief requesting that the North Carolina Supreme
Court declare the Act unconstitutional. The case was ultimately resolved on other
grounds, however, and the constitutional argument was never reached. See, e.g.,
Shearin, supra note 5, at 54-55.
In 1962 a case arose on diversity in federal district court in which the validity of
the nonsigner clause was again questioned. In Parker Pen Co. v. Dart Drug Co., 202
F. Supp. 646 (M.D.N.C. 1962), Judge Preyer felt bound by Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders,
supra, and granted plaintiff's motion for an injunction under the nonsigner clause.
32. 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939).
33. Justice Barnhill disagreed in a fierce dissent which reverberates between the

lines throughout the opinion in Bulova Watch. Id. at 182-97, 4 S.E.2d at 541-50.
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who failed to heed this advice were a pair of North Wilkesboro discount
jewelers.
BULOVA WATCa Co. v. BRND DISTRIBUTORS, INC.

Over the years the Bulova Watch Company has induced a number
of merchants throughout the nation to sign fair trade agreements for
its watches.8s Bulova executed such contracts with several North Carolina dealers, 5 and under the State Fair Trade Act these agreements
gave Bulova the right to compel all other retailers to sell watches at
the company-set price. 6 Brand Distributors, Inc. and Motor Market,
Inc. felt that they could sell Bulova merchandise at prices considerably
below list and still realize a reasonable profit satisfactory to themselves.8 ' To avoid Bulova's fair trade contracts, these two merchants
did not obtain goods from Bulova directly, but instead purchased new
watches at bankruptcy sales 8 and from other parties not bound by fair
trade agreements with Bulova.3 9 Brand Distributors and Motor Market
sold these watches for less than the fair trade price, and Bulova sued
in superior court to enjoin future cut-rate sales. The superior court
granted the injunction, and the court of appeals reluctantly affirmed,40
34. The West Publishing Company's national reporter system bears convincing witness of Bulova's litigiousness in enforcing these agreements against signers and nonsigners alike. See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 274 Ala. 270, 147 So. 2d 797
(1962); Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 108 N.W.2d 365
(1961); Bulova Watch Co. v. Ontario Store, Inc., 18 Ohio Op. 2d 221, 176 N.E.2d 527
(Franklin County C.P. 1961); Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 80 Nev. 483,
396 P.2d 683 (1964); Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo.
1962).
35. "By such agreement the retailer agrees not to sell or offer for sale any watch
or other article, bearing the plaintiff's brand or trade name, at a price different from
that shown on a retail price list compiled and furnished by the plaintiff, who reserves
the right to change the listed prices from time to time. The agreement further provides
that the plaintiff agrees to employ all reasonable and lawful means, including legal action, to obtain and enforce general observance of such prices by retailers." 285 N.C.
at 468, 206 S.E.2d at 142.
36. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
37. See generally Defendant Appellants' Supplemental Brief at 2-5, Bulova Watch
Co. v. Brand Distribs., Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
38. Id. at 468, 206 S.E.2d at 143. Note that under the North Carolina Fair Trade
Act, trustee-vendors at bankruptcy sales are not bound to sell fair trade merchandise at
the fixed price. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-55(4) (1965).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-55(4) (1965).
40. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs., Inc., 20 N.C. App. 648, 202 S.E.2d 350
(1974). "More than thirty-four years ago, our Supreme Court, Justice Barnhill dissenting, held that the 'Fair Trade Act' was valid and constitutional. . . . Until that opinion
is modified or superseded by the Supreme Court, we are bound by it, although we consider much of defendant's argument to be sound." Id. at 649, 202 S.E.2d at -350-51
(Vaughn, J.).
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feeling itself bound by the Ely Lilly decision.41 The North Carolina
Supreme Court granted certiorari to reassess its decision in that prior
42
case.
Defendants attacked the nonsigner clause in much the same
fashion as had their counterpart in Ely Lilly.4 3 They contended that the
statute was invalid as applied to non-signers in that (a) it delegates
legislative power to a private corporation in violation of article H1, section 1 of the North Carolina constitution,44 and (b) it deprives nonsigners of liberty without due process of law in violation of article I,
45
section 19.
The court was clearly on firmer ground in its analysis of the first
proposition. Justice Lake correctly noted that the General Assembly
in limited circumstances has the power to fix retail prices in the public
interest and that this power cannot be delegated to private interests.4"
Yet the nonsigner provision of the Fair Trade Act permitted one private party, the manufacturer, to fix prices arbitrarily and enforce them
against other private parties with whom he had no commercial or contractual relationship. 47 The court was clearly struck by the absolute
power of the manufacturer to raise or lower at will his statewide fixed
prices, with no legislatively prescribed standards or criteria to regulate
these changes in price. 48 Moreover, the court's unease was compounded by its realization that, under the Fair Trade Act, statewide
resale price maintenance can be achieved through the execution of a
single fair trade contract to which all retailers in the State would become bound.49
The opinion takes pains to point out the error of Ely Lilly on the
matter of delegation of legislative power. In the prior case the court
had relied upon a "restrictive covenant" theory to hold that, once an
article in commerce had been impressed by the manufacturer with a
fixed resale price, this fixed price "ran with" the product into the
41. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
42. 285 N.C. at 471, 206 S.E.2d at 144.
43. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
44. Defendant Appellants' Supplemental Brief at 5.
45. Id.
46. 285 N.C. at 475, 206 S.E.2d at 147-48.
47. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
48. ' The price so fixed need have no relation to the cost to such retailer, to a reasonable profit to him or to any other standard. When so fixed, it is subject to change
by the producer at will from time to time and with no right in any retailer to be heard
by anyone." 285 N.C. at 476, 206 S.E.2d at 147.
49. Id. at 475, 206 S.E.2d at 147-48.
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hands of the nonsigner retailer. 50 Thus, explained the court in Ely
Lilly, the legislature had delegated nothing, for the retail price was
an inseparable characteristic of the product itself and "ran with" it
through all levels of the marketing process.51 This restrictive covenant theory was rejected in Bulova Watch as inapplicable to the
case at bar.52 Nothing in the record indicated that defendants had purchased any Bulova merchandise which had been originally "impressed"
with a factory-set resale price, and indeed there was evidence that defendants' vendors were not bound by any fair trade obligations.5"
Therefore, the restrictive covenant theory could not support the
54
statute.
The nonsigner clause of the North Carolina Fair Trade Act was
thus unequivocally held unconstitutional as an improper delegation of
legislative power. The court should have ended its inquiry here. Yet
quite unnecessarily the opinion proceeded to the second of defendant's
contentions, that the statute deprived nonsigners of "liberty" under
article I, section 19 of the State constitution. In so doing, the court
drifted away from the careful, well-reasoned jurisprudence of preceding paragraphs and tumbled recklessly into the realm of partisan politics.
The court's discussion of this latter issue reads more like an exercise
in advocacy journalism than a landmark decision by a state court of last
resort.

The court began with a sweeping statement of its constitutional
duty to declare acts of the General Assembly unconstitutional when
they unjustifiably restrict one's freedom to use and enjoy private property.55 The constitutional fate of the Fair Trade Act was thus made
to hang in the balance between personal liberty and public benefit.
The court left no doubt who would do the balancing.
Offering but a nod of deference to the General Assembly, the
court relied upon its "advantage of access to another page of history"56
in reflecting upon the shifting policy considerations and needs of the
contemporary marketplace. Quoting the Wall Street Journal," pointing
50. 216 N.C. at 176-77, 4 S.E.2d at 537-38.
51. Id.

52. 285 N.C. at 476, 206 S.E.2d at 148.
53. Id. at 476-77, 206 S.E.2d at 148.
54. Id.

55. Id. at 478, 206 S.E.2d at 149.
56. Id.

57. Id. at 479, 206 S.E.2d at 149.
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to judicial hostility toward nonsigner clauses in other states,58 and relying upon its own economic analysis of the anticompetitive effects of
vertical and horizontal price fixing,50 the court concluded that the freedom of contract of nonsigners outweighed any public benefit derived
from the statute.60
Bulova Watch raises serious questions of separation of powers, and
is certain to be viewed by some as judicial legislation in its most blatant
form, particularly since the General Assembly has consistently refused
to repeal fair trade legislation of some thirty-eight years' standing.0 1
In all fairness, there are few who will mourn the passing of resale
price maintenance in North Carolina. Enacted originlly to protect the
property interests of manufacturers in trademarked goods, state fair
trade laws have succeeded only in permitting legalized price fixing by
retailers at the consumer's expense.62 America's experiment with resale price maintenance is an idea whose time has come and gone again,
and the national trend indicates that state fair trade acts have far outlived their usefulness.63 The demise of fair trade in North Carolina
will undoubtedly benefit consumers, for there should emerge greater
competition and lower prices for high quality, brand name merchandise.
In addition, North Carolina now joins what is without doubt the national
mainstream in opposition to resale price maintenance.6 4 These policy
considerations weighed heavily in the court's balancing test in Bulova
Watch.
CONCLUSION

In holding the nonsigner provision of North Carolina's Fair Trade
Act unconstitutional, the State supreme court has most likely rung the
58. Id., quoting Coming Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., - Mass. -, 294
N.E.2d 354 (1973).
59. Id. at 480-81, 206 S.E.2d at 150.
60. Id. at 481, 206 S.E.2d at 151.
61. Contemplation of this latter half of the opinion in Bulova ,Watch inspires in
one the nagging suspicion that the matters there discussed and the conclusions drawn
therefrom might more appropriately arise in the committee rooms of the General Assembly rather than in the splendid isolation of chambers of court. Whenever the court
strikes down an act of the General Assembly, there are those who object that the court
is in effect usurping the powers of the legislative branch. These troublesome concepts
of substantive due process are beyond the scope of this case note, but are discussed skillfully and at length in Comment, Hospital Regulation After Aston Park: Substantive
Due Process in North Carolina, 52 N.C.L. REV. 763 (1974).
62. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
63. See, e.g., Note, The Impending Demise of Resale Price Maintenance, 1970
WA H. U.L.Q. 68 (1970).
64. See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
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death knell of resale price maintenance in the State, for the nonsigner
clause is the key to effective fair trade enforcement. But at what cost
has this been achieved? Between the North Carolina Supreme Court
and the ultimate result the court wished to achieve stood two formidable
legal obstacles-the twin pillars of statutory and caselaw precedent to
the contrary. The ease with which the court brushed them both aside
manifests an exercise of sheer judicial power and will surely provoke a
search for the source of such awesome strength. The court made no
attempt to reconcile Bulova Watch with Ely Lilly. While there are differences in the factual backgrounds of the two cases, none are of constitutional significance with respect to the nonsigner clause. Ely Lilly
is, in a word, overruled. The decision must be understood as a reassertion by the court of its sensitivity to important changes in public policy
and its determination and competence to make the law reflect those
changes.
MICHAEL A. ALMOND

Public Utilities-Fair Rates for Fair Service
On November 5, 1971, General Telephone of the Southeast (General)' applied to the North Carolina Utilities Commission (Commission) for an increase in the rates General charged its North Carolina
customers for local telephone service.2 The Commission found "the
record to be replete with evidence of operational inefficiences and
chronically poor service ' 3 and denied the rate increase.4 General appealed the order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals which remanded the proceeding to the Commission for specific findings of fact.5
General then petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for certiorari," contending that both the statutory formula for determining the
1. General, a Virginia corporation, serves the Durham, Creedmoor, Altan, Goose
Creek and Monroe, North Carolina exchanges. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 285 N.C. 671, 674, 208 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1974).
2. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 21 N.C. App. 408, 204
S.E.2d 529 (1974).
3. N.C. Utilities Comm'n, Order Denying Rate Increases, Docket P-19 Subs 133
& 136, at 55 (Oct. 23, 1973).
4. Id.
5. 21 N.C. App. at 411, 204 S.E.2d at 531.
6. 285 N.C. 596 (1974). Thus, the Commission never made the additional find-
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rates charged by public utilities in North Carolina7 and the United
States Constitution forbade consideration of the quality of service rendered by the utility as a factor in determining the return on investment
allowed the company.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. General Telephone firmly rejected the statutory argument °
and apparently rejected the constitutional one."' In so doing, the court
reaffirmed the principle that the Commission has both a right and a
duty to consider the quality of service rendered by a public utility in
setting utility rates,' 2 but also implicitly brought into doubt the ratesetting formula that has been used in North Carolina since 1899..
North Carolina's statutory scheme for utility rate setting is patterned after the landmark decision of Smyth v. Ames' s in which the
United States Supreme Court established the minimum due process requirements for state regulation of utility rates.' 4 According to Ames, a
state's utility commission must first determine the "fair value of the
property being used by . . . [the utility] for the convenience of the public.' 5 After determining a percentage "fair return" on this "rate
base," 6 the commission must calculate a rate schedule that will allow
the company to realize revenues sufficient to earn a "fair return on fair
value."'17 Ames gave little guidance to state utility commissions on the
difficult question of what factors should be considered in computing the
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133(b) (1965). See State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v.
State, 239 N.C. 333, 80 S.E.2d 133 (1954); text accompanying notes 13-17 inIra.
8. Brief for Appellant at 60, 67, State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. General Tel.
Co., 21 N.C. App. 408, 204 S.E.2d 529 (1974).
9. 285 N.C. 671, 208 S.E.2d 681 (1974).
10. Id. at 683, 208 S.E.2d at 688.
11. Id. at 682, 208 S.E.2d at 688.
12. This principle was first established in State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Morgan,
277 N.C. 255, 177 S.E.2d 405 (1970). (Commonly referred to as Lee Telephone).
13. 169 U.S. 466 (1898); see Note, Public Utility Regulation-Time for Re.
evaluation, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1140, 1141 (1973).
14. 169 U.S. at 546-47. The specific formula adopted in Ames was abandoned by
the United States Supreme Court. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas. Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1942). The Court continued to hold that a private utility must be allowed to earn
enough to meet its operational and capital expenses. Id. at 603.
15. 169 U.S. at 546-47. This valuation is known as the "fair value rate base."
Disputes over the proper method for determining the base are probably the most common form of utility regulation litigation. 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATON
36 (1970). Ames and subsequent cases never decided exactly what factors should be
used and what weight should be given them in reaching this determination. 169 U.S.
at 546-47; 1 A. KAHN, supra, at 37-38. See also, e.g., State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n
v. General Tel. Co., 281 N.C. 318, 338-39, 189 S.E.2d 705, 720 (1972).
16. 169 U.S. at 546-47.
17. Id.
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rate base or in establishing a "fair return." ' In relation to the latter
point, the Supreme Court in Bluefield Water Works & Improvement
Co. v. Public Service Commission 9 concluded that every utility is enyield it a return comparable to other businesses
titled to rates that will
20
risk.
(low)
similar
of
The test that emerges from Ames and Bluefield apparently is an
economic one. A utility commission first must determine the "fair
value" of the company's investment based on its original cost less depreciation, the plant's present replacement cost and the like. The

Commission then must survey other governmentally protected industries and determine a "fair rate of return" on this investment base. In

this context, "fair" acquires a specialized meaning based more on economic and accounting concepts than equity.
Previously, the North Carolina Supreme Court had held that the

rate-setting plan of section 62-133(b) of the North Carolina General
Statutes was identical to the Bluefield test.21 That section provides:
In fixing such rates, the Commission shall:
(1) Ascertain -the fair value of the public utility's -property ....
(2) Estimate such public utility's revenue under -the present
and proposed rates.
(3) Ascertain such public utility's reasonable operating expenses ....
(4) Fix such rate of return on the fair value of -the property as
will enable the public utility by sound management to produce a
fair profit for its stockholders ....
(5) Fix such rates to be charged by the public utility as will earn
in addition to reasonable operating expenses ascertained pursuant
to paragraph (3) of this subsection the rate of return fixed pur18. "In order to ascertain that value [the rate base], the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value
of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction
...are all matters for consideration." Id. This list was neither exhaustive nor mandatory. Id. The rate of return must be sufficient for the utility to maintain its plant and
pay some dividend to the stockholders. Id.
19. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
20. Id. at 690. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1942) expressed
the test somewhat differently. The Court held that the rate of return allowed a public
utility should be sufficient to pay the operating expenses and the costs of attracting and
holding capital. Id. at 602. The North Carolina Supreme Court has identified this
"cost of capital" test with the Bluefield test. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. General
Tel. Co., 285 N.C. 671, 681, 208 S.E.2d 681, 688 (1974); State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n
v. Duke Power Co., 285 N.C. 377, 393, 206 S.E.2d 269 (1974); State ex rel. Utilities
Comm'n v. Morgan, 278 N.C. 235, 179 S.E.2d 419 (1971).
21. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Morgan, 278 N.C. 235, 179 S.E.2d 419
(1971).
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suant to paragraph (4) on -the fair value of the public utility's
property ascertained pursuant to paragraph (1).22
Section 133(b), however, is not the only section in chapter 62 relating
to rates.23 Section 2 declares that the policy of the chapter is to "provide fair regulation of public utilities in the interest of the public,
to promote adequate, economical and efficient utility services .
Section 42 empowers the Commission to issue orders to correct deficiences in service. Section 131(b) states that "[e]very public utility
shall furnish adequate . . . service."

Section 133(a) commands the

Commission to set rates that will be fair both to the utility and to consumers, and section 133(d) requires the Commission to consider "all
other material facts" in reaching its conclusions as to reasonable rates.
In the light of the above provisions, the court has held that section 133(b) could not be interpreted to "require the Commission to
shut its eyes to 'poor' and 'substandard' service . ...24 Instead,
in State ex. rel. Utilities Commission v. Morgan (commonly referred
to as Lee Telephone) 25 and again in General Telephone, the court held
that chapter 62 required the Commission to consider the quality of service rendered by the utility in setting rate levels. 20 "The clear purpose
of chapter 62.

.

.is to confer upon the Utilities Commission the power

and the duty to compel a public utility company to render adequate
service and to fix therefore reasonable rates. 27 An implicit quid pro
exists in all monopoly regulations:28 "Having been granted a monopoly in its franchise area, the utility is under a duty to render reasonably adequate service."2"

Although General Telephone declared that the "primary purpose
22. N.C.GEN.STAT. § 62-133(b) (1965).
23. "The entire chapter is a single integrated plan. Its several provisions must be
construed together so as to accomplish its primary purpose." 285 N.C. at 680, 208
S.E.2d at 687. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Morgan, 277 N.C. 255, 264, 177 S.E.2d
405, 411 (1970).
24. 285 N.C. at 682, 208 S.E.2d at 688, citing State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v.
Morgan, 277 N.C. 255, 266, 177 S.E.2d 405, 412 (1970).
25. 277 N.C.255, 177 S.E.2d 405 (1970).
26. 285 N.C. at 683, 208 S.E.2d at 688; 277 N.C. at 266, 177 S.E.2d at 412. In
both cases, the court analyzed chapter 62 and used virtually identical language to explain
its interpretation. Curiously, General Telephone did not cite Lee Telephone for this
part of its analysis.
27. 277 N.C. at 266, 177 S.E.2d at 412.
28. "A quasi-public entity receives well defined and valuable privileges not accorded a private, unregulated corporation . . . . In return, the State reserves the right
to supervise and regulate its operations." State ex rel. Utilities Conm'n v. State, 239
N.C. 333, 343, 80 S.E.2d 133, 140 (1954).
29. 277 N.C. at 263, 177 S.E.2d at 410.
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of chapter 62 is to assure the public adequate service at reasonable
charge,"' 0 the court did not decide what method the Commission
should use to set rates in compliance with this purpose. Apparently,
the court believed that the legislature had given that task to the Commission,"1 whose finding that General rendered "chronically poor service," 2 like any other finding of fact, was conclusive since it was supported by competent evidence.83
Although the Commission specifically noted the effect of poor service in assessing General's rate of return, 4 it did not disclose the
method by which this effect was discovered. Before General Telephone, the Commission had determined rates by the economic method
of "fair return on fair value." Now, the Commission has evidently
modified or discarded that mode of calculation in favor of a nebulous
decision about the "real"!'value of the service.8 5 The latter method appears to ignore the Bluefield procedure outlined in section 133(b).
The statutory method seems objective and precise while the new process is subjective and vague. Nevertheless, the two approaches to ratemaking are reconcilable. Although fair return-the first step of the
statutory fair-return-on-fair-value calculation-is perhaps susceptible of
objective determination," the fair value of the rate base is not. The
Commission "must arrive at its own independent conclusion [about the
fair value rate base] without reference to any specific formula. ...
30. 285 N.C. at 680, 208 S.E.2d at 686-87. Previous cases have held that the
Commission has the sole authority to determine the adequacy of the utility's service and
the rates to be charged therefor. State ex reL. Utilities Comm'n v. General Tel. Co.,
281 N.C. 318, 336, 189 S.E.2d 705, 717 (1972) and cases cited therein.
31. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-130(a) (1965).
32. 285 N.C. at 680, 208 S.E.2d at 686.
33. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Coach Co., 269 N.C. 717, 722, 153
S.E.2d 461, 465 (1967) and cases cited therein.
34. "We conclude that if all prerequisites were present, a substantially higher rate
of return should and would be allowed but that in view of the inefficient and inadequate
service .. .no increase in rates should be allowed."

N.C. Utilities C.omm'n, Order

Denying Rate Increases, Docket P-19 Subs 133 & 136, at 56 (Oct. 23, 1973).
35. See 285 N.C. at 688, 208 S.E.2d at 692. For a discussion of the inherent impossibility of making objective decisions on the "real" value of utility service, see J.
BoNnnlo-rr, PIuNCIPLES o PUBLiC UTIL1TY RATs 82-92 (1961).
36. "The apparent precision with which experts . . . compute the fair rate of return is somewhat illusory." State ex reL. Utilities Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 281 N.C.
318, 370, 189 S.E.2d 705, 738 (1972). In addition, the court's efforts at precision have
also been illusory. "What constitutes a 'just and reasonable' rate which will return a
fair return on the investment depends on. . .4) what rate constitutes a just and reasonable rate of return on the Rate Base." State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. State, 239 N.C.
333, 344, 80 S.E.2d 133, 140-41 (1954).
37. State ex reL. Utilities Comm'n v. State, 239 N.C. 333, 344, 80 S.E.2d 133, 141
(1954). See State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 281 N.C. 318, 33839, 189 S.E.2d 705, 718-19 (1972).
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Thus, at its core, the process by which the Commission traditionally had
calculated rates was subjective.8 8 Accordingly, modifying it to include
the dictates of the new qualitative approach should be relatively easy.
A subjectively determined penalty for poor service is subtracted from
a subjectively determined "fair return on fair value." 9 The resulting
rate schedule is not only fair according to section 133(b) 40 but also
reflects the "real" value of the service.

General argued that the real value method sanctioned an unconstitutional confiscation. 4 While conceding that deficiencies in service
should result in a lower valuation of its rate base, 42 General argued
that the rate of return could not fall below a percentage return determined by following a literal application of section 133(b).48 General
also claimed that a reduction in the rate of return for inadequate service after a reduction in the rate base constituted a double penalty for
the same fault."
In response, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that the
Bluefield test "assumes reasonably good service."" If the service is
adequate, the test is an economic one of "fair return on fair value."
If the service is poor, the words remain the same but their meanings
38. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 15, at 37-38. If both the rate base and the rate
of return are arrived at arbitrarily, the Commission may easily abandon the entire system while maintaining the appearance of conformity. The Commission would first decide on the revenues to be allowed the utility and then set the rate base and the rate
of return accordingly.
39. That is the theoretical approach. A more practical method is simply to deny
any increase in rates as a penalty for poor service, adjust the rate base and declare the
resulting rate of return to be "just and reasonable' under the circumstances. The North
Carolina Supreme Court seems to have endorsed the first method while the Commission
seems to have adopted the second. N.C. Utilities Comm'n, Order Denying Rate Increases, Docket P-19 Subs 133 & 136 (Oct. 23, 1973).
40. See 285 N.C. at 684-85, 208 S.E.2d at 689-90.
41. Brief for Appellant at 55, 62, State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. General Tel.
Co., 21 N.C. App. 408, 204 S.E.2d 529 (1974).
42. Id. at 62.
43. General argued that numerous decisions by both the North Carolina and the
United States Supreme Courts had established the principle that a public utility must
be allowed to earn a reasonable rate of return. Since the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that the rate of return established by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133(b) (1965) was
the minimum reasonable rate of return in State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Duke Power
Co., 285 N.C. 377, 388, 206 S.E.2d 269, 276 (1974), General argued that a lower rate
would be per se unreasonable, unconstitutional and confiscatory. Brief for Appellant
at 62-67.
44. Brief for Appellant at 55. The court quickly disposed of this argument. The
deduction from fair value was for deficiencies in the physical plant. The deduction from
fair return was for a different inadequacy-poor management. 285 N.C. at 683-84, 208
S.E.2d at 689.
45. 285 N.C. at 681-82, 208 S.E.2d at 688.
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change. In the latter circumstances, "fair" means equitable to the consumer.4" Consequently, no particular rate of return can be per se unrearate of return
sonable.47 While the costs remain the same, the allowable
48
will vary with the fluctuations in the quality of service.
Since General realized a profit and paid a dividend under the poor
service rate, the court found that the allowed rate of return was not
confiscatory in fact. 49 The court did not make clear whether the test
for a confiscatory rate was profitability or the declaration of dividends.
It emphasized the latter criterion, 0 but the declaration of dividends
is a poor gage of a company's financial position. A company may pay
dividends at the discretion of its board of directors so long as it retains
earned surplus. 51 Accordingly, a company could declare dividends
during a year in which it had suffered a net operating loss. Conversely,
the company could refuse to declare a dividend even though it made
a considerable profit on the year.
Rates low enough to force the company to operate at a net loss are
probably illegal under section 62. Although the primary purpose of
chapter 62 is to assure the public of adequate service at a reasonable
charge, as a necessary corollary to this purpose, some protection of investment must be guaranteed to the owners of the public utility's capital. 52 A profitable rate is guaranteed to provide and maintain the facilities necessary for rendering adequate service. 53 Since a -utility with
poor service probably cannot improve that service while operating at
a net loss, 5 4 any rate that would deny the company a profit because
of poor service would be self-defeating.
General Telephone was undoubtedly correct in holding that chapter 62 required the consideration of the quality of service in the public
46. See id. at 680-81, 208 S.E.2d at 687.
47. Id. at 682, 208 S.E.2d at 688, citing Covington & Lexington Turnpike Co. v.
Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1896).
48. "There is no such thing as a reasonable rate for service that is deficient." C.
PHILLIPS, THE EcONOMICS OF REGULATION

400 (rev. ed. 1969).

49. "After paying all interest on General's indebtedness, taxes and the dividends
on the portion of its preferred stock allocable to North Carolina intrastate service, this
left $1,740,282 for the common stockholders. This was sufficient to pay a 6% dividend
on . . . the common stock . . . . This is not confiscation." 285 N.C. at 683, 208
S.E.2d at 286.
50. Id. at 683, 208 S.E.2d at 689.
51.

R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRAcTICE, § 21-2 to

-5 (1974).
52. 285 N.C. at 680, 208 S.E.2d at 687.
53. Id.
54. But see id. at 685, 208 S.E.2d at 690.
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utility rate-making process. The intent of the statute is to allow the
utilities to charge equitable rates,"' and the court has properly restored
that commonplace meaning to the once technical phrase "fair return
on fair value." Rate setting is a complicated task and requires clearer
standards than an individual Commissioner's sense of justice. Since
chapter 62 does not provide any guidelines for the incorporation of service quality in the rate-making process, the court should formulate
workable standards within the spirit of the statute.
Drawing an analogy from Bluefield,50 the court could require the
Commission to survey the quality of service given by other utilities and
establish minimal standards of service. The Commission could then
lower or even raise rates by the proportion that a given utility's service
varied from this standard. While somewhat subjective, this express
method would provide a benchmark for review that would be preferable to the unstated procedure apparently adopted by the Commission
and approved by the court.
E. THOMAS

WATSON

Real Property-Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Quality in
New Housing Sales: New Protection for the North Carolina
Homebuyer
For the majority of American jurisdictions, application of the
doctrine of caveat emptor in new housing sales is a long established
tradition.' These courts frequently justify use of the doctrine by citing the need for certainty of title in real estate actions and the available alternative of express warranties.' In Hartley v. Ballou,3 a case
of first impression in North Carolina, the supreme court rejected this
outmoded tradition in favor of finding an implied warranty of workmanlike quality in new housing sales and thus joined the expanding
55. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
56. 262 U.S. at 690.
1. See, e.g., Voight v. Ott, 86 Ariz. 128, 341 P.2d 923 (1959); Tudor v. Heugel,
132 Ind. App. 579, 178 N.E.2d 442 (1961); Allen v. Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d
515 (1968); Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St., 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966).
2. Hartley v. Ballou, 20 N.C. App. 493, 496-97, 201 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1974).
3. 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
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minority of jurisdictions 4 that have recognized the necessity of providing some protection to homebuyers.
In October 1969 builder-vendor Ballou completed the dwelling
that became the subject of this litigation. Later in that month, and
prior to purchase, plaintiff Hartley inspected the house and found it
satisfactory with no sign of leakage. At about the time that Hartley
moved into the house in December, the basement flooded after a hard
rain. In January defendant Ballou spent 4,000 dollars waterproofing
the basement, which remained dry for eighteen months until August
1971 when it flooded during a hurricane. The basement flooded one
month later during another hurricane and again in October during a
heavy rain. Hartley then sued, alleging a breach of both an express
and an implied warranty. The trial court found a breach of an implied warranty and granted damages for all incidents of flooding.'
After approval by the court of appeals, 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the lower courts misapplied the
implied warranty and remanded for a trial de novo7 because of confusion created by variances between the plaintiff's allegations and his
proof. Nevertheless, the court explicitly stated that in every sale by a
builder-vendor of a new dwelling there is an implied warranty to the
initial vendee that, at the time of the passing of the deed or the taking of possession, the dwelling meets the prevailing standard of workmanlike quality.'
As noted above, this finding of an implied warranty departs
abruptly from the doctrine of caveat emptor that controls in most
jurisdictions. Although of uncertain origins, the doctrine has been
cited by courts and commentators often enough and long enough that
it is frequently labeled as an ancient maxim.9 Caveat emptor translates loosely as "buyer beware." Practically speaking it means that
the buyer "pays his money and takes his chances."' 0 The harshness
4. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Week v. A:M Sunrisa Constr. Co.,
36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83
S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
5. 286 N.C. at 57-58, 209 S.E.2d at 780.
6. 20 N.C. App. 493, 201 S.E.2d 712 (1974).
7. 286 N.C. at 66, 209 S.E.2d at 785.
8. Id. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
9. For an excellent discussion of the origins and development of caveat emptor
see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim CaveatEmptor, 40 YALE LJ.1133 (1931).
10. The law of implied warranty has developed far more extensively in personalty
than in realty. Caldwell v. Smith, 20 N.C. 193 (1838), an early case involving personal
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of this rule in regard to new housing sales has led many courts to
adopt one of two alternatives." The first alternative was set out
in Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates Ltd.,ln an English case.

In this

decision, which marked the first rejection of caveat emptor, the court
held that a house purchased during construction was impliedly war-

ranted to be completed in a workmanlike manner. Thus, the English court drew a distinction over whether the house was purchased
before or after construction.

Following the lead of Vanderschrier

v. Aaron,"3 an Ohio case, American jurisdictions initially accepted
this dichotomy. Many courts, however, have not found a rational
basis for such a distinction. Adopting a second alternative to caveat
emptor, those dissenting jurisdictions found an implied warranty regardless of whether the house was sold before, during, or after con4

struction.1

In Hartley v. Ballou the North Carolina court accepted this sec-

ond alternative, expressly rejecting both caveat emptor 3 and the
Miller 6 approach. The implied warranty however, is not open-ended.
The North Carolina court carefully circumscribed the situations and
manner in which it may be applied. First, the sale must be made by
a builder-vendor.' 1 On its face this requirement would seem to permit
circumvention of the implied warranty by simply separating the
two functions. Courts, however, have usually looked at the realities
of a transaction and have found implied warranties in situations in
property, held that caveat emplor applied where "the purchaser received the very article
for which he contracted-there was no stipulation with respect to its qualities, and these
were at least as well known to him as to the vendor." Id. at 196. In the area of personalty however, caveat emptor gradually gave way to an implied warranty of fitness
for use that became codified in the Uniform Commercial Code.
11. Note, Phasing Out Caveat Emptor: Implied Warranties in Builder-Vendor
Contracts,2 CAPrroL L. REV. 199 (1973).
12. [19311 2 K.B. 113.
13. 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
14. Of particular interest in studying this transition are two decisions by the Colorado Supreme Court. In Slisar v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963), the
court applied the English rule. Only one year later in Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo.
78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964), it extended this holding to cover situations in which the house
was purchased after completion. The court reasoned "that a different rule should apply
to the purchaser of a house which is near completion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems incongruous . . . .
ilt is recognizing a distinction without
a reasonable basis for it." Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402. For a discussion of this distinction see Beauman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule,
14 VANIX L. REV. 541, 543-47 (1960).
15. 286 N.C. at 60-62, 209 S.E.2d at 782-83.
16. Id. at 61, 209 S.E.2d at 782.
17. The North Carolina court describes this as "the vendor, if he be in the business
of building such dwellings." Id. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
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which the builder used a realtor to make the sale'" and in which the

vendor used independent contractors for the actual construction. 9 In
the latter instance the Texas court noted that it is "highly irrational

to make a distinction between the liability of a vendor-builder who
employs servants and one who uses independent contractors.

' 20

The

"builder-vendor" requirement primarily serves to emphasize that no
implied warranty will run from a purchaser who, obtaining the dwell-

ing in an arms length transaction, subsequently resells in good faith
and not for the purpose of evasion. 2 '
Another restriction set out in Hartley limits the warranty to the

'initial vendee."'22 Thus, the warranty runs to the purchaser and
not with the land. This distinction seems to serve no justifiable purpose and is capable of causing considerable problems.

Many struc-

tural defects are not apparent until the dwelling reaches a certain age
or perhaps passes through a particular weather cycle. In Hartley for

example, had Hartley lived in the house during a dry season and
had he been forced to sell the house soon after he acquired it, the
purchaser would have had no recourse when the heavy seasonal rains

finally exposed the defect.

Such a result is highly inequitable.

The

personal nature of -the warranty may be explained as a holdover

from considerations of privity, 23 but that is an explanation and not a
justification.

Although no other jurisdiction has passed on the rights

of a repurchaser under a theory of implied warranty,24 courts have
18. E.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966).
19. E.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
20. Id. at 561. The potential for extending liability is vividly demonstrated in
Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., -

Cal. App. 2d -,

-, 61 Cal. Rptr. 333, 334

(2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), vacated, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1968), a case decided on tort liability theory, where the court held a contractor "responsible, for his own work or that of a subcontractor, to the purchasers, subsequent purchasers, or third parties for personal injuries or property damage resulting from substantial defects in construction." Nor did the court stop there. It also extended liability
to the lender who apparently did not use good judgment in selecting his developers.
This extension was based on public policy and the ability to bear the financial burden.
21. In such a situation the vendor has no greater knowledge than the vendee.
Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
22. 286 N.C. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783; see Note, Sale of House by Builder-Vendor
Creates an Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 24 ALA.L. Rav. 332, 338 n.28
(1972).
23. Most courts facing this issue have followed the logic of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), a products liability case, in finding
privity not a bar. See, e.g., Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961).
24. In Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd per curiam, 264
So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972), a case finding an implied warranty for sale of a condominium,
the court considered such a problem through dicta. "We ponder, but do not decide, what
result would occur if more remote purchasers were involved. We recognize that liability
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held, under a strict liability theory, that a builder is liable to a thirdparty plaintiff25 or repurchaser 2 0 -reasoning that might by analogy
be used to extend liability beyond the initial vendee under an implied
warranty theory.
Another requirement of the holding would limit the warranty to

those defects in existence at the time of the passing of the deed or
27
the taking of possession by the initial vendee (whichever first occurs).

This criteria sets one limit on the builder's liability. A major problem,
which the court did not address, however, concerns the time span of

that liability. For example, assuming that a defect in a dwelling was in
existence at the time of the passing of the deed and that the initial

vendee is still in possession, how long will the builder-vendor remain
liable, one year, ten years, twenty years? The problem of determining this time limit has troubled many commentators. 28 The proper
time should depend on many factors including the type of defect and
its seriousness. In some cases one year may be too long while in
others eight years will not be long enough.29 In finding the actual
limit therefore it is essential that courts approach the "duration of
the warranty" on a case-by-case basis and apply a test of reasonableness.

30

Hartley sets the qualitative standard for the warranty by requiring
construction in a "workmanlike manner. 83 1 This warranty extends
to the dwelling and all of its fixtures. 2 The North Carolina court
explained the workmanlike standard in Moss v. Knitting Mills"3
holding that the "law exacts ordinary care and skill only."3 4 Implicit
must have an end but question the creation of any artificial limits of either time or remoteness to the original purchaser." Id. at 18.
25. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
26. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
27. 286 N.C. at 26, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
28. Note, 24 ALA. L. REV., supra note 20, at 338-39; Note, Caveat Emptor-Intplied Warranty of Habitability, 12 DUQUESNE L. Rlv. 109, 115 (1973).
29. Kreigler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
30. The South Dakota court adopted this standard in Waggoner v. Midwestern
Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 68, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (1967). The court stated that "[tihe
duration of liability is likewise determined by the standard of reasonableness."
31. 286 N.C. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
32. Id. This statement is in line with other jurisdictions that have allowed recovery for defects in various other items. Gable v. Silver, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla.) (per
curiam), aff'g 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (air conditioner); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (boiler).
33. 190 N.C. 644, 130 S.E. 635 (1925).
34. Id. at 648, 130 S.E. at 637. As in other jurisdictions, a perfect dwelling is not
required. See Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
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in the notion of workmanlike quality is the idea that the dwelling
will be warranted only to hold up under reasonable or foreseeable
use. The court brought out this point in Hartley by its finding that
the dwelling was not warranted to withstand extreme weather condi'3 5
tions such as hurricanes but only the more typical "northeasters.
"Workmanlike manner" is not the terminology used by all courts
that have rejected caveat emptor. Other jurisdictions, with reference
to landlord-tenant law, have spoken in terms of fitness for habitation"
or with reference to the Uniform Commercial Code, have described the
warranty in terms of "fitness and merchantability.

37

Of course, some

have adopted the phrase "workmanlike construction" 38 that was used
in Hartley. In spite of the differences in phraseology, the decisions
do not reveal any substantive difference that might be attributed to
the particular term applied. Nevertheless it is arguable that the North
Carolina court, like other courts, 9 will look with particular emphasis
to precedents in the area from which it borrowed its standard, whether
it be from landlord-tenant law, the UCC, or common law.
The court stated that the implied warranty in the contract of
sale survives the passing of the deed or the taking of possession.
Thus, the court rejected the argument that the doctrine of merger
operates to fuse the contract into
the delivery of the deed, constitut40
terms.
its
all
of
ing a fulfillment
As a final factor in establishing an implied warranty, the court
considered whether Hartley had notice of the defect and stated that
"[a]n implied warranty cannot be held to extend to defects which are
visible or should be visible -to a reasonable man upon inspection of
the dwelling."' The court used language from the Uniform Commercial Code and analogized from warranties applicable to the sale of
goods.42 In Hartley plaintiff had no notice of the defects prior to his
35. 286 N.C. at 62-63, 209 S.E.2d at 783.

36. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966).
37. Gable v. Silver, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla.) (per curiam), affg 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
38. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo.78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
39. See Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of Real Estate, 26 U. MIAMi L. REv.
838, 843 (1972).
40. For a good discussion of why merger should not apply see Week v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 IM. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962). Essentially, the court
held that if there are provisions in the contract that delivery of the deed does not fulfill
there is no merger. The incorporation of an implied warranty therefore would prohibit
merger.
41. 286 N.C. at 61, 209 S.E.2d at 782.
42. N.C. GN.STAT. § 25-2-316(3)(b) (1965).
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purchase, and thus an implied warranty was applicable. The court,
however, did not stop with this assertion. Instead, it appeared to
hold that the implied warranty is revocable at any time subsequent to
the purchase by notice to the purchaser of the existence of a defect.
In Hartley, therefore, defendant escaped liability for damage that occurred after the first storm and after the defendant attempted to repair the basement, on the theory that H ,rtley then had notice of potential problems.
This concept of revocation must be applied flexibly because
strict application, as in Hartley, creates new problems. Hartley effectively refused 43 to extend the warranty to cover repairs made by
the builder-vendor in response to complaints by the purchaser, suggesting that Hartley should have filed suit immediately. 4 This ruling is
unsound in light of traditional judicial policy. It will tend to encourage litigation and discourage amicable settlement by the purchaser
and the builder-vendor as the purchaser would not want to risk losing his warranty. His sole recourse, should he deal with the builder,
would be to obtain an express warranty for the repairs. This provides no satisfactory solution because most purchasers would be unaware of the problem and because builder-vendors would not freely
give such a warranty. It seems best, therefore, in the situation in
which repairs are carried out by the builder-vendor, to extend the
implied warranty to cover them.
In setting out the above factors, the court concerned itself with
the initial finding of an implied warranty and with the extent of its
application. Once a warranty is found, however, there remains a
problem of what damages will be appropriate. Hartley addressed
that question only through dicta45 because the alleged notice negated
any claim for damages subsequent to the attempt to repair by defendant. Nevertheless, the court offered suggestions on the type of dam43. Importantly, however, it is not entirely clear that the court mandated such a
result. Rather, the refusal to find further damages may be attributable to the concept
of "foreseeability," see text accompanying note 35 supra, in that hurricanes or unusual
weather conditions caused the later damage. The specific finding of the court that "with
knowledge of these facts, plaintiff continued in possession until the waterproofing proved
insufficient under hurricane conditions," 286 N.C. at 63, 209 S.E.2d at 784, supports
such an interpretation. This foreseeability interpretation seems more consistent with the
philosophy of the implied warranty than does the harsh application of notice. See Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) in which the court
allowed recovery for leakage on three separate occasions.
44. 286 N.C. at 65, 209 S.E.2d at 785.
45. Id. at 63, 65, 209 S.E.2d at 783, 785.
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age claims it would entertain. It "assumes" that Hartley could have
asked for the difference in market value as impliedly warranted and
as it actually existed or the cost of repair. 46 The court also suggested
that recission might have been appropriate.4 7
By accepting the doctrine of an implied warranty of workmanlike quality in new housing sales, North Carolina supplies homebuyers
with practical tools to protect themselves. However, some aspects of
the court's holding, such as restriction to the initial vendee and the
notice requirement, may cause inequitable results if the language of
the court is applied strictly in future cases. On balance the rule
announced in Hartley is well reasoned. One can hope that it is the
forerunner of more judicial acceptance of the responsibility for consumer protection in matters of property law.
CRAIG J. TILLERY

Sales-Applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to the Sale
of a Business
The Sales Article of the Uniform Commercial Code' purports to
govern "transactions in goods."' Although the Code does not define
"transactions," it does define "goods" as "all things . . . movable
....
I* In conformance with the broad scope of this definition the
North Carolina Court of Appeals recently held that a contract for the
sale of a business consisting entirely of movable assets constitutes a
"transaction in goods" falling within the coverage of the Code.4
Miller v. Belk5 involved a contract for the sale by Peggy S. Miller
of her laundry and dry cleaning business, which consisted solely of
46. Id. at 63, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
47. Id. at 65, 209 S.E.2d at 785.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-2-101 to -725 (1965).
2. Id. § 25-2-102.
3. Id. § 25-2-105(1). The entire definition reads as follows:
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other
than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (article
8) and things in action. "Goods!' also includes the unborn young of animals
and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in
the section on goods to be severed from realty (§ 25-2-107).
4. Miller v. Belk, 23 N.C. App. 1, 207 S.E.2d 792 (1974).
5. 23 N.C. App. 1, 207 S.E.2d 792 (1974).
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tangible, movable assets." When the buyer, Joel L. Kirkley, Jr., refused to consummate the agreement, Miller notified him that she intended to seek legal redress, but said nothing about reselling the business. A short time later, without notifying Kirkley, she did resell to
a third party for substantially less than the amount called for in the original contract. She then sued Kirkley to recover the difference between
the original contract price and the amount she realized upon resale.
After a default judgment was vacated by the court of appeals, 7 a nonjury trial was held, and judgment was entered against Kirkley for the
amount sought by plaintiff.
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals applied the Uniform Commercial Code to the contract s and held that plaintiff had
failed to comply with the requirement of North Carolina General Statutes section 25-2-706(3) that the seller notify the buyer of his intention to resell in order to recover the difference between the contract
price and the resale price. 9 Therefore, plaintiff's recovery was limited
to the difference between the contract price and "'the market price
at the time and placy for tender.' "10
Prior to Miller the North Carolina courts had not considered
whether the Uniform Commercial Code applies to the sale of a business.'1 The Code does not address the question specifically. The
court of appeals, therefore, turned to other jurisdictions for assistance.
The case that most influenced the court, Foster v. Colorado Radio
Corp.," involved a seller's suit for breach of a contract for the sale of
a radio station, the assets of which consisted of studios, real estate,
transmission equipment, the station's license, good will, and office
equipment and furnishings.13 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals divided the contract, applying the Code only to the office equipment and
furnishings on the ground that they were the only assets that came
within the Code's definition of "goods.' 4
6. No mention of good will was made by the parties. Id. at 5, 207 S.E.2d at
794.
7. Miller v. Belk, 18 N.C. App. 70, 196 S.E.2d 44, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 665,
197 S.E.2d 874 (1973).
8. 23 N.C. App. 1, 207 S.E.2d 792. The alternative was to apply North Carolina
common law. See note 35 infra.
9. Id. at 5, 207 S.E.2d at 795.
10. Id. at 6, 207 S.E.2d at 795, quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-708(1) (1965).
11. 23 N.C. App. at 4, 207 S.E.2d at 794.
12. 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967).
13. Id. at 225-26.
14. Id. at 226-27. Non-Code law was applied to the nongoods portion. Id. It
does not appear from the opinion whether the parties had allocated the purchase price
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The only other case cited by the North Carolina court was
Melms v. Mitchell' in which the Oregon Supreme Court applied the
relevant Code provisions to a contract for sale of a cordwood business.
As in Miller all of the assets were tangible and within the Code's definition of "goods."'" Unlike Miller, however, the parties had allocated
the purchase price among the assets. 17 The Oregon court held that

the Code applied to the transaction because no statutory exception is
made for the sale of assets, otherwise qualifying as goods, that are part

of a going business.'
Notwithstanding Foster and Melms, one case has recently held
that in some circumstances the Code does not apply to the sale of a
business consisting of goods and nongoods. Field v. Golden Triangle

Broadcasting,Inc.,' 9 a Pennsylvania case involving a contract for the
sale of two radio stations, refused to divide the contract between goods
and nongoods, partly on the ground that the parties intended that the

contract not be divisible. 20 An important factor in the court's determination of this intention was the lack of reference in the contract to
specific assets. 21

The court also distinguished Foster on the ground

that the goods involved in that case represented a significant portion
of the contract price, whereas in Field the percentage of goods was

insignificant.22
Apparently, no other court has discussed the application of the
Code to the sale of a business. 23 Thus, the scant authority existing
prior to Miller held that the Code applied to the sale of a business as
a going concern, except when the percentage of the purchase price atamong the different assets of the business; however, in discussing the value of each part
of the contract the court seems to have assumed or known that the price was not allocated. See id.
15. 266 Ore. 208, 512 P.2d 1336 (1973).
16. Id. at 217, 512 P.2d at 1340.
17. The parties in Miller listed the assets of the business, but they did not assign
separate values to them. See Record at 29-30.
18. The court also held that allocation of the purchase price negated the possibility
that the parties intended to treat the business as a unit. 266 Ore. at 217, 512 P.2d at
1340-41.
19. 451 Pa. 422, 305 A.2d 689 (1973).
20. Id. at -, 305 A.2d at 696 (alternative holding). The court held that "the nature of the transaction, the intention of the parties as reflected by the writing, and the
lack of specific reference to designated assets renders inescapable the conclusion that the
letter agreement was one integrated contract." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at-, 305 A.2d at 696.
23. A Georgia case, Crooks v. Chapman Co., 124 Ga. App. 718, 115 S.E.2d 787
(1971), held that the Code did not apply to the contract involved, but gave no reason
and did not reveal the terms of the contract.
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tributable to the assets within the Code's definition of goods was "insignificant." Furthermore, when the business consisted of significant
portions of goods and nongoods, the Code was applied only to the
goods portion of the contract, with non-Code law being applied to the
nongoods portion.
Since the facts in Miller strongly favored application of the
Code,2 4 the law that North Carolina courts will apply to other contracts
for the sale of a business remains open to speculation. Three types
of contracts have yet to be evaluated by the North Carolina courts: a
contract for the sale of a business whose assets are all goods, in which
the price is allocated among the assets; a contract for the sale of a business consisting of significant portions of both goods and nongoods; and
a contract for the sale of a business consisting of an insignificant percentage of goods.25
In the first case, in which all of the assets of the transferred business are goods and the purchase price is allocated among them, the
court would probably apply the Code to the transaction. In Miller the
price was not allocated,26 but the court held that the transfer was in
reality nothing more than a transfer of the individual assets.27 Presumably, the court would hold likewise when the parties do allocate
the price among the assets.2 8
Arguably, allocation should not be a factor when a business consists entirely of goods, because, regardless of the parties' intention, the
sale is a "transaction in goods." The Code lends further support to
this result by introducing the concept of the "commercial unit," which
is defined as "such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a single
whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its
character or value ... ."9 A business consisting entirely of goods
will generally fit this definition.30
24. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
25. A fourth possible contract is on6 for the sale of a business consisting entirely
of nongoods. By its terms the Code is inapplicable to such a contract, but the court
may wish to apply the Code by analogy. See text accompanying notes 37-38 infra.
26. See note 17 supra.
27. 23 N.C. App. at 5, 207 S.E.2d at 794.
28. In fact, the Oregon Supreme Court in Melms reached a similar result largely
on the ground that the parties allocated the price. 266 Ore. at 217, 512 P.2d at 1340.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-105(6) (1965). Although Comment 4 to this section
indicates that the definition is intended to help with the phrasing of later sections, the
concept is, nevertheless, relevant to the present analysis.
30. Although allocation of the purchase price may indicate that the parties did not
intend to treat the business as a unit, any inference of such an intention from mere allo.
cation, without more, would not be warranted, Melms notwithstanding. The price of
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The second type of contract involves the sale of a business consist-

ing of significant portions of both goods and nongoods.

Foster is au-

thority for dividing the contract into goods and nongoods portions

whether or not the price is allocated among the assets."1 Such a division would result in application of the Code to the goods portion of

the contract and the non-Code law of the jurisdiction to the nongoods
portion.32 Arguably, however, such contracts should not be divided.
Because application of the Code may yield a different result than other

statutory or common law of the jurisdiction, division of the contract may
create anomalous results.

For example, the Code is more likely than

North Carolina common law33 to recognize the validity of written contracts that do not specify all the terms agreed to by the parties. 34
Therefore, when a business consists of both goods and nongoods, the

contract might be held valid with respect to the former and invalid with
respect to the latter.
This and other possible inconsistent results 35 can be avoided by

applying only one law to a particular contract. Arguably, the existence
any item or unit is necessarily determined with reference to its components, whether or
not the reference is explicit. Furthermore, if the sale is considered a transfer of each
individual asset, the Code more obviously applies to the contract under discussion, because every asset of the business is a "good."
31. By dividing the contract when the price was not allocated, the Tenth Circuit
implied that it would do so in the presence of allocation.
32. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
33. Because North Carolina never adopted the Uniform Sales Act, article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code must be compared to the North Carolina case law.
34. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-203 (1965) (requirement of seal); id. 9 252-204(3) (omission of terms in contract); id. §§ 25-2-207(l)-(2) (additional terms in
acceptance or confirmation of contract); id. §§ 25-2-305(1)-(2) (open price term).
The North Carolina Comments at the end of each Code section and at the beginning
of Article 2 are helpful in determining where the Code differs -from other North Carolina law.
35. Other sections of Article 2 that are said by the North Carolina Comments to
change or modify North Carolina law are the following: id. § 25-2-104(1) (distinction
between merchants and nonmerchants); id. § 25-2-201 (statute of frauds); id. § 25-2202(a) (parol evidence rule); id. § 25-2-205 (revocability of firm offers without consideration); id. § 25-2-209(1)-(2) (modification or rescission of contract); id. § 25-2-311
(options and cooperation respecting performance); id. § 25-2-316(2) (exclusion or modification of implied warranty of merchantability); id. § 25-2-318 (requirement of privity
for buyer's family, household, and guests with regard to warranty coverage); id. § 252-401(1) (effect of reservation of title by seller); id. § 25-2-403(1) (power of one with
voidable title to "transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value"); id. § 252-403(2) (effect of entrusting "possession of goods to merchant who deals in goods of
that kind"); id. § 25-2-511(1) (tender of payment as condition to seller's duty of delivery); id. § 25-2-610 (effect of anticipatory repudiation); id. § 25-2-709 (right to action
for price after breach); id. § 25-2-716 (buyer's right to specific performance or
replevin); id. § 25-2-717 (requirement of notice before deduction of damages from price
by buyer); id. § 25-2-721 (remedies for fraud); id. § 25-2-722 (right to sue third party
for injury to goods); id. § 25-2-723 (proof of market price); id. § 25-2-725(1) (statute
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of assets that do not meet the definition of "goods" precludes application of the Code to the entire contract, so that non-Code law must be
applied. The "commercial unit" concept supports nonapplication of
the Code because by definition the commercial unit must be a "unit
of goods.""0 On the other hand, the Code has been applied by analogy
to other transactions involving items not within the Code's definition
of goods.17 Moreover, applying the Code by analogy to the nongoods portion of a business would provide in most cases a more modern
rule than non-Code law for resolving the relevant issue. 8
Finally, when a business consists of both goods and nongoods,
but only an "insignificant" amount of goods, Field supports application
of non-Code law to the entire contract, at least when the price is not
allocated among the assets.3 ' If, however, the court is willing to apply
the Code to the goods portion of the contract except when the percentage of goods is "insignificant," it must determine the meaning of "insignificant." Field apparently considered goods comprising less than
five percent of the total assets to be insignificant. 40 To avoid such arbiof limitations); id. § 25-2-725(2) (time of accrual of cause of action). The list is not
exhaustive.
Foster demonstrates the problem. In that case, although plaintiff resold the entire
business in one transaction, the court denied recovery only on the goods portion of the
contract. 381 F.2d at 226-27. The result in Miller, however, would apparently have
been the same if the Code had not been applied. Cf. Clinton Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Goldberg, 202 N.C. 506, 163 S.E.2d 455 (1932); Lamborn & Co. v. Hollingsworth & Hatch,
195 N.C. 350, 142 S.E. 19 (1928). However, an earlier case, Merrill v. Tew, 183 N.C.
172, 110 S.E. 850 (1922), allowed the seller to recover the difference between the original contract price and the resale price without mention of a notice requirement. It may
be that either the seller in fact gave notice or the buyer did not raise the issue, but
neither explanation appears in the opinion.
36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDn § 2-105(6). Nevertheless, the Code has been
applied to entire contracts that involved more than goods. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox,
499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974). Contra, Gallegos v. Graff, 32 Colo. App. 213, 508 P.2d
798 (1973); Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963).
The cases can be reconciled on the basis of the main purpose of the transactions involved in each case. Bonebrake involved a contract for the sale of goods, with services
provided incidentally, whereas in Epstein and Gallegos the goods were provided only incidentally. The cases are not directly analogous to the question above since, by assumption, neither the goods nor the nongoods are merely incidental, but they do indicate a
judicial willingness to apply only one law to a contract.
37. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105, Comment 1 (application of Code
by analogy to investments securities approved).
38. If the relevant non-Code law is statutory, however, this option is not available,
because the court is not free to disregard a statute that is clearly applicable.
39. 451 Pa. at-, 305 A.2d at 696.
40. In Field the goods represented approximately four and a half per cent (measured in terms of value or price) of the total assets of the business, id. at - & n.9,
305 A.2d at 696 & n.9, whereas in Foster the goods accounted for five to ten percent.
381 F.2d at 226 n.5.
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trary distinctions, the court should determine the applicable law as if
the business consisted of "significant" portions of both goods and nongoods. It must be observed, however, that as the percentage of goods
becomes smaller, the justification for applying the Code rather than
non-Code law likewise decreases, by the literal terms of the Code.4
On its facts Miller is a logical application of the cases decided in
other states. Even under the "commercial unit" theory the court was
correct in applyhg the Uniform Commercial Code since the business
was a "commerical unit" of goods. The court of appeals, however, arguably erred in its apparent endorsement of the Foster theory that the
Code's drafters intended the Code to apply to any contract for the sale
of a business. 42 Such a specific intention does not appear in the Code
or its Comments. In fact, by its literal terms the Code should be limited to cases, such as Miller, in which the entire business consists of
goods.
Notwithstanding the defect in the reasoning in Foster, a broader
intention on the part of the drafters does support application of the
Code to contracts for the sale of other types of businesses. This intention manifests itself in the expressed purpose of the Code to "modernize the law governing commercial transactions."4 3 The Code may be
applied by analogy to situations outside of its literal coverage when reason and logic so require." Relying on the broader intention of the
drafters will often enable the court to avoid the inconsistencies that may
result from division of the contract and to gain the advantages provided
by application of a more modern rule to the transaction.
RiCHARD ,G.CHANEY
41. Unless the non-Code law is statutory the Code could still be applied by analogy
if the court accepts that theory.
42. See Miller v. Belk, 23 N.C. App. 1, 4-5, 207 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1974).
43. UNIFORM COMMERCUL CODE § 1-102(2) (a).
44. See id., Comment 1; id. § 2-105, Comment 1.
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Securities-Underdevelopment of Securities Fraud in North
Carolina Courts and the Potential Effect of the
North Carolina Securities Act of 1975
Securities fraud' has presented special problems and has traditionally received special treatment, especially under federal law. This
special treatment seems to result from recognition of two basic facts:
first, there is a great potential for fraud and unfair dealings when
corporate insiders 2 and other sophisticated investors deal with private
investors; secondly, due to the peculiar nature of securities, detection
of fraud in securities transactions is normally very difficult.3 In recognition of these problems, Congress and the Securities and Exchange
Commission enacted securities laws, rules and regulations that seek to
impose -high standards on all persons who buy and sell securities by
prohibiting certain conduct.4 The resulting federal law developed in
the federal courts has carried out this congressional, and public, desire for exacting standards, especially when insiders are involved.'
Despite these developments on the federal scene, state courts have
traditionally applied common-law concepts of fraud in -the securities
area, regardless of the parties involved. While several recent cases
indicate a trend toward integration of federal securities law concepts
into state law,6 the North Carolina courts very recently showed themselves to be firmly entrenched in the common-law view of securities
fraud.
In Ragsdale v. Kennedy7 the president and general manager of a
corporation, in connection with the sale -by him of some of the cor1. "Securities fraud" is fraud committed in the registration, purchase or sale of
securities. This note is concerned only with fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.
2. Corporate "insiders" will be used in this note as referring to officers and directors of the corporation.
3. This difficulty results from the actualities of securities transactions, For example, a purchaser, perhaps in reliance upon representations made to him, decides to
purchase some stock in a corporation. He receives a piece of paper. The most careful
inspection of this piece of paper will not disclose whether the representations of the
seller were accurate or fraudulent. With the exception of some latent defects, this situation does not apply to purchases of houses, cars, or almost any other commodity.
4. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1970); S.E.C.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
5. Such federal law is based mainly upon rule 10b-5 that makes it unlawful to
commit any act of deception in the purchase or sale of securities. The basic requirement of rule 10b-5 is complete disclosure. See text accompanying notes 25-31 inlra.
6. See text accompanying notes 18-22 infra. See also N. LATrIN, TIE LAw 1o
CORPORATONS 296 (2d ed. 1971); R. RoBINSON, NoRTH CAROLINA CORPORION LAW
AND PRACTCE § 12-14, at 252-54 (2d ed. 1974).

7. 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494, rev'g 22 N.C. App. 509, 207 S.E.2d 301 (1974).
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pany's stock, made misleading statements concerning the condition of
the corporation and failed to disclose material facts about the corporation's financial condition. Subsequently, the president-general manager sued on a note given by the purchasers as partial payment for
the stock. The purchasers alleged fraud as a defense to the suit.
The court of appeals affirmed judgment on the pleadings in favor of
the president, finding neither actual fraud nor 'a -fiduciary relationship
upon which to base a finding of constructive fraud. 8 The North
Carolina Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded on the
ground that there was sufficient evidence of active fraud to present a
jury question. The supreme court based its decision on the rule "that
even though a vendor may have no duty -to speak under (the circumstances, nevertheless if he does assume to speak he must make a full
and fair disclosure as to the matters he discusses." 9 The court further stated that in North Carolina "when the circumstances make it
the duty of the seller to apprise the buyer of defects in the subject
matter of the sale known to the seller but not to the buyer, suppression of the defects constitutes fraud."'1 In addition to establishing
these principles, -the court outlined the essential elements of a cause of
action for actionable fraud: "(1) false representation or concealment
of a material fact, (2) reasonably calculated to deceive, (3) made
with intent to deceive, (4) which does in fact deceive, (5) resulting
in damage to the injured party.""
The two courts seem to have applied correct concepts of active
fraud under North Carolina law. 1 2 The general rule in North Carolina is that intentional misrepresentation of material facts by a corporate m sider in the purchase or sale of the corporation's securities is
actionable under common-law principles of fraud,'" whereas mere
8. 22 N.C. App. 509, 514, 207 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1974).
9. 286 N.C. at 139, 209 S.E.2d at 501.
10. Id. at 140, 209 S.E.2d at 501. It should be noted that the purchasers were
directors and therefore had a duty to stay informed of the activities and conditions of
the corporation. Anthony v. Jeffress, 172 N.C. 378, 379, 90 S.E. 414, 415 (1916); R.
ROnINSON, supra note 6, § 12-6, at 234-35. However, the fact that the president controlled and managed the corporation, failed to call directors' meetings, and knew that
the purchasers were relying on his statements would seem to place a duty upon him to
disclose fully and truthfully all material facts relating to the condition of the corporation.
11. 286 N.C. at 138, 209 S.E.2d at 500.
12. See Johnson v. Owens, 263 N.C. 754, 140 S.E.2d 311 (1965); Bruton v. Bland,
260 N.C. 429, 132 S.E.2d 910 (1963); Early v. Eley, 243 N.C. 695, 91 S.E.2d 919
(1956); Lester v. McLean, 242 N.C. 390, 87 S.E.2d 886 (1955); Berwer v. Union Cent.
Life Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 554, 200 S.E. 1 (1939).
13. See, e.g., Johnson v. Owens, 263 N.C. 754, 140 S.E.2d 311 (1965); R. ROBINSON suara note 6. § 12-14. at 252.
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non-disclosure of a material fact is actionable only when the insider
is found to have breached a fiduciary obligation. 14 The majority view
in state courts is that insiders owe fiduciary duties to shareholders only
in the conduct of corporate affairs-not in personal dealings with
shareholders. 5 The court of appeals in Ragsdale clearly showed its
adherence to the majority view.
Ragsdale is significant for two reasons. First, it illustrates the
requirements of proof in the area of common-law fraud and the difficulties these requirements present to one who must prove such fraud.
Requirements of proof of scienter (including knowledge of falsity and
intent to deceive), justifiable reliance and causation have proved very
difficult for many plaintiffs in securities cases, and non-disclosure has
rarely been actionable under state law.' 0 The basic weakness in the
older and perhaps still majority common-law rule, which the North
Carolina courts applied in Ragsdale, is that a director or officer can
deal with individual shareholders at arms' length without any fear of
liability so long as he merely avoids actual, intentional, fraudulent
misstatements,
Secondly, Ragsdale is significant for the rather remarkable fact
that the majority opinions of both courts not only failed to recognize
recent developments in federal securities law, but also failed even to
acknowledge the existence of the recent trend among state courts to1
ward adopting federal law concepts in the area of securities fraud. 7
This recent trend among state courts appears to be a reaction to
the general weaknesses and the particular difficulties of recovery by
injured investors in securities fraud cases when common-law fraud
concepts are applied.'8 One of the first decisions to signal a
development of state law similar to federal doctrines in the securities
area was Diamond v. Oreamuno.Y' There the New York Court of
Appeals faced the question of whether officers and directors of a corporation are accountable for gains realized by them in transactions in
14. See, e.g., Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 63 S.E.2d 202 (1951).
15.
. HENN, HANDBOOK OF "rFlIAw oF CORPO1ATIONS 471-72 (2d ed. 1970).
See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 22 N.C. App. 509, 515, 207 S.E.2d 301, 305 (1974).
The minority view has found a fiduciary duty even in dealings with shareholders. See,
e.g., Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932). The intermediate view,
however, has found no such duty absent "special facts." See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213
U.S. 419, 431 (1909).
16. A. BRoMNER, SEcuRIs LAw: FRAtn--SEC RuLn On-5 § 2.7, at 55
(1969).
17. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
18. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
19. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
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the company's stock as a result of -their use of material inside information. In answering the question affirmatively, the court held two
corporate officers liable to the corporation in a derivative suit for
the amount of money they saved by selling their shares of stock with
knowledge of adverse inside information before such information was
disclosed to the public. The court ruled that the insiders breached
their fiduciary duty by using a corporate asset, the inside information, for their own benefit and were thus liable even though no damage to the corporation was shown. The court based its decision
upon theories of federal law, acknowledging that the precise question
before them had been decided under New York law but :recognizing
that nothing in the federal law preempted the power of states to create
remedies that seek to effectuate purposes similar to those of the federal
20
law.
More recently, Schein v. Chasen,21 relying upon Diamond, held
that under the law of Florida the president of a publicly held corporation, together with a brokerage firm and two mutual funds by
whom the president's tippees and subtippees were employed, could
all be held liable to the corporation for their gains resulting from sales
of their stock before certain adverse information was publicly disclosed. Admittedly, Diamond and Schein do not deal with the question of remedies available to injured investors. The cases are very
significant to the present discussion, however, because federal-law
concepts were used in cases in which state law was being applied.2 2
The doctrines enunciated by the federal courts in interpreting
federal securities law are preferable to common-law doctrines in the
area of securities fraud because they allow injured investors to recover
more readily. This situation results from two principal differences
between federal and state law: first, federal law recognizes a cause
of action based upon non-disclosure; secondly, federal law has dispensed with the requirement of proof of scienter. 23 Basically, all that
is required under federal law is proof of misrepresentation or non-dis20. Id. at 503, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
21. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lehman Bros.
v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974) (remanded to the court of appeals to reconsider
whether the controlling issue of state law should be certified to the Florida Supreme

Court).

22. For a discussion of these cases see R. RoBiNsoN, supra note 6, § 12-14, at
252-53.
23. A. BROMBERG, supra note 16, § 8.4, at 203; see, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
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closure
of a material fact and some resulting damage to the plain24

tiff.

The foundation of most federal law in -the securities fraud area
is rule lOb-5, 25 promulgated by the SEC under section 10b of -the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.26 The rule makes unlawful any
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any security accomplished directly or indirectly by the use of the mails or interstate commerce or any facility of any national securities exchange.27 The type
fraud prohibited includes false statements, non-disclosures and any
kind of activity -that might mislead or deceive, so long as such activity occurs "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."2 s Furthermore, the fraud must relate to a "material fact," which
the United States Supreme Court has defined as any fact that a rea.

sonable investor would consider important in making a decision.2
In cases involving personal transactions, proof that the untrue
statement or non-disclosure, if material, was relied upon and in fact
caused the loss may be required,30 whereas in cases involving

dealings with -the general public, proof of materiality alone will satisfy
the requirements of reliance and causation."'
An early case held that -a person injured by acts constituting a violation of rule lOb-5 has an implied right of action against the violator
for damages even though no such relief is expressly provided in the
24. A. BROMBERG, supra note 16, § 8.1, at 194. For a discussion of the requirement of misrepresentation or non-disclosure of a material fact see id. §§ 8.1-.3, at 194202. For a discussion of the requirement of resulting damage to plaintiff, variously described in terms of reliance, causation or privity, see id. §§ 8.5-.7, at 205-20.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). The full text of the rule is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1970).
27. The requirement that interstate commerce, mails, or a national security exchange be used has been construed loosely by the courts. A. BROMBERo, supra note 16,
§ 11.2, at 245; see, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1967), cert,
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (holding that an intrastate phone call suffices because the
telephone system is interstate).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
29. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972).
30. R. RoniNsoN, supra note 6, § 16.2, at 335.
31. Id., citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).

19751

SECURITIES FRAUD

1109

Act.42 This case was the beginning of a line of cases that ultimately
led to the establishment of strict standards, duties and liabilities for
corporations and corporate insiders in their dealings with the public,
the most basic and most pervasive duty being that of full disclosure. 33
These standards and duties resulted from the fact that conduct prohibited by rule 10b-5 and its progeny of case law includes not only the
making of untrue statements but also any activity that might deceive
or mislead, including non-disclosures. 4
A second reason why federal securities fraud law is preferable to
common-law fraud is that the federal concepts come closer to satisfying
public desires and interests. The existence of state blue sky laws and
federal securities laws reflects the public desire 'and the necessity for
high ethical standards in securities transactions. The potential for
fraud and unfair dealings when insiders and sophisticated investors
deal with private investors requires legislative and judicial action to
create and enforce 'high standards in general and fiduciary duties in
particular upon these insiders. The problems and difficulties of proof
under common-law fraud3 5 and -the resulting barrier to recovery by injured investors create little deterrence of securities fraud and consequently do not accomplish the public desire for high standards in the
securities area. Therefore, it is desirable that state courts apply federal-law concepts instead of common law in the securities fraud area.
Regardless of the desirability of, and the apparent recent trend
toward, integrating federal law into state securities fraud cases, a
threshold question that must be answered is whether it is proper for
state courts to exercise jurisdiction in the securities fraud area in the
face of section 27 of the 1934 Act 36 that establishes exclusive jurisdiction in the federal district courts of rule 10b-5 and other 1934 Act
litigation. The answer is that such state court action seems proper
within certain limitations. The legislative purpose in enacting section 27 appears to have been to achieve consistency in the interpreta-"
32. Katdon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). For a
discussion of the theory behind this implied liability under Rule 10b-5 see A. BRoMBERG,
supranote 16, § 2.4, at 27-34.
33. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
34. R. RoBiNsoN, supra note 6, § 16-2, at 334. Clearly the conduct of the president-general manager in Ragsdale constituted prohibited activity under federal securities
law.
35. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
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tion of the federal securities law by confining actions to federal courts,
instead of depending on the United States Supreme Court to resolve conflicts between state courts. The ultimate purpose of the provision is
to prevent the state courts from disrupting the development of this
particular federal law.37 Therefore, so long as state courts decide
only state law and do not interpret federal law, there seems to be no
conflict.3 8 Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act is consistent with this
view. 39 It makes clear that Congress did not intend to preempt state
regulation of securities fraud, and therefore state blue sky laws and
traditional common law are impliedly retained. "Congress established
concurrent jurisdiction for -the regulation of securities transactions,
while it vested exclusive jurisdiction in -the federal courts for the enforcement of the 1934 Act."40
Therefore, there appears to be no compelling or justifiable reason
why North Carolina courts should not follow the recent trend among
state courts and begin to apply the federal-law concepts of securities
fraud. On the contrary, there are strong reasons and even statutory
support for such action.
As noted previously, the public desire for 'high standards in the
securities area requires legislative and judicial creation and enforcement of 'high standards in general and fiduciary duties in particular
upon corporate insiders. Significantly, the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act provides that "[o]fficers and directors shall be
deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and to its
shareholders.

...
4 This provision is unusual, although not unique,

in that it explicitly treats the relationship as a fiduciary one and
makes the duty run to shareholders as well as to the corporation.4"
37. 83 H.mv. L. Rnv. 1421, 1427 (1970).
38. Id.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). Section 28(a) states that the provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are "in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity." Arguably, this language encompasses state law
at the time of enactment of the federal law and state law extensions into other areasfor example, insider trading. Consequently, if a case has a tenable theoretical basis in
state law, the state court should be able to exercise its jurisdiction, regardless of whether
on the same facts a lob-5 action in federal court exists also. 83 HARV. L. Rav., supra
note 37, at 1428.
40. Note, The Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings on Exclusive FederalJurlsdiction Over Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv.
936, 937-38 (1971). The author explores the problems arising when actions are brought
in federal court under lOb-5 following a state court verdict on the same facts.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1965).
42. Folk, Revisiting the North CarolinaCorporation Law: The Robinson Treatise
Reviewed and the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. REv. 768, 796-97 (1965).
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Described as "one of the strongest and best features of the North
Carolina statute,"4 3 this explicit recognition of a direct fiduciary duty
owed by insiders to the corporation and shareholders creates a "firm
cornerstone for generally enforcing high ethical standards in many different and varied situations."4 4
This fiduciary duty as codified in the statute "provides a strong
rationale for holding that an insider has a positive obligation under
[North Carolina] law to disclose to any shareholder from whom he is
buying shares, as well as to any prospective shareholder to whom he is
selling, material inside information affecting the value of those
shares.1 45 However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Ragsdale held that section 55-35 of the North Carolina General Statutes
applies only when the insider is acting "in the conduct of the business
and in the management of the affairs of a corporation." 46 There appears to be no statutory support for this holding. The statute is silent about whether the fiduciary relationship obtains in corporate
dealings or personal dealings, or both. However, due to the well-established duty of loyalty of an insider ito his corporation and to its
shareholders when acting in corporate affairs, 4 the statute adds little unless it extends the fiduciary duty to personal dealings.
The public desire for high standards in order to deter fraud, the
recent trend among other state courts, the preferability of federal securities law, and section 55-35 seem to justify, if not demand, a change
in North Carolina law in the securities fraud area. However, North
Carolina is part of a majority of state courts that have not yet applied
federal law as developed under rule l0b-5 to common-law fraud cases,
even when alleged securities fraud by corporate insiders is involved.
The likelihood of such application, however, is greater when a state's
blue sky law resembles provisions of the federal securities laws.48
Effective April 1, 1975, North Carolina enacted a new blue sky
43. Id. at 796.
44. Id. at 797. The refusal of the North Carolina courts, as exemplified by Ragsdale, to recognize this cornerstone and begin building upon it a body of case law requiring full disclosure and accurate representations by corporate insiders in their dealings
with private investors, is not conducive to high ethical standards in securities transactions. While federal law is always available to compel high standards, it is desirable
that state law and state courts seek to attain the same result.
45. R. ROBINSON, supranote 6, § 12-14, at 253.
46. 22 N.C. App. at 515, 207 S.E.2d at 305.
47. R. ROBINSON, supra note 6, § 12-5, at 232-33; see, e.g., Anthony v. Jeffress,
172 N.C. 378, 380, 90 &E. 414, 415 (1916); Townsend v. Williams, 117 N.C. 330, 336,
23 S.E. 461, 463 (1895).
48. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 16, § 2.7, at 58.
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law, known as the North Carolina Securities Act. 49 Modeled after the
Uniform Securities Act,' 0 probably the most significant difference between it and the prior blue sky law is in the area of fraud. One of
the most notable deficiencies of the old blue sky law was that it was
absolutely silent on the subject, except in the context of registration.
The new law should adequately fill this void. Section 78A-8 of the
North Carolina General Statutes prohibits fraudulent practices in
connection with the sale or purchase of securities. This section, which
is almost identical to SEC rule 10b-5, 51 provides the basis for certain
types of administrative proceedings, judicial injunctions"2 and criminal
prosecution. 53 Section 78A-56(j) expressly provides, however, that
Section 78A-8 is not a basis for civil liability, which is governed by
section 78A-56(a) and (b).
Section 78A-56(a)(2) of the Act imposes civil liabilities on any
person who "[o]ffers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading . . .
This language is essentially that of the second clause of the Act's antifraud provision, 5 which, as previously noted, is almost identical to
that of Rule lOb-5. Section 78A-56(b) of the Act imposes similar liabilities on the purchaser of a security. Together, these sections mean
that, if a buyer or seller of securities makes an untrue or misleading
statement of a material fact or fails to disclose a material fact, he is
subject to civil liability.
The existence of a statutory section with language almost identi49. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78A-1 to -65 (Supp. 1974).
50. The new North Carolina Blue Sky Law is not identical to the Uniform Securities Act (U.S.A.). The differences result partly from the fact that the drafters used
the Wisconsin version of the U.S.A. as a model. One significant and desirable difference is that the U.S.A. provides for civil liability of fraudulent sellers only, whereas the
Wisconsin and North Carolina versions extend civil liability to fraudulent purchasers as
well. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(b) (Supp. 1974).
51. See note 25 supra.
52. Any violation, whether wilful or otherwise, of the Act's anti-fraud provisions
is subject to injunctive action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-47 (Supp. 1974).
53. Any person who wilfully violates the Act's anti-fraud provisions is subject to
the criminal penalties of a fine of up to $5,000.00, or imprisonment for up to five years
or both. Id. § 78A-57.
54. Had the new blue sky law been in effect in North Carolina at the time of
the suit in Ragsdale, section 78A-56(a)(2) clearly would have provided a remedy for
the purchasers since the president's conduct fitted the section's express language. Id.
§ 78A-56(a) (2).
55. Id. § 78A-8(2).
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cal to that of SEC rule 10b-5 provides strong support for adoption of
federal-law principles. 56 Since many securities fraud issues are and
will be subject to both federal and state law, it seems desirable that

state law be coordinated with federal law to the fullest extent possible. 5T
CONCLUSION

The long-stated aim of the anti-fraud securities laws and rules
is -to equalize the bargaining power of parties to securities transac-

tions and provide equal access to all material information that could
affect the value of the securities being sold.5 s

The courts in Rags-

dale fell short of this aim by refusing even to acknowledge the existence of a possible securities fraud case and by dealing with the case

in terms of common-law fraud rather than in terms of the securities
fraud law that has been developing in this country for the past fifty
years.

With the enactment of the new North Carolina Securities Act

the courts should break away from common-law fraud concepts when
dealing with cases involving alleged fraud in securities transactions.

Moreover, they should go beyond strict enforcement and application
of the new Securities Act provisions relating to fraud and instead
should join the recent trend among state courts and apply federal law
standards as developed under SEC rule lOb-5. Until the North Caro-

lina courts adopt such an approach, it is certain that defrauded investors
will have a much easier time obtaining relief in federal courts. 9
DANIEL BLUE DEAN
56. As noted previously, civil liability under federal law has been implied by the
courts. Under North Carolina law such civil liability is statutory. Id. § 78A-56.
57. Even assuming such coordination of state and federal law, it must be noted
that suit in federal courts under rule lOb-5 will almost always be more attractive.
Despite the fact that the Uniform Securities Act, as enacted in North Carolina, has
adopted all three lOb-5 clauses in its general prohibition, id. § 78A-8, and clause two
in its express civil liability provision, id. § 78A-56, there is no assurance of the broad
implied liability that has been posited in federal case law. Even if state courts were
able to grant implied liability and were as favorable to private investors in other respects, a lOb-5 suit in federal court will still be more attractive in many cases for several
reasons, including the following: federal law can cross borders for jurisdiction, venue
and process; federal law has a background and framework sympathetic to investors; federal discovery rules are more liberal than those in some states. A. BROMBERG, supra
note 16, § 2.7, at 57.
58. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 80, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951); A.
BROMBERG, supra note 16, § 3.2, at 64.
59. It is interesting to speculate whether an allegedly defrauded investor-defendant,
such as in Ragsdale, can get into federal court. It is clear that defendants in this case
could not have removed the action to the federal courts. C. WMGHTr, HANDBOOK OF THE
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Sovereign Immunity-Should the King Remove His Armor?
Amid boisterous calls for governmental responsibility, the ancient
doctrine of sovereign immunity acts as a stagnant moat between the injured subject and the sovereign's castle keep. Recently, however, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals entered the lists to combat this kingly
concept, holding in Smith v. Stdte1 that the State waived its immunity
from suit by entering into a legislatively authorized employment contract that it subsequently breached. In so ruling, the court of appeals
clearly pierced the sovereign's armor, an act that may lead to a further
weakening of the defense.
Section 122-25 of the North Carolina General Statutes' gave the
North Carolina Commissioner of Mental Health the power to appoint
a medical superintendent for each state-owned and state-operated hospital. Under this authorization, plaintiff, Dr. C. Capers Smith, was appointed to a six-year term as superintendent of Broughton Hospital in
Morganton, North Carolina. After apparently performing satisfactorily
in this position for two years and seven months, plaintiff was summarily
dismissed after a dispute with his supervisor. Plaintiff alleged that the
dismissal was without cause or authority, was contrary to statute, and
was effected without a hearing or due process.
As a result of the dismissal and other alleged injuries, plaintiff
sued the State of North Carolina and other co-defendants seeking to
recover compensatory damages. A motion by defendants to dismiss
the action on the ground of sovereign immunity was denied by the trial
court, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling.
To evaluate the court's decision properly, it is necessary to understand the concept of sovereign immunity and its application by the
courts. Sovereign immunity refers to the common-law rule that an action, whether at law or in equity, cannot be maintained against the
State, in any court, by any plaintiffW unless the State expressly consents
oF FEDERAL CouRTs § 38, at 131 (2d ed. 1970). It is not clear, however, whether
defendants could have brought a separate suit in federal court based upon rule 10b-5.
Such was permitted in Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 960 (1974).
LAW

1. 23 N.C. App. 423, 209 S.E.2d 336 (1974).
2. Id. at 426, 209 S.E.2d at 338.
3. This statutory provision was repealed in 1973 as part of the reorganization of
state government. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 276, § 133(c), 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 576.
4. See Orange County v. Heath, 282 N.C. 292, 192 S.E.2d 308 (1972); 7 J.
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to suit or otherwise waives its immunity.5

The doctrine, which is deeply rooted in the common law, apparently evolved in England as a legal formalization of the monarchistic,

religious principle that "the King can do no wrong."6 It folowed that
there was no need for suits against the sovereign; and none were al-

lowed. It is uncertain why this monarchical rule was adopted by the
newly independent states, fearful as they were of the excesses of government.7 Nevertheless, all states have at one time given effect to the
doctrine, and many still do, giving various justifications for its modem
application.8

Regardless of the recognized basis for the rule:, it seemed

for many years to be firmly entrenched in the judicially declared law
of the several states.
In spite of this weighty precedent, current judicial thought has
moved toward the abandonment of sovereign immunity.9 In fact, at
least one state supreme court has totally abrogated the doctrine. 10 In

addition, most states have curtailed the operation of sovereign immunity in the area of state tort liability, distinguishing between claims
arising out of the performance of "proprietary" and "non-proprietary"
governmental functions." On the other hand, in the area of govern-

mental contracts, even though some courts have seen the necessity for
limiting the immunity, most of these tribunals have taken a moderate
position, allowing suits only in situations in which the state has consented to the action or waived its immunity. Some courts following
this trend have held that by entering into any contract the state waives
its immunity and beomes liable for its breach.' 2 Others limit this deSTRONG, N.C. INDEx 2D, State § 4 (1968); 72 AM. Jum. 2D States, Territories & Dependencies § 99 (1974).
5. See cases cited notes 12-13 infra.
6. W. PRossER, HAmBooK OF nEa LAw oF ToiTs 970 (4th ed. 1971); 72 Am.
Jun. 2D States, Territories& Dependencies § 99 (1974).
7. Several commentators have attributed the interjection of the common-law doctrine into the law of the newly formed states to the debt-ridden financial condition of
these governments during the period immediately following the Revolutionary War. See,
e.g., Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the FederalGovernment, 47 COLUM. L.
REv. 722 (1947).
8. See text accompanying notes 28-31 infra.
9. O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967); Lyon & Sons,
Inc. v. State 13d. of Educ., 238 N.C. 24, 76 S.E.2d 553 (1953).
10. See Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo.97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971).
11. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300.1 (1974). This distinction between types of governmental activity and the attendant variations in application of sovereign immunity have been fairly well developed and will not be dealt with here.
12. E.g., Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19,
314 P.2d 278 (1957); Regents of Univ. Sys. v. Blanton, 49 Ga. App. 602, 176 S.E. 673
(1934) (action by professor on an employment contract); Carr v. State ex rel. du Coet-
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parture from the general rule of immunity to those contracts that are
legislatively authorized.13
In the face of this modem trend, the North Carolina courts have
uniformly been very hesitant to abrogate sovereign immunity in contract cases.14 For example, in General Electric Co. v. Turner"; the
North Carolina Supreme Court stated: "'It is axiomatic that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own court or any other without its consent
and permission. . . . [This is] an established principle of jurisprudence
in all civilized nations.' "16 This immunity is absolute and unqualified
"unless by statute [the State] has consented to be sued or has otherwise
waived its immunity.' 7 The rule, however, has been even more restrictive in North Carolina than in other states as a result of the holding
that consent cannot be implied from any act of the government, but
must be expressly given."
While a cursory view of the North Carolina precedent indicates
that the State courts are unalterably devoted to this strict version of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the supreme court did recognize
the trend toward abrogation of the rule as early as 1953. In Lyon &
Sons, Inc. v. State Board of Education"9 the court characterized the rule
as "monarchistic" and unjust. It did not, however, change the rule,
but instead, shifted the burden of any reform to the legislature.20
losquet, 127 Ind. 204, 26 N.E. 778 (1891); Meens v. State Bd. of Educ., 127 Mont. 515,
267 P.2d 981 (1954) (action by professor against state for breach of employment con-

tract).

13. E.g., George & Lynch, Inc. v. State, 57 Del. 158, 197 A.2d 734 (1964) (action
against the state for breach of a highway contract); V.S. DiCarlo Constr. Co. v. State,
485 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1972) (action against the state for breach of a construction contract for the building of State Government Emergency Operations Center).
14. J. STRONG, 2D, supra note 4.
15. 275 N.C. 493, 168 S.E.2d 385 (1969).
16. Id. at 498, 168 S.E.2d at 389, quoting Schloss v. State Highway Comm'n, 230
N.C. 489, 491, 53 S.E.2d 517, 518 (1949).
17. Lincoln Constr. Co. v. Property Control & Constr. Div. of the Dep't of Administration, 3 N.C. App. 551, 553, 165 S.E.2d 338, 339 (1969) (action for "extras" allegedly due under a grading and paving contract with the state) (emphasis added); Nello
L. Teer Co. v. Highway Comnm'n, 265 N.C. 1, 9, 143 S.E.2d 247, 253 (1965).
18. Orange County v. Heath, 282 N.C. 292, 192 S.E.2d 308 (1972).
19. 238 N.C. 24, 76 S.E.2d 553 (1953).
20. Indeed, this tactic has been much used by courts that have felt the need for
reform in the law, but that have not wished to carry the burden of such change. The
rule of sovereign immunity is, however, a judicial contribution to the law of the states,
and there is therefore no technical reason why the abrogation of the doctrine, in whole
or in part, could not come about through the initiative of the courts. Furthermore, legislative inaction in the face of condemnatory language such as that used in Lyon
& Sons should, in some degree, educate the courts about the efficiency of leaving much
needed change to the legislatures whose time has been consumed with other concerns,
At least two courts, after waiting for the legislative bodies in their respective states to
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More than twenty years later, in Smith v. State,21 the court of appeals defined the "or otherwise waives its immunity" language22 in a
manner that limited the inequitable rule of sovereign immunity in
North Carolina. The court reasoned that an express statutory authorization for entering into contracts for a term of years carries with it "by

logical implication a waiver of sovereign immunity from a suit for
breach" of that contract.2"

The court felt that to rule otherwise would

indicate that the legislature could approve contracts that are binding
on a citizen but not on the State. The court was unwilling to assume

that the legislature intended this untenable result.2 4 In addition, the

court of appeals observed that "a truly democratic government should
be required 25to observe the same rules of conduct that it requires of
its citizens. '
By finding an implied waiver of immunity in legislative authoriza-

tion to enter into contracts, thus precluding dismissal of actions against
the State on the ground of sovereign immunity, the appellate court apparently overlooked the requirement of express consent to suit that had

been enunciated by the supreme court.20 In doing so, the court seems
to have exceeded its judicial authority.2 7 There is, however, a seman-

tic distinction that would allow the court of appeals to reach that conclusion without departing from the rule prescribed by the supreme court.
The "express" consent limitation had been applied by the supreme

court to consents to suit only. Therefore, the alternative ground for
refusing to dismiss suits against the State-a waiver of immunity-is
technically free of the restriction. While this argument admittedly favors form over substance, it is one way in which the North Carolina
act in this area, have taken the first step in correcting the injustices that flow from a
narrow application of the doctrine. See, e.g., Stone v. Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384,
393, 381 P.2d 107, 113 (1963) ("This doctrine having been engrafted upon Arizona law
by judicial enunciation may properly be changed or abrogated by the same process.");
Kersten Co. v. Department of Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117 (Iowa 1973); Pierce v.
Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
21. 23 N.C. App. 423, 209 S.E.2d 336 (1974).
22. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
23. 23 N.C. App. at 426, 209 S.E.2d at 338.
24. Id.; accord, George & Lynch, Inc. v. State, 57 Del. 158, 197 A.2d 734 (1964);
Kersten Co. v. Department of Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117 (Iowa 1973).
25. 23 N.C. App. at 426, 209 S.E.2d at 338.
26. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
27. Generally, a court inferior in position to one having rendered a decision that
is cited as precedent on appeal is bound by the higher court adjudication, regardless of
the correctness of that decision. Nonetheless, many decisions of lower courts that deviate from this rule are vindicated when the higher court sustains the intermediate court's
departure from precedent. See 20 AM. Jun. 2D Courts § 201 (1965) and cases cited
therein.
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courts can introduce an element of beneficial flexibility into the law,
allowing protection from spurious suits on one hand and providing, on
the other hand, relief in those situations in which the State can justifiably be held accountable for its wrongdoings.
Ultimately, the decision to change the law in North Carolina must
rest upon policy considerations. Modem courts have based their application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity upon various foundations, including fiscal concerns, conceptual rationalizations and mere
expediency. Among the more meritorious arguments presented in favor of the doctrine are concerns about the drain upon the public treasury that would result from compensation of private injuries 28 and the
potential interference with the administration of public business.29
-While both of these arguments present valid concerns, one cannot overlook the fact that the suits and resultant drain upon state funds are,
in these cases, occasioned by the alleged misdeeds of state officials or
their agents. Any rule that flatly denies a plaintiff recovery for such
wrongdoings ultimately damages the government in a manner far
greater than a justified expenditure of public funds by reducing public
respect for the governing body.30
Furthermore, the basic principles of contract law dictate that the
traditional view of governmental immunity be reconsidered. It must
be assumed that in authorizing the State to enter into contracts, the
State constitution and legislature contemplated the State's involvement
in valid contracts.31 Traditionally, contracts are valid only when there
is mutuality of obligations between the parties. 32 Otherwise, one or
both of the parties would be free to refuse to perform, thus depriving
28. E.g., Orange County v. Heath, 282 N.C. 292, 296, 192 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1972);
W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 975.
29. Glasman v. Glasman, 309 N.Y. 436, 440, 131 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1956);
Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the Emperor Has No Clothes, 1966 ILL.
L.F. 828, 829.
30. Other arguments for the doctrine are less persuasive. Several courts have had
difficulty resolving the conceptual contradiction between the idea of supreme executive
power and private suits against the State. Others have seen the idea of an entire people
committing one wrong as a logical "absurdity." Yet another argument is based upon
the idea that a state can do no wrong (replacing the earlier regal version of the tenet)
and that therefore an agent of the State always acts "ultra vires" when committing a
wrongful act. Least convincing are those applications of the rule based upon the embarrassment such liability would cause the government. None of these arguments stands
up in the face of the need for responsible government and compensation for wrongful
injury. See W. PRossER, supra note 6, at 975.
31. George & Lynch, Inc. v. State, 57 Del. 158, 197 A.2d 734 (1964); cf. Smith
v. State, 23 N.C. App. 423, 209 S.E.2d 336 (1974).
32. 1 S. WLLISTON, CoNTrACTS § 1 (3d ed. 1957).
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immunity in this area has this effect. Such a result ascribes "bad faith
and shoddy dealing to the sovereign."34 Yet, few would argue that

in such situations the private party would be allowed to breach the contract with impunity. Nevertheless, the logical conclusion of the argu-

ment that relieves the State of its obligations under a contract is just
that: if one party is not bound, neither is the other.
The North Carolina Supreme Court will be called upon to further

review the disposition of Smith v. State. 5 In doing so, the court will
be faced with three options: first, the court may construe the "express"

limitation to apply in all circumstances and reiterate the prior law in
this clarified form; secondly, the court may rule that by entering into
legislatively authorized contracts the State impliedly consents to suit or

waives its immunity (the approach taken by the court of appeals); or,
thirdly, the court may abolish sovereign immunity in North Carolina.
The first option is undesirable. By refusing to modify the law,
the court would continue the inequities of a system in which the State
is free to breach its contracts with impunity and in which governmental

responsibility is sacrificed to the unjustified continuation of an archaic
rule.

The second option is more desirable in two aspects. Primarily,
33. It is frequently stated that to make an enforceable contract, there must be "mutuality of obligation." Horton v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 255 N.C. 675, 122 S.E.2d 716
(1961) (obligation must in general be mutual); Smith v. Barnes, 236 N.C. 176, 72
S.E.2d 216 (1952) (no mutuality, no contract); Kirby v. Stokes County Bd. of Educ.,
230 N.C. 619, 55 S.E.2d 322 (1949) (an essential element of every contract). The concept is a semantic one referring to the idea of consideration which underlies the law
of contracts. Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th
Cir. 1968). It seems, however, that this mutuality is not essential to every contract.
An embodiment of the consideration principle, mutuality of obligation is necessary only
when there is no other consideration supporting one party's promise. Each promise then
becomes consideration for the other. McCraw v. Llewellyn, 256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d
575 (1962). When there is any other consideration for the contract, so that each promise does not depend wholly upon the other for its consideration, mutuality of obligation
is not essential. The test is whether legal liability is imposed upon the promisor for
breach of his promise. This test should be applied as of the time one of the promises
is sought to be enforced, not at the time the promises are made. Hutchings v. Slemons,
141 Tex. 448, 452, 174 S.W.2d 487, 489 (1943). In the case in question, at the time
of enforcement of the employment contract, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents
the plaintiff from enforcing the State's promise, which was the only consideration for
his promise to perform as superintendent of Broughton Hospital. There is, therefore,
no mutuality of obligation, i.e. consideration, on the part of the State and the contract
is therefore not binding on either party.
34. Kersten Co. v. Department of Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Iowa
1973).
35. 23 N.C. App. 423, 209 S.E.2d 336 (1974).
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by holding that the State impliedly waives its immunity from suit in limited situations, the supreme court could retain the benefits of the doctrine-an opportunity to protect the public funds and administration
from spurious suits-while relieving the system of the inequities that
have previously resulted from the strict application of the common law
rule. In addition, this course would allow a desirable change in the
law without the disruption caused by overturning numerous prior decisions.
The third choice is probably the most unlikely. Total abrogation
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity appears to be too great a step
even for those courts bent upon reform.3 0 Additionally, total departure from previous law is not necessary to dispose of this case justly.
Nevertheless, this course seems to be the most desirable. By removing
the protective armor that surrounds the State and shields it from responsibility for its wrongful acts, the court might move the legislature
to enact a system of governmental responsibility and claims processing.
Undoubtedly, such judicial action would be more effective in this area
than the unheeded hints already given.3 7 But more importantly, such
a ruling would give the concept of governmental responsibility an effectiveness lacking in any system that allows the sovereign to abuse its
citizens without liability.
H. KING MCGLAUGHON, JR.

Taxation-Out-of-State Distributors Versus the North Carolina
Soft Drink Tax: The Battle May Not Be Over
In Richmond Food Stores, Inc. v. Jones1 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals summarily affirmed a superior court decision declaring unconstitutional a section of the North Carolina Soft Drink Tax Act.'
The provision in issue, entitled "Alternative method of payment of
36. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
37. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
1. 22 N.C. App. 272, 206 S.E.2d 346 (1974).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-113.41-.67 (1972). This writer's research has disclosed only three other states with equivalent soft drink tax statutes: Louisiana, South
Carolina, and West Virginia. IA. t~v. STAT. §§ 47:881-:908 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 65-751 to -782 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-19-1 to -11 (1974).
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tax,' 3 allowed resident distributors or wholesale dealers of "bottled" 4
soft drinks to pay the tax at one-half of the rate charged out-of-state
distributors, who shipped soft drinks into the State for sale. ]t also provided that resident distributors could remit the tax monthly with accompanying sales reports, whereas -nonresidents were required to pay the
tax through the more time-consuming and expensive method of purchasing and affixing a tax stamp or crown to each bottled drink. Both
the court of appeals and lower court regarded the provision as a discrimination against interstate commerce, violating article I, section 8,
clause 3 of the United States Constitution-the commerce clause. 5
Significantly, Richmond Food Stores does not address the equally
important question of when-consistent with commerce clause restrictions-North Carolina can levy any tax on a nonresident distributor.
More specifically, the commerce clause bars a state tax on the privilege
of doing interstate business.6 A convincing argument can be made -that
a nonresident distributor, who merely solicits orders in North Carolina,
accepts them out-of-state, and then delivers the goods to his customers,
is engaged in purely interstate business.
Richmond Food Stores, Inc. is a Virginia cooperative, engaged in
the business of wholesale food distribution.7 The company distributes
grocery items in several states,' including North Carolina in which it
services thirty to thirty-five independent food retailers. 9 One item distributed is "Shasta" bottled and canned soft drinks for which the company is subjected to the North Carolina soft drink tax. 10 According
to the trial testimony of a Department of Revenue official, Richmond
Foods is one of about fifty to seventy-five out-of-state distributors shipping bottled soft drinks into North Carolina.1"
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.56A (1972).
4. "Bottled,"-as statutorily defined, "means enclosed in any closed or sealed glass,
metal, paper or other type of bottle, can, carton or container, regardless of the size of
such container." Id. § 105-113.44(2). Thus, canned soft drinks fall within the definition of "bottled."
5. Although both courts declared the discrimination in the "Alternative method
of payment of tax," id. § 105-113.56A, to be unconstitutional, neither court voided the
provision entirely. Rather, the courts merely rejected the distinction between residents
and nonresidents. The practical effect of Richmond Food Stores is to allow nonresidents to use the "Alternative method of payment of tax."
6. E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
461-62 (1959); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Alpha
Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).

7. Record at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.at 31.
10. Id.
I1.Id.at 20.
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The North Carolina Soft Drink Tax Act, enacted in 1969, is purely
a revenue, rather than a regulatory, measure. 12 The Act labels the
tax it imposes as a "license" tax on the privilege of "doing domestic
or intrastate business . . . [in] selling, manufacturing, purchasing, con-

signing, using, shipping or distributing, for the purpose of sale within
this State, soft drinks of every kind whatsoever. . ... The tax is
'1

levied at a per unit rate on soft drinks and on soft drink syrups, powders, and base products; 4 at is measured by the number of sales of each

commodity within the State."" The basic rate of tax on the privilege
of distributing "bottled" soft drinks (the issue in Richmond Food
Stores) is one cent per bottle.16 The basic method of paying ,the tax
is through the purchase of tax stamps or crowns, which are required
to be affixed to each bottle within -twenty-four hours of its receipt or

manufacture in the State.' 7

Peculiarly, the Act-before Richmond

Food Stores-permitted resident distributors or wholesale dealers of
bottled soft drinks to use an alternative method of payment's under
which they would pay one-half of the basic per bottle rate'9 and would
12. N.C. GEN.STAT. § 105-113.42 (1912). The section declares, "It is the purpose
of this Article to provide a source of additional revenue which shall be applied to the
general fund of the State."
13. Id. § 105-113.43.
14. Id. § 105-113.45.
15. Id. § 105-113.43.
16. Id. § 105-113.45.
17. Id. § 105-113.51(a).
18. Id. § 105-113.56A. The section reads as follows:
§ 105-113.56A. Alternative method of payment of tax-Instead of
paying the tax levied in this Article in the manner otherwise provided, any resident distributor or wholesale dealer, and any distributor or wholesale dealer
having a commercial domicile in this State may pay the tax in the following
manner, with respect to bottled soft drinks:
Beginning with sales made on and after October 1, 1969, of bottled soft
drinks subject to the tax, sales reports shall be made to the Commissioner on
or before the fifteenth day of each succeeding month, accompanied by payment
of the tax due, determined as follows: For the first fifteen thousand gross of
bottled soft drinks sold annually, seventy-two (720) per gross; for all in excess
of fifteen thousand gross, one cent (10) per bottle. In addition, there shall
be allowed a discount of eight percent (8%) of the said tax to be remitted.
All persons paying the tax in this manner shall be subject to such rules
and regulations as the Commissioner may prescribe, including the requirement
that such persons furnish such bond as the Commissioner may deem advisable,
in such amount and upon such conditions as in the opinion of the Commissioner will adequately protect the State in the collection of the .taxes levied by
this Article.
19. The tax rate under the "Alternative method of payment of tax" is $.72 per
gross (one gross = 144 bottles) or $.005 per bottle for the first 15,000 gross (2,160,000
bottles) sold in the State. All sales over 15,000 gross are taxed at the basic rate of
$.01 per bottle. Thus, a resident distributor, before the Richmond Food Stores decision,
paid only $10,800 tax on his first 15,000 gross of sales. In comparison, a nonresident
distributor like Richmond Food Stores paid $21,600 tax on the first 15,000 gross.
At the trial, a Richmond Food Stores official testified that his company had never
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avoid the use of tax stamps and crowns altogether.2 0

Under the Soft Drink Tax Act, each bottled soft drink is subject
to taxation only once. The Act places tax liability on one of -the follow-

ing: the distributor or dealer "who first distributes, sells, uses, consumes or handles" the product unless stamps or crowns are already affixed; the first consignee if the goods are shipped into the State by com-

mon carrier; or the person who brings -the soft drinks into -the State.21
Richmond Food Stores, as the first distributor of soft drinks within the

State and also as the person bringing soft drinks into the State, was assessed with -tax liability. Since it distributed soft drinks "for the purpose of sale within this State," 22 the company apparently believed it
reached the 15,000 gross level of sales in North Carolina. Record at 35. Thus, on each
sale his company made in North Carolina, they were assessed twice the amount of tax
levied on a resident.
20. Although the State contended initially that tax stamps and crowns were vital
to enforcement of the soft drink tax against nonresidents, cross-examination at trial of
a Department of Revenue official revealed that stamps and crowns served no useful purpose. Since most resident distributors did not use stamps or crowns, the absence of a
tax stamp on a soft drink can in a supermarket indicated nothing about whether a tax
had been paid. Id. at 21-22. Stamps and crowns are only useful if everyone is required
to use them; otherwise, a tax official has to rely exclusively on sales reports to determine
if tax has been paid.
The difficulties involved in using tax stamps are described in the trial testimony
of a Richmond Food Stores official. In the first place, the stamps could not be applied
by machine; each stamp had to be pealed from its backing by hand and then affixed
to the individual bottle or can. Secondly, since Richmond Food Stores was a comparatively small company it could not maintain separate inventories of each of its products.
Therefore, when an order of soft drinks, subject to the North Carolina tax, was ready
for shipment, each case had to be broken open, the stamps applied, and the case resealed.
This process created delays in shipment (especially when an order was for four or five
hundred cases of drinks) and cost the company considerable employee hours of wages.
Id. at 32-33.
It is true that the difficulties encountered with tax stamps could have been avoided
by the use of tax crowns or lids. Apparently, Richmond Food Stores was too small to
convince its manufacturer to use tax paid lids or crowns. The Richmond Food Stores
official testified: "We could use tax paid lids if we could get Shasta to make a special
run for North Carolina and stamp it for us, but I can't imagine what the cost might
be if you stop the machines at the Shasta factory and changed over to a Carolina lid."
Id. at 35.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.51(b) (1972). The exact language of the subsection is as follows:
(b) The distributor or dealer who first distributes, sells, uses, consumes
or handles bottled soft drinks, syrups, powders, base products, and other items
subject to the soft drink excise tax is subject to the tax unless taxpaid stamps
or crowns have previously been affixed. The distributor, wholesale dealer or
retail dealer, or any person who is the original consignee of any bottled soft
drink, soft drink syrup, powder, base product or other item subject to the soft
drink excise tax manufactured or produced outside this State, or who brings
such into this State, shall pay the excise tax.
The textual statement that liability falls on the first consignee when goods are
shipped into the State by common carrier is an administrative interpretation of subsection (b). Record at 20-21.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.43 (1972).

1124

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

was within the group of persons subject to the tax. Therefore, it conceded liability for some tax, 23 but challenged the discriminatory rates
and the discriminatory method of tax payment, resting its arguments
largely on the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 2
THE SCOPE OF COMMERCE CLAUSE PROTECTION
In drafting the commerce clause,2 5 the framers of the Constitution
recognized that free trade between the states, unburdened by discriminatory and retaliatory acts against commerce, was essential to national
economic unity.26 The purpose of the clause was not merely to vest
regulatory power with the federal government but to insulate commerce from unwarranted state interference-in effect to create a national "common market." 27 Although the United States Supreme
Court quite early made the two-step determination that taxation is a
form of regulation 28 and that the commerce clause was designed to limit state regulation of trade, 29 the Court's use of the clause to invalidate
state taxes is of comparatively recent origin, 0 beginning with the
Case of the State Freight Tax31 in 1872. In the ensuing years,
23. This concession will be examined thoroughly later in the note. This writer has
considerable doubt as to whether Richmond Food Stores was "doing domestic or intrastate business" as required by id.
24. The company also argued that the "Alternative method of payment of tax" violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the
federal constitution as well as provisions of the North Carolina Constitution. These arguments are not discussed by the court of appeals in the Richmond Food Stores decision
and were not a basis of the court's holding. Accordingly, they are not discussed in this
note.
25. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8,cl. 3. The commerce clause states, "the Congress shall
have Power . .. To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes. ...
26. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11, 22 (A. Hamilton); THE FmEnmAuST No. 42 (J.

Madison); Celler, The Development of a Congressional Program Dealing with State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 385 (1963); Hartman, State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REV. 1051,
1053-55 (1960); Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of
InterstateBusiness, 75 HARV. L. REv. 953, 956 (1962).
27. See authorities cited note 26 supra.
28. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425-37 (1819).
29. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-49 (1827).
It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding from the feebleness of
the federal government, contributed more to that great revolution which introduced the present system, than the deep and general conviction, that commerce
ought to be regulated by Congress. It is not, therefore, a matter of surprise,
that the grant should be as extensive as the mischief, and should comprehend
all foreign commerce, and all commerce among the States.
id. at 446.
30. J. HELLEmSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 163
(1969).
31. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872) (unconstitutional to levy tax on goods in interstate transit).
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cases challenging state taxes on commerce clause grounds have forced
the Court 'to balance state needs for revenue against the national inter-

est in free trade.3" As a general rule, the Court recently has been sympathetic to state needs, and it has significantly narrowed the area of

tax exempt interstate commerce despite considerable opposition from
the business community and Congress. 33

Although as a general proposition it may be said that Supreme
Court decisions dealing with state taxation of interstate commerce are
impossible to reconcile,3 4 the decisions do uniformly condemn state
taxes that discriminate against interstate business. Typical of state tax
laws voided as discriminatory against interstate commerce are the fol-

lowing: laws exempting local goods, thus leaving only commodities
from out-of-state subject to the tax; 5 laws taxing nonresident merchants but exempting the chief local competitors; 6 and laws charging
higher tax rates to nonresidents." The policy behind the condemnation of discriminatory taxation is succinctly expressed by the Supreme
Court in Best & Co. v. Maxwell: "The freedom of commerce which
32. "The power of the States to tax and the limitations upon that power imposed
by the Commerce Clause have necessitated a long, continuous process of judicial adjustment" Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251 (1946).
33. E.g., Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (out-of-state vendor with
limited contact responsible for collection of state use tax); Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (interstate business subject to state income tax). Reaction by the business community to these decisions was vehement, and
there was considerable debate in Congress on the whole question of state taxation of
interstate commerce. For a discussion of the congressional debate see Celler, supra note
26, at 385; Mickey & Mickum, CongressionalRegulation of State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 38 N.C.L. REv. 119 (1960).
The only legislation produced by the congressional debate, 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84
(1970), imposes a narrow restriction on state income taxation of interstate business.
Basically, the statute prohibits an income tax on the vendor of tangible personal property
who merely solicits orders in the taxing state, accepts or rejects them out of state, and
if accepted, delivers by shipment directly'to his customers. Id. § 381(a) (1).
34. "The history of this problem is spread over hundreds of volumes of our Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past would neither clarify

what has gone before nor guide the future." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252
(1946). For excellent surveys on the entire subject of state taxation of interstate commerce see W. BEAmAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTIER STATES (1963); P. HARTMAN, STATE
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953); Symposium--State Taxation of Interstate

*i
.

Commerce, 46 VA. L. RPv. 1051 (1960).
35. I.M. Darnell & Son Co. v. City of Memphis, 208 U.S. 113 (1908) (products
of Tennessee soil exempt from property tax); Guy v. City of Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434
(1879) (vessels unloading Maryland products not charged wharfage fee); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) (peddler selling "growth, produce or manufacture" of state
exempt from license tax).
36. West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. City of Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957);
Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S.
454 (1940).
37. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
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allows the merchants of each state a regional or national market for
their goods is not to be fettered by legislation, the actual effect of which
whatever may be the
is to discriminate in favor of intrastate businesses,
38
ostensible reach of the [statutory] language."
Richmond Food Stores is not the first recognition by a North Carolina court of the commerce clause's protection against discriminatory
taxation. In 1879 the North Carolina Supreme Court voided a tax
levied on a resident grocer for -the amount of his out-of-state purchases.3 The decision expressly overruled -an earlier North Carolina
40
case that ,hadsustained a discriminatory tax on "spirituous" liquors.
More recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle against discriminatory taxation of interstate commerce in Billings
Transfer Corp. v. County of Davidson.41 In that case the court found
property of a resident trucking company to be subject to a county ad
valorem property tax despite a commerce clause challenge, but in dicta,
that the tax was valid only as long as it was nonthe court emphasized
42
discriminatory.
In light of the solid line of precedent condemning discrimination by
a state against commerce, Richmond Food Stores is clearly correct. The
alternative method of payment, with its discriminatory rates and discriminatory reporting methods, directly contravened the commerce
clause, and was probably intended to give a competitive advantage to
the in-state distributor.
The most intriguing aspect of Richmond Food Stores is not the
holding itself, but the potential argument on similar facts that out-ofstate soft drink distributors are not constitutionally or statutorily subject
to the soft drink tax at all. The statute expressly limits itself to persons
who are "doing domestic or intrastate business within this State" and
the tax is on the "privilege" of doing -that business.43 The statutory
language seems to reflect a legislative awareness of commerce clause
restrictions on taxation. 44 Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court have condemned state "privilege" taxes on interstate business,
38. 311 U.S. 454, 457 (1940).
39. Albertson v. Wallace, 81 N.C. 479 (1879).
40. Davis v. Dasbiel, 61 N.C. 114 (1867) (resident liquor dealer was required to
pay 15% tax rate on liquor purchased out-of-state and 10% tax rate on liquor bought
from a North Carolina manufacturer).
41. 276 N.C. 19, 170 S.E.2d 873 (1969).
42. Id. at 24, 170 S.E.2d at 877-78.
43. N.C. GEN. SAT. § 105-113.43 (1972).
44. Brief for Appellant at 5.
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no matter how fairly the taxes in question are measured or appor-

tioned. 46 The principle behind the decisions is that the "privilege" to
engage in interstate commerce is given by the federal government and
not by state governments.48

The problem confronting ,the Court in cases dealing with taxation
of the interstate merchant has been to determine the line between interstate and intrastate business. To sustain a state "doing business"

tax levied on an out-of-state seller, the Court has required some local7
activity, sufficiently separated from the purely interstate transaction.
An analysis of Supreme Court decisions provides some help in defining
the elusive term "local activity."
Probably the most consistent line of decisions dealing with state
privilege taxes are 'the "drummer" or itinerant salesman cases. 48 These
cases have held that the mere solicitation of orders by an out-of-state
merchant either through Itinerant salesmen or a sales office within the
taxing state is interstate business and is not subject to a state privilege

tax. Apparently, the rationale of the decisions is that the free access
of vendors to interstate markets is essential to a unified economy.49
The "drummer" decisions must be distinguished from another line

of cases known as the "peddler" decisions.

0

These cases have sus-

tained state privilege taxes on the out-of-state vendor who not only solicits orders, but also carries with him quantities of his product which
45. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
46. Hartman, supra note 26, at 1091.
47. Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama 393 U.S. 537 (1969); Norton Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246
U.S. 147 (1918).
48. The leading case in the long line of "drummer" decisions is Robbins v. Shelby
County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). The decisions are collected in Memphis
Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 392-93 n.7 (1952).
49. W. BwsAN, supranote 34, ch. 16, at 6.
50. E.g., Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941); Wagner v. City of
Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919). The "peddler" cases are collected in Memphis Steam
Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 394 n.12 (1952).
Wagner v. City of Covington supra, involved facts quite similar to Richmond Food
Stores. Plaintiff in that case was a soft drink bottler in Cincinnati, Ohio who sold
drinks to retailers across the Ohio River in Covington, Kentucky. He challenged a soft
drink license tax imposed by the City of Covington on the grounds that he was engaged
solely in interstate business and consequently, was protected by the commerce clause.
In its decision, the Court distinguished between two types of sales activity conducted by
the plaintiff bottler. The first type, where orders were received in Cincinnati and shipments were delivered directly to Kentucky customers, was interstate business and was
not subject to a license or privilege tax. The second type, where the bottler merely
loaded up his wagon and traveled from customer to customer taking and filling orders
on the spot, was intrastate business and was subject to a privilege tax.
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he sells directly to customers in the taxing state. By carrying the goods
with him, the out-of-state vendor becomes in the Court's view simply
another local merchant. 51 Thus actual selling, as distinguished from
mere solicitation, is a local activity.
The rule of the "drummer" decisions--hat mere solicitation is not

local activity-extends to other aspects of the interstate sale. The
Court has held that it is purely interstate business when a transaction
contains only the following elements: (1) orders solicited by salesmen
working out of a local sales office; (2) orders submitted to an out-ofstate office for approval; (3) commodities shipped directly to the customer.52 On the other hand, the Court has found some activities of

the interstate vendor -tobe local in nature 'and properly to be subject
to a state privilege tax. Distribution of goods through a local warehouse or local office rather than by direct shipment to the customer
is local activity.53 Likewise the maintenance of a local repair station
to service the vendor's product,54 the use of salesmen to assist the vendor's wholesale customers in making resales, 5 and the taking and ac-

ceptance of orders at a local office56 have been held to be local activities.
Clearly some nonresident soft drink distributors will be engaged
in local activities (local warehouse, acceptance of orders in North Carolina, etc.) ,that make -them amenable to the North Carolina Soft Drink
Tax Act. However, it is likely that others will merely solicit orders,
51. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 394 (1952).
52. J. HELLERsTE N, supra note 30, at 174; see Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v.
Alabama, 393 U.S. 537, 539 (1969); Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S.
534, 537 (1951); Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1918). Although the "drummer" decisions and the above-cited authorities firmly held that mere
solicitation and delivery is interstate business immune from a privilege tax, the Supreme
Court has recognized that sales activity can become sufficiently intense to transform it
from solicitation into local activity. In General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S.
436 (1964), the Court sustained the imposition of a privilege tax on General Motors,
measured by a percentage of the company's gross receipts from sales to automobile dealers in the State of Washington. Orders from the dealers were sent outside the state to
be accepted or rejected, and shipments were made to the dealers. However, General
Motors maintained representatives in the taxing state who directly supervised and assisted dealers in their sales and service activity. The Court found a "maze of local connections" sufficient to take General Motors' activity out of the protection of the commerce clause.
53. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
54. Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 154 (1918).
55. Id. at 155; cf. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
56. Graybar Elec. Co. v. Curry, 308 U.S. 513, affg per curiam 238 Ala. 116, 189
So. 186 (1939); W. BEAMAN, supra note 34, ch. 12, at 3-4; see Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935).

1975]

1129

SOFT DRINK TAX

accept them out-of-state and then ship directly to their customers. This
would appear to be interstate, not intrastate activity, leaving the dis-

tributors within the protection of the commerce clause and outside the
statutory language of "doing domestic or intrastate business." 5
If nonresident distributors are able to 'avoid payment of the soft

drink tax on commerce clause grounds, there will be adverse consequences.

First, the State will lose tax revenue.

Secondly, and more

importantly, the North Carolina soft drink industry will be left at a competitive disadvantage with its out-of-state rivals. The State must therefore find some constitutional method to tax the soft drinks distributed

by an out-of-state seller although the seller himself is immune from taxation. Seemingly, out-of-state soft drinks can be taxed in at least two

ways. The first way is simply to levy the present soft drink tax on the
first North Carolina consignee of goods shipped from outside the State.

This procedure is used by the State of South Carolina" which has a
similar soft drink tax and is currently used by North Carolina when soft
drinks are delivered to North Carolina by a common carrier. 51

The second way to tax the soft drinks is to convert the tax from
a privilege tax to a sales and use tax."0 The sales -and use tax has been
sustained by the United States Supreme Court against commerce clause
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.43 (1972). Neither the record nor the court of
appeals decision in Richmond Food Stores is specific on the extent of that company's
activities in North Carolina. Quite possibly the company was engaged in local activities. Therefore, no conclusion is offered about whether Richmond Food Stores itself
was subject to the soft drink tax. It is merely suggested that some nonresident distributors may be able to avoid payment of the tax.
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-768 (1962).
59. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
60. A sales tax is a type of gross receipts or gross income tax, levied on the proceeds of a sale of tangible personal property. In its "pure form," the tax is imposed
on the seller directly although he might have been able to pass the cost on to the buyer.
W. BEAMAN, supra note 34, ch. 13, at 1. In McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S.
327 (1944), the Supreme Court held that the out-of-state seller could not be assessed
a sales tax if he accepted orders outside the taxing state and was engaged solely in solicitation and delivery within the taxing state.
A use tax is levied on the purchaser of tangible personal property, but frequently
the seller is made the collection agent for the taxing state. He remits the tax to the
state and is liable for the tax if he fails to collect it. Although the sales and use taxes
may appear to be different in form and not in substance, with the seller paying the tax
and attempting to pass it on to the buyer, there are important substantive differences.
Under the use tax, the seller is merely the surety for the buyer's obligation. Thus, even
if a state imposes tax liability on the seller for failure to collect the tax, he still has
a right of recourse against the buyer. In addition, if the seller refuses to collect a use
tax, the state may sue the buyer for the amount of tax due. In contrast, sales tax liability falls directly on the seller. Although he may try to pass the tax to the buyer,
he has no legal right to do so. BEAMAN, supra note 34, ch. 13, at 7-8.
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arguments.61

Under this type of tax arrangement, North Carolina

would levy a soft drink "use" tax on the resident purchaser of out-ofstate soft drinks. However, the seller of the drinks would be required
to collect the tax and to remit it to the State. At -the same time, a
sales tax would be levied on transactions between resident soft drink
manufacturers and resident distributors. As long as the sales and use
tax rates are the same (no discrimination), the commerce clause would
not be violated since a use tax does not fall directly on the out-of-state
seller.62 In addition, local merchants would not be left at a competitive
disadvantage. Finally, to insure against a successful commerce clause
attack based on the burdensome administrative costs involved in colleoting a use tax, North Carolina could allow the out-of-state seller to
keep eight percent (the discount currently allowed by the alternative
method of payment) of the tax he collects as a type of salary.0
CONCLUSION

The North Carolina Court of Appeals correctly determined in
Richmond Food Stores that the alternative method of paying the North

Carolina soft drink tax unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. However, the'decision did not reach the issue of commerce clause restrictions against privilege taxes on interstate business.
61. The sales tax has been employed effectively with a compensating use tax. Under the usual arrangement, the sales tax is levied on intrastate sales and the use tax is
levied on purchasers of out-of-qtate products. The use tax therefore is a means to avoid
sales tax weaknesses created by the commerce clause. J. HELLmrTnm , supra note 30,
at 237-38. This type of arrangement has been sustained by the Supreme Court, particularly if the out-of-state seller is allowed to keep a portion of the tax he collects to cover
administrative costs. E.g., Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
300 U.S. 577 (1937).
62. Although the Supreme Court has been more willing to sustain a use tax than
a sales or privilege tax levied directly on the seller, the Court has still required some
minimum local activity. In its most liberal use tax decision, the Court held that a Georgia firm, using a small number of independent contractors to solicit orders in the taxing
state, could be required to collect a Florida use tax. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S.
207 (1960). Two other Supreme Court decisions have held that a seller did not have
enough local activity to be required to collect a use tax: National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (mail order firm with no solicitors in taxing state and deliveries made by common carrier or the mail); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (department store with no solicitation in taxing state and
deliveries made in company's own trucks). Out-of-state soft drink distributors would
appear to have more local activity than a mail order or department store although it
is possible to make the contrary argument. Seemingly, regular solicitation of orders and
delivery to regular customers would be enough local activity to require the distributor
to collect a use tax.
63. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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In this writer's view, a nonresident soft drink distributor who solicits
orders by catalog or through salesmen, accepts them out-of-state, and

then ships directly to his North Carolina customers is constitutionally
and statutorily exempt from the present Soft Drink Tax Act."4

Although the out-of-state seller may be beyond the State's taxing
jurisdiction, his goods are not. Therefore, the State legislature should
amend the Soft Drink Tax Act, placing tax liability on the resident pur-

chaser. This action would protect interstate commerce, the local merchant, and State tax revenue.
PAUL M. DENNIS, JR.
64. In a decision delivered since the completion of this note, the United States Supreme Court sustained the imposition of a business and occupation tax, measured by a
percentage of the gross receipts from sales, on an out-of-state manufacturer whose only
"local" connection with the taxing state was one resident employee. Standard Pressed
Steel Co. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 95 S. Ct. 706 (1975). The resident employee (an engineer) served as liaison between the out-of-state company, a manufacturer
of aircraft fasteners, and its principal customer in the State of Washington, Boeing Aircraft. The engineer did not take sales orders; rather, orders were sent directly to the
manufacturer, and shipments were made to Boeing by common carrier. The employee's
duties were to obtain the engineering design of fasteners needed, to secure the testing
of sample products, to resolve problems after sale, and to maintain the good will of
Boeing personnel. Id. at 708.
The Court felt that General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), was
directly controlling. See note 52 supra. Apparently the Court was unwilling to distinguish between district sales and service representatives supervising independent automobile dealers (the facts of General Motors) and a single engineer participating extensively
in the purchasing decisions of a principal customer (facts of StandardPressed Steel).
Since the opinion in Standard Pressed Steel is very brief and contains only a cursory analysis of prior precedent, it is difficult to determine the full implications of that
decision. Possibly, the decision can be interpreted to overturn the "drummer" cases and
to stand for the proposition that a seller's use of local salesmen in a taxing state is sufficient activity to sustain the imposition of a privilege tax. However, this interpretation
seems unlikely. It is more plausible to conclude that the Court viewed an engineer-consultant, living in the taxing state, as qualitatively different from a mere salesman.
In light of two Supreme Court decisions-West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v.
City of Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957) and Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U.S. 95,
100-01 (1919)-that directly reject the imposition of a privilege tax on nonresident
wholesale grocery distributors who do nothing but solicit orders and deliver commodities,
and in view of the consistent line of "drummer" cases, this writer still believes that many
nonresident soft drink distributors can avoid payment of the North Carolina soft drink
tax. This position derives considerable support from a recent opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas, the author of the majority opinion in Standard Pressed Steel. :in United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 637-38 (1973) (sustaining use tax on aircraft fuel)
(Douglas, J., dissenting), Justice Douglas reaffirmed the proposition that solicitation of
orders and the resulting shipment of goods by an out-of-state firm is an insufficient basis
to levy a tax on the firm. He also acknowledged that the use tax was conceived as
a means to complement a sales tax, "i.e., to fill in gaps where the States could not constitutionally tax interstate arrivals or departures.' Id. at 638.
The traditional approach to taxing the interstate seller-levy a use tax but not a
sales or privilege tax-stated by Mr. Justice Douglas in United Air Lines is the one
taken in this note, and this writer believes it is still valid after Standard Pressed Steel
Co. v. Washington, supra.
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Taxation-Personal Property Owned by Nonresidents: Taxable
While at a North Carolina Manufacturing Plant?
In In re Hanes Dye & Finishing Co.' the Supreme Court of North
Carolina determined that certain unfinished textile goods, owned by
non-North Carolina residents, were not taxable by the county in which
they were physically located. These goods, temporarily in North Carlina for processing by a resident finishing company, were admittedly
in the State on the day for listing property for taxation. Yet, as a result of the decision, the goods escaped taxation by North Carolina
since only the county in which they were located had any connection
with them. Potentially, the decision could exclude much of the personal property owned by nonresident corporations and individuals
from -thisState's property tax base.
The case arose when Forsyth County sought to tax unfinished
cloth that had been shipped to the Hanes Dye and Finishing Company2 to be processed.' Many owners4 of the cloth were nonresidents of North Carolina who had purchased the goods in other states
and had shipped ,them to North Carolina for finishing by HanesY
These owners planned to reship the finished cloth to buyers in other
states.8 Hanes' possession of the goods, therefore, was only one step
in a multi-state industrial process, and the cloth was only temporarily
in its possession.'
Unfortunately for Hanes and its customers, the cloth was phys1. 285 N.C. 598, 207 S.E.2d 729 (1974).
2. The Hanes Dye and Finishing Co. is a North Carolina corporation with its
principal office and place of business in Winston-Salem, Forsyth County. Its only plant
is located in Winston-Salem. Id. at 600, 207 S.E.2d at 731.
3. Hanes "is sometimes referred to in the industry as a commission finisher,
meaning that it is commissioned to do dyeing and finishing of cloth for its customers."
Id.
4. The cloth's owners are known as "converters" in the textile industry. A "converter" obtains a contract for the sale of a particular cloth product to one of his customers, primarily the clothing industry or any other industry which uses cloth as part of
its product. After obtaining the contract, the converter buys unfinished cloth from a
greige mill and has it shipped to a finishing plant like Hanes. From the finishing plant,
the goods may be shipped directly to the converter, to the converter's customers, or to
another manufacturing plant for further treatment. Id. at 601-04, 207 S.E.2d at 73133.
5. In 1971, approximately 95.4% of Hanes' work was done for nonresidents. Id.
at 604, 207 S.E.2d at 733.
6. In 1971, approximately 95% of the goods shipped from Hanes were shipped
outside of North Carolina. Id. at 605, 207 S.E.2d at 733.
7. The time from the receipt of the goods by Hanes until reshipment averaged
five to six weeks but was often as little as three weeks. Id. at 604, 207 S.E.2d at 733.
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ically located in North Carolina on "tax day," January 1,1 and pursuant to a special statute,' Hanes, as custodian of the property, was
compelled to list it for taxation. Hanes and its customers then contested the taxability of the goods, arguing they were only in the State
"on a temporary basis" and thus were not subject to a property tax.' 0
Both the county and State tax boards rejected Hanes' contention deciding that the property was within the taxing jurisdiction of the State
since it was in Hanes' possession "for a very substantial business purpose-that of being dyed, finished, or otherwise processed."'" The
boards reasoned that since the property was within North Carolina's
jurisdiction, it was property subject to taxation under the terms of the
North Carolina Machinery Act." Section 105-274 of that Act provides that all real and personal property within North Carolina's jurisdiction shall be subject to taxation unless specifically exempted or
excluded. 3
In In re Hanes the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a
decision of the Superior Court of Forsyth County reversing the conclusion of the State taxing authorities. The court based its holding on
section 105-304 of the Machinery Act-the section that determines
8. North Carolina, as is common among the states, has a "tax day" on which all
property within the State's jurisdiction is to be listed and appraised. See Developments
in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L.
REy. 953, 97& (1962). 'Tax day" in North Carolina is January 1. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-285 (Supp. 1974).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-315 (1972). The statute says, "As of January 1, every
person having custody of taxable tangible personal property that has been entrusted him
by another for storage, sale, renting, or any other business purpose shall furnish the appropriate tax supervisor the reports required. .. ."
10. 285 N.C. at 599-600, 207 S.E.2d at 730.
11. Id. at 608, 207 S.E.2d at 735.
12. The present Machinery Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. H9 105-271 to -395 (1972), was
enacted by the General Assembly in 1971. Its purpose is "to provide the machinery
for the listing, appraisal, and assessment of property and the levy and collection of taxes
on property by counties and municipalities." Id. § 105-272.
13. Property subject to taxation.-(a) All property, real and personal,
within the jurisdiction of the State shall be subject to taxation unless it is:
(1) Excluded from the tax base by a statute of statewide application
enacted under the classification power accorded the General Assembly by Article V, Sec. 2(2), of the North_ Carolina Constitution, or
(2) Exempted from taxation by the Constitution or by a statute of
statewide application enacted under the authority granted the
General Assembly by Article V, Sec. 2(3), of the North Carolina Constitution.
(b) No provision of this Subchapter shall be construed to exempt from
taxation any property situated in this State belonging to any foreign corporation unless the context of the provision clearly indicates a legislative intent to
grant such an exemption.
Id. § 105-274.
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the place in North Carolina for listing tangible personal property.14
According to that section, tangible personal property of a nonresident
corporate or individual taxpayer is to be listed where it is "situated"
within the State.1 5 The section defines "situated" as "more or less
permanently located." 16 Relying on this definition, the court concluded
that Forsyth County could not tax the goods in question because they
were not "more or less permanently located in the county." 17 The
practical effect of the holding was to immunize the cloth from taxation anywhere in North Carolina since only Foryth County had any
connection with the property.
Significantly, In re Hanes virtually ignored section 105-274 of
the Machinery Act," the section -that was the basis of the State tax
board's determination. The court did not hold that the goods were
beyond the State's taxing jurisdiction or that they were "exempted"
or "excluded" from taxation."' Rather, the court looked solely to
section 105-304 and its definition of "situated" to deny Forsyth County
the right to tax the cloth. Therefore, from the standpoint of statutory construction, the crucial issue in In re Hanes was whether section
105-274--defining property subject to taxation-or section 105-304defining the place for listing tangible personal property-was the appropriate section to determine Forsyth County's power to tax the
cloth.
Section 105-274 embodies the General Assembly's determination
of property subject to taxation by the local governmental units of
14. Place for listing tangible personal propert.-(a) Listing Instructions.This section shall apply to all taxable tangible personal property that has a
tax situs in this State and that is not required by this Subchapter to be appraised originally by the Department of Revenue. The place in this State
at which such property is taxable shall be determined according to the rules
prescribed in subsections (c) through (h), below.....
(b) Definitions-For purposes of this section:
(1) "Situated" means more or less permanently located.
(d) Property of Taxpayers With No Fixed Residence in This State.(1) Tangible personal property owned by an individual nonresident
of this State shall be taxable at the place in this State at which
the property is situated.
(2) Tangible personal property owned by a domestic or foreign taxpayer (other than an individual person) that has no principal office in this State shall be taxable at the place in this State at
which the property is situated.
Id.§ 105-304.
15. Id.§ 105-304(d)(1)-(2).
16. Id. § 105-304(b)(1).
17. 285 N.C. at 613, 207 S.E.2d at 739.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-274 (1972).
19. The court said that the exemptions and exclusions mentioned in section 105274 were "not pertinent to this appeal." 285 N.C. at 607, 207 S.E.2d at 735.
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the State. 20 This determination is made under a specific provision of
the State constitution that gives the General Assembly the power to
classify property subject to taxation and to exempt property from
taxation.21 This power is subject to an overriding constitutional limitation expressed in article V, section 2(1): "The power of taxation
shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public purposes

only, and shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted away."
Other specific limitations also appear in article V, section 2.22 In addition to State constitutional limitations, the United States Constitution imposes further limitations on the General Assembly's taxing
power.

The federal limitations are the due process clause of the

fourteenth amendment, the commerce clause of article I, section 8,

and the prohibition against taxing imports of article I, section 10.21
The basic taxing decision of the General Assembly, as expressed

in section 105-274 is that all property, either real or personal, is
subject to taxation if it is within the State's jurisdiction and is not spe-

cifically exempted or excluded by another statute or the state constitution.2 4 No distinction is made in the section between property owned

by residents and property owned by nonresidents.25 Implicit in the
phrase "within the jurisdiction of the State," however, is a recognition
by the General Assembly of federal constitutional limitations on the
power to tax property of nonresidents.20
20. H. Lnwis, THE ANNOTATED MACHNERY Acr OF 1971, at 8 (The Institute of

Government, University of North Carolina, 1971). North Carolina imposes no statewide property tax. The Machinery Act merely provides the procedure for property taxation by local governments. See note 12 supra.
21. N.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 2.
22. The primary limitations are as follows: the power to classify or to exempt
property cannot be delegated by the General Assembly; every exemption and classification shall be on a statewide basis and by a rule uniformly applicable in every taxing
unit.
23. North Carolina Supreme Court decisions recognizing federal limits on state
taxing power include: In re Asheville Citizen Times Publishing Co., 281 N.C. 210, 188
S.E.2d 310 (1972) (tax on imports); Billings Transfer Corp. v. County of Davidson,
276 N.C. 19, 170 S.E.2d 873 (1969) (due process and commerce clause); Pocomoke
Guano Co. v. Biddle, 158 N.C. 212, 73 S.E. 996 (1912) (commerce clause).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-274 (1972).
25. Subsection (b) of section 105-274 states specifically that no part of the Machinery Act "shall be construed to exempt from taxation any property situated in this
State belonging to any foreign corporation unless the context of the provision clearly
indicates a legislative intent to grant such an exemption."
Subsection (b) is drawn from prior N.C. GFN. STAT. § 105-396 (1965) and is included in present section 105-274 "to place together all provisions of the act dealing with
the inclusion of property within the tax base." H. Lwis, supra note 20, at 8.
26. H. Lnwis, INTaASTATE TAX Srrus oF TANimLE PERSONAL PnoPmRTY 1-3 (The

Institute of Government, University of North Carolina, 1963).

1136

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

Although section 105-274 makes both real and personal property
subject to taxation, the mobile nature of tangible personal property
creates special tax problems.17 Personal property, unlike real property has no fixed location or situs, and in North Carolina, in which
local governmental units rather than the State levy the tax on property,
the intrastate tax situs of personal property is vitally important.
Historically, the North Carolina Supreme Court has relied on
the General Assembly to determine where personal property, within
the state's jurisdiction, is to be taxed.28 The commitment of tax situs
determination to the legislature has apparently been absolute subject
only to constitutional limitations, and the court has refused to upset
even inequitable taxing results.29 In City of Winston v. City of Salem,
the court expressed its basic thoughts on tax situs: "It seems to us
that sound public policy requires that the Legislature be left free, as always heretofore, to prescribe regulations as to the situs of personal
property, and unless the constitutional provision were plain and explicit to the contrry, we can not hold the statute to be unconstitutional."' 0
Present section 105-304 of the Machinery Act is an 'attempt by
the General Assembly to determine the intrastate tax situs of tangible
personal property whether owned by North Carolina residents or by
nonresidents of the State. It provides that tangible personal property
27. For an indication of the problems in determining tax situs of personal property
see id.
28. In re Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 263 N.C. 345, 139 S.E.2d 633 (1965);
Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Town of Lumberton, 179 N.C. 409, 10Z S.E. 629 (1920);
City of Winston v. City of Salem, 131 N.C. 404, 42 S.E. 889 (1902).
29. City of Winston v. City of Salem, 131 N.C. 404, 42 S.E. 889 (1902). In that
case the taxpayer corporation, a tobacco company, had its principal office and place of
business (a factory) in the town of Winston but had its tobacco warehouse in the town
of Salem. Salem attempted to tax leaf tobacco stored in the warehouse. Under the controlling statute, all tangible personal property was taxable at the residence of the owner,
and a corporation's residence was its principal office or place of business. Thus all of
the leaf tobacco was taxable in Winston despite its being stored in Salem. This result,
of course, inequitably allowed a local government providing no services for the property
to derive all the revenue from it, while the local government providing services derived
no benefit. Nonetheless, the supreme court refused to modify the legislative determination of situs.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-304(f)(2), (4) (Supp. 1974) attempts to avoid the result
of City of Winston v. City of Salem. Although tangible personal property as a general
rule is still taxable at the residence of the owner, it may acquire a situs elsewhere if
"situated" there for certain business purposes. Section 105-304(f) (4) provides that the
presence of tangible personal property at a business premise on "tax day" is prima facie
evidence that it is "situated" at the location.
30. 131 N.C. at 405-06, 42 S.E. at 890.
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of a nonresident shall be taxable where "situated."'1

Property of a

resident is taxable at the owner's residence unless the property is "situated' sewhere for certain business purposes.12 Although the intrastate tax situs of property owned by both residents and nonresidents depends on the meaning of the word "situated," that word despite its
presence in the Machinery Act since 1939 was not defined until the
1971 Machinery Act. This act defines "situated" as "more or less permanently located." 3
The statutory definition of "situated" originated-at least in connection with the tax situs of tangible personal property-in In re Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc.3 4

This case required the court to determine

the place in North Carolina for listing certain tangible personal property owned by a resident corporation. The property in question was
the rolling stock-the "line-haul" tractors and trailers--of a trucking
company which had its principal office in Forsyth County but which
had truck terminals in several other North Carolina locations. These
"line-haul" tractors and trailers were seldom present at any one .terminal for longer than loading and unloading. Under the "listing section," tangible personal property of a resident corporation was to be
listed at its residence, its principal office, unless "situated" elsewhere
for business purposes. The court held that all of the "line-haul"
equipment was taxable in Forsyth County, the corporation's residence,
because none of it had become "situated" at any one of -the other
terminals. The court said: "Clearly, situated connotes a more or less
permanent location .

. .

. It does not mean a mere temporary pres-

,,35
ence..
It is important to note that in In re Pilot Freight Carriers,Inc.
and in subsequent cases involving the intrastate tax situs of truck rolling stock,36 the court assumed that the property had a tax situs in the
State and looked to the listing section, section 105-304, solely to determine the location within the state for taxation. In contrast to these
cases, In re Hanes did not require the court to determine the place in
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-304(d)(1)-(2) (1972).
32. Id. § 105-304(f) (2). See note 29 supra.
33. N.C. GEN.SrrAT. § 105-304(b)(1) (1972).
34. 263 N.C. 345, 139 S.E.2d 633 (1965). H. LEWs, supra note 20, at 89.
that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-304 (1972) involves only tangible personal property.

Note

35. 263 N.C. at 351, 139 S.E.2d at 638 (citations omitted).
36. In re McLean Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 375, 189 S.E.2d 194 (1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1099 (1973); In re McLean Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 242, 188 S.E.2d 452
(1972); In re Moss Trucking Co., 16 N.C. App. 261, 191 S.E.2d 919 (1972).
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North Carolina where the cloth was taxable; rather, the case was a
challenge to North Carolina's power -totax the property at all.
The listing section of the Machinery Act, relied on by the court to
decide In re Hanes, specifically states that its subsections are not applicable unless the tangible personal property "has a tax situs in this
State. 3' 7 It becomes operative only after a threshold determination is
made as to whether the property is "subject to taxation" by North
Carolina. The primary draftsman of the North Carolina Machinery
Act, Professor Henry W. Lewis,38 describes the operation of the listing
section as follows:
Section 105-304 makes specific the fact that the section is
concerned only with personal property that has a tax situs in
North Carolina; it is not intended to deal with the determination of
whether the property is taxable in this state. The section is concerned solely with the place within this state at which property, if
taxable in this state, is to be taxed.3 9
Thus, the North 'Carolina Supreme Court erroneously interpreted section 105-304 in In re Hanes. That section is intended solely
to determine the intrastate tax situs of tangible personal property
which is subject to -taxation somewhere in North Carolina. However,
by holding that the cloth in Hanes' possession was not taxable by
Forsyth County since not "situated" there, the court in effect left the
goods without any "tax situs" in North Carolina. Only Forsyth
County, of all the local governmental taxing units in the state, had
any possible claim to tax the property.
Under a proper analysis of the problem before it, the supreme
court should have looked to section 105-274 to determine if the cloth
were subject to taxation in North Carolina.40 Since the cloth was
personal property and was not specifically "exempted" or "excluded"
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-304(a) (Supp. 1974).
38. Professor Lewis of the North Carolina Institute of Government was consultant
and draftsman to the Local and Ad Valorem Tax Study Commission which prepared
the initial House Bill 169; consultant to legislative committees and subcommittees to
which the bill was referred; draftsman of the House Committee substitute; and was consultant to the floor managers of the bill. H. LEwis, A LEGISLATIVE HsTORY OF "AN
ACT TO BE KNOWN AS THE MACHINERY ACT OF 1971," at ii (The Institute of Government, University of North Carolina, 1971).
39. H. LEwis, supra note 20, at 89.
40. See Davenport v. Ralph N. Peters & Co., 274 F. Supp. 99, 112-13 (W.D.N.C.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 386 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1967) (construing former similar
section). This case involved the taxability of cottonseed oil, owned by nonresidents, lo.
cated in North Carolina storage tanks on "tax day." The court determined first that
the oil was subject to taxation by North Carolina. Then it used the listing statute to
determine the intrastate tax situs.
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from taxation, it met the requirements of section 105-274. The only
real question before the court was whether the property was within
the State's jurisdiction. Hanes argued that the cloth's temporary presence was insufficient to give the State any taxing jurisdiction over
it;41 Hanes did not contend that the cloth was taxable somewhere else
in North Carolina other than Forsyth County. Thus, the court should
never have concerned itself with section 105-304. The section in no
way addresses the jurisdictional issue.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court erroneously used
section 105-304 to determine whether the cloth possessed by Hanes
was "subject to taxation" in North Carolina, a rejection of the court's
interpretation of that section does not resolve the fundamental issue
in the case. The holding of In re Hanes is that cloth, owned by nonresidents, shipped to Hanes from outside North Carolina, and then reshipped by Hanes to points outside North Carolina, is not taxable
while it is in this State.42 If these goods are not within the taxing jurisdiction of North Carolina due to federal constitutional limitations, the holding of In re Hanes is correct despite the errors in statutory construction.
Two of the federal constitutional limits on a state's power to tax
are relevant to the facts of In re Hanes: the commerce clause of article I, section 8 and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. First, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held
that the commerce clause immunizes from state taxation those commodities that are actually moving in interstate commerce.43 However,
if the interstate movement is broken or interrupted in a particular
state, the Court has held that the property loses its immunity and
becomes subject to local taxation.44 Although the issue in these commerce clause cases is really a factual one 45 -whether the interstate
movement is sufficiently broken to take the goods out of commerce and
expose them to taxation-some controlling principles emerge in the
41. 285 N.C. at 599-600, 207 S.E.2d at 730.
42. Id. at 615, 207 S.E.2d at 740.
43. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933); Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504
(1913); Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1902); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885).
For a collection of the cases on this point see Annot., 171 A.L.R. 283 (1947); Annot.,
78 L. Ed. 138 (1933).
44. See authorities cited note 43 supra.
45. "The questioin is always one of substance, and in each case it is necessary to
consider the particular occasion or purpose of the interruption during which the tax is
sought to be levied." Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 10 (1933).
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decisions. If interstate transit is interrupted "due to the necessities of the
journey or for the purpose of safety and convenience in the course of
movement," the goods are considered to still be in interstate commerce and not subject to taxation.
On the other hand, if the
property in interstate transit comes to rest in a state for the business
purposes of the owner, or "for disposal or use" as he sees fit, then
movement is considered sufficiently broken to expose the goods to state
taxation.47
Applying these principles to In re Hanes, taxation of the cloth
by Forsyth County would seemingly not violate the commerce clause.
The cloth was not removed from an interstate shipment for any reason other than the business profit of the owners. While the cloth was
located at Hanes, it was undergoing a manufacturing process, and
as such, it was no longer a part of an interstate shipment,4" but rather
'49
was "part of the general mass of property within the State.
In re Hanes is closely analogous to Bacon v. Illinois, ° a Supreme Court decision involving an attempt by Illinois to tax grain
temporarily removed from an interstate shipment. The owner removed the grain for the limited purposes of "inspecting, weighing,
cleaning, drying, sacking, grading or mixing." Once these processes
were completed, the grain was put back on railroad cars and shipped
to out of state buyers. In its decision, the Supreme Court determined
that the interruption, although brief, was sufficient to give Illinois a
right to tax the grain because removal was solely for the benefit of the
owner and was unconnected with the interstate travel. It is important
to note that although the taxpayer in Bacon was an Illinois resident,
the case cannot be distinguished from In re Hanes on that basis.
The Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention by Illinois that
residency of the owner was relevant to the issue."1 The clear indi46. Id. at 9-10; Annot., 171 A.L.R. 283 (1947).
47. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 10 (1933); Annot., 171 A.L.R. 283 (1947).
48. Property brought from another state into a state for the purpose of subjecting the same to a manufacturing process in such state, preparatory to its
being shipped to markets or customers without the state, is not deemed in
transit so as to prevent acquisition by it of a taxable situs in the state where
the manufacturing process takes place.
Annot., 110 A.L.R. 707, 726 (1937). An exceellent state case on this point is McCutcheon v. Board of Equalization, 87 N.J.L. 370, 94 A. 310 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
49. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 10 (1933).
50. 227 U.S.504 (1913).
51. "The question [immunity from taxation] is determined not by the residence
of the owner but by the nature and effect of the particular state action with respect to
a subject which has come under the sway of a paramount authority." Id. at 512.
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cation of Bacon is that the grain was taxable by Illinois regardless of
the residence of the owner.
In addition to the commerce clause, the Supreme Court has also

interpreted the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to
limit state taxation of certain types of property.

For example, in

cases involving state attempts to tax the instrumentalities or means of
commerce-barges, railroad cars, trucks, and aircraft-the limits of
the due process clause have been a central issue.5"

However, for

some reason, probably historical, the Supreme Court has regarded the
commerce clause rather than the fourteenth amendment to be con-

trolling in cases involving commodities in commerce.5 3 The distinction in constitutional analysis between goods in commerce and instrumentalities of commerce is stated explicitly in Braniff Airways v. Ne-

braskaState Board of Equalization& Assessment:
While the question of whether a commodity en route to market
is sufficiently settled in a state for the purpose of subjection to
a property tax has been determined by this Court as a Commerce
Clause question, the bare question whether an instrumentality of
commerce has a tax situs in a state for the purpose of subjection to
a property tax is one of due process. 54
The distinction appears to be one of form rather than substance.

Ac-

cording to a reasonable interpretation of Supreme Court decisions,
once "transit [is] broken sufficiently to deprive property of the protection of the commerce clause, [the Supreme Court] has been of the

opinion that situs was acquired so that the tax would not offend the
Fourteenth Amendment."5 5 That interpretation leads to the conclusion that the cloth in In re Hanes, clearly outside the protection of
the commerce clause, had enough contact with North Carolina to

meet due process challenges. 56
52. The instrumentalities of commerce make regular trips through several states,
but are usually in no state for very long periods of time. The tax question is whether
contact of the property on a regular rather than a sustained basis is sufficient to warrant
an apportioned property tax. For a full discussion of the constitutional problems in taxing instrumentalities of commerce see Billings Transfer Corp. v. County of Davidson,
276 N.C. 19, 25-34, 170 S.E.2d 873, 878-84 (1969); Developments in the Law, 75 HAnv.
L. Rav., supra note 8, at 979-87.
53. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347
U.S. 590, 598-99 (1954); Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit (pts. 1-4), 7 VA. L.
Rav. 167, 245, 429, 497 (1920-1921).
54. 347 U.S. 590, 598-99 (1954).
55. Powell, supra note 53, at 515.
56. Even using a pure due process analysis, taxation of the cloth in In re Hanes
appears to withstand constitutional challenge. "The test of whether a tax law violates
due process is 'whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to pro-
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CONCLUSION

The North Carolina Supreme Court thwarted legislative intent
by using section 105-304 to determine whether the cloth in Hanes'
possession was subject to taxation by Forsyth County. That section
was intended only to determine the intrastate tax situs of property
taxable somewhere in the state. Arguably, the definition of "situated"
in section 105-304(b)(1), "more or less permanently located," is
somewhat misleading since personal property -by its nature is seldom
"more or less permanently located." However, the definition must
be considered in the context of section 105-304 in its entirety. "Situated" within the section means simply "more or less permanently located" vis-h-vis any other taxing unit in the State. The word and its
definition do not stand by themselves, and they do not resolve whether
property is taxable in North Carolina.
If the supreme court continues to read the definition of "situated" out of context, then much of the personal property owned by
non-North Carolina residents will escape taxation. For example,
any goods that are part of a business inventory such as goods in the
process of manufacture and goods held for sale will seldom if ever
be "more or less permanently located." Therefore, if they are owned
by a nonresident, under In re Hanes they will be immune from North
57
Carolina taxation.
If the supreme court was concerned about the federal constitutional problems it should have faced them directly, considering whether
the cloth under section 105-274 was within North Carolina's jurisdiction. Although ample precedent existed to find the goods within the
State's jurisdiction, a holding to the contrary would have done no vitection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return."' Billings
Transfer Corp. v. County of Davidson, 276 N.C. 19, 24-25, 170 S.E.2d 873, 878 (1969),
citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). Forsyth County provided all the protection for the goods during their stay in North Carolina. It was offering something for which it could ask return.
57. It is important to note that in In re Hanes, the court expressed the opinion
that in two circumstances cloth owned by nonresidents would be taxable while at Hanes.
In the first case, the cloth was purchased from a North Carolina mill and then shipped
to Hanes for finishing. In the second case, cloth was purchased from an out-of-state
mill, shipped to Hanes for finishing, but was intended to be sold to a North Carolina
resident. Clearly, in both of these cases, the cloth would not be any "more or less permanently located" than in the case where the cloth is bought out of state and intended
for reshipment out of state. Under the In re Hanes rationale this property should also
be immune from taxation. 285 N.C. at 615-16, 207 S.E.2d at 740 (Higgins, J., dissent-

ing in part).
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olence to the Machinery Act. In a later case, the court could have
simply held the property of a nonresident to be within North Carolina's
jurisdiction, distinguishing In re Hanes on its facts. For some inexplicable reason, the court failed to follow this course, and instead engrafted section 105-304 onto section 105-274, thereby creating a judicial exemption for much personal property of nonresidents.
PAUL M. DENNIS, JR.

Torts-Contracts-City Streets and State Roads: New Roadblocks for Injured Plaintiffs
In Matternes v. City of Winston-Salem1 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a person injured on a city street that is part of
the State highway system cannot recover from a city that was negligent
in maintaining the street under a contract with the State. The ruling
narrowed previous decisions of the court concerning the right of a
member of the public to recover for the breach of a contract for the
public benefit. Matternes held that a person must be an expressly intended third-party beneficiary to recover under the contract 2 and ignored the possibility of a separate tort action.
Interstate 40, a part of the State highway system, runs through
the center of Winston-Salem. On January 7, 1973, an accumulation
of snow and ice made an elevated portion of the road slippery. A car,
driven by plaintiff's wife and containing her minor child, skddded out
of control, crashed through a guard rail, and landed on the street below. The wife was killed and the child injured. Plaintiff sued in the
State superior court alleging that the City of Winston-Salem was negligent in failing to remove the snow and ice and in failing to maintain
the road adequately under a contract with the State. 3 Plaintiff claimed
that as a member of the public he was a third-party beneficiary of the
contract.4 The superior court granted summary judgment for the city5
1. 286 N.C. 1, 209 S.E.2d 481 (1974).
2. Id. at 12, 209 S.E.2d at 487.
3. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 136-66.1(3) (1974) allows any city or town to undertake
by written contract with the Board of Transportation the maintenance of State roads
within municipal limits.
4. 286 N.C. at 3, 209 S.E.2d at 482.
5. Id. at 6, 209 S.E.2d at 483.
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based upon section 160A-297(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes, which relieves North Carolina cities of the responsibility for maintenance
of, and tort liability for injury on, State roads within city lim6
its.

In affirming the summary judgment, Justice Lake, writing for the
North Carolina Supreme Court, did not base the decision on the statute,
but stated that the liability of the city, if any, must arise from the contract between the city and the State. The contract made no mention
of liability for injury. The court used the Restatement of Contracts
formulation of third-party beneficiaries and found that plaintiff was an
incidental beneficiary possessing no rights against the promisor.8 The
intent of the parties was "that the only beneficiaries contemplated were
the parties . . . themselves."

While all travelers would have bene-

fited from proper performance of the contract, "such benefit [was]
incidental to the real purpose of the contract . ... 0
The court's holding departs from well established North Carolina
precedent. In Gorrell v. Greensboro Water Co." defendant had a
contract with Greensboro to supply water. Because of the defendant's
failure to supply the water, plaintiff's property was destroyed by fire.
The North Carolina Supreme Court allowed plaintiff to recover as a
third-party beneficiary, stating that members of the public are the intended beneficiaries of such a contract since they supply the consideration in the form of taxes.' In a similar situation, Potter v. Carolina
Water Co. 13 held that, since the contracting parties could have precluded recovery by third persons, their failure to do so indicated that
liability
to members of the public was within the "intent of the par' 1
ties.

6. "A city shall not be responsible for maintaining streets or bridges under the
authority and control of the Board of Transportation, and shall not be liable for injuries
. . . resulting from any failure to do so." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-297(a) (1974).
7. 286 N.C. at 11, 209 S.E.2d at 486.
8. Id. at 12, 209 S.E.2d at 487. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932) divides third-party beneficiaries into three classes: donee beneficiaries, to whom the
promisor intends a gift; creditor beneficiaries, to whom the promisee owes a duty; and
incidental beneficiaries, who fit neither of the other two classes.
9. 286 N.C. at 15, 209 S.E.2d at 489.
10. Id. Justice Sharp, concurring, thought that a traveler on a road is a beneficiary
of such a contract, but would not allow recovery in this case because N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-297(a) (1974) controls irrespective of any contract. 286 N.C. at 23, 209
S.E.2d at 489-90.
11. 124 N.C. 328, 32 S.E. 720 (1899).
12. Id. at 333, 32 S.E. at 721.
13. 253 N.C. 112, 116 S.E.2d 374 (1960).
14. Id. at 118, 116 S.E.2d at 378-79.
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Matternes, attempting to distinguish Gorrell, stated that the Gor-

rell contract gave the water company a franchise that imposed extra
duties.'"

As far as the traveling public was concerned, however, the

city was in the same position as the water company-there -was no one
else to do the work. The public was forced to rely on the city to maintain the streets.

To support its position, Matternes relied heavily on H. R. Moch
Co. v. Renssalaer Water Co.,'8 a New York case that, contrary to Gorrell, held that the water company was not liable to a citizen whose property was destroyed because of a failure to supply water."

Although

the New York rule has been followed in most jurisdictions,' 8 the Gorrell rule is favored by legal commentators.

9

The North Carolina court

also stated that since Matternes had no cause of action against the State
as promisee, he should not be able to sue the city as promisor2 0 This
reasoning ignored Gorrell, in which the plaintiff likewise had no cause

of action against the promisee."
Since Interstate 40 is a State road, the State has a duty to main-

tain it.22 Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case, the doctrine of governmental immunity protected the State from liability for
negligent failure to maintain its roads. 3 North Carolina has partially
abrogated this common-law concept by the Tort Claims Act,2 " which
15. 286 N.C. at 14, 209 S.E.2d at 488.
16. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
17. Id. at 164, 159 N.E. at 897.

18. Only Florida, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania follow the Gorrell rule. Mugge v.
Tampa Water Works Co., 52 Fla. 371, 42 So. 81 (1906); Tobin v. Frankfort Water Co.,
158 Ky. 348, 164 S.W. 956 (1914); Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co,, 414 Pa. 199,
199 A.2d 875 (1964). See also W. PRossas, HANDBooK OF THE LAw oF ToRTs § 93
(4th ed. 1971).
19. See, e.g., Corbin, Liability of Water Companies for Losses by Fire, 19 YALB
UI. 425 (1910).
20. 286 N.C. at 14, 209 S.E.2d at 488-89.
21. See Mabe v. City of Winston-Salem, 190 N.C. 486, 130 S.E. 169 (1925). The
court also noted that R.EsTATmENT oF CouNm~crs § 145 (1932), which is the "official"
policy of the Board of Transportation, would preclude recovery by Matternes. Section
145 provides that a promisor bound to a governmental body to render a service to the
public is not liable for failure to do so unless there is an intent manifested in the contract to compensate members of the public or unless the promisee would be liable in
the absence of a contract, Illustration 2 of this section is the Gorrell situation, and the
Restatement writers do not follow the North Carolina rule. Thus, if Gorrell has any
vitality left, it is limited to its particular facts.
22. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 136-66.1(1) (1974) makes the State responsible for State
roads within municipal limits. See also Milner Hotels, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 271 N.C.
224, 226, 155 S.E.2d 543, 545 (1967).
23. See W. PRossER, supra note 18, § 131.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1974) allows recovery when the injury is the
"result of a negligent act of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the
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makes the State liable for the negligent acts of its employees. Although

Matternes characterized the city as an employee of the State,2 5 the necessary "act," as construed in Flynn v. North Carolina State Highway
& Public Works Commission,20 was absent. In Flynn the State's fail-

ure to fill in a hole in a road caused plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle, but plaintiff could not recover because the failure to fill the hole
7
was an "omission" and not an "act.

'2

In contrast, the immunity of cities extends only to "governmental"
functions such as fire fighting,28 police protection,20 and maintaining
a public library.3 0 Normal tort liability attaches to "proprietary" functions, those which could be done by private contractors. 1 Maintenance
of roads within city limits was early held to be a proprietary function. 2
Furthermore, section 160A-296(1) of the North Carolina General
Statutes places an affirmative duty on cities to maintain streets and
sidewalks. 3
Thus, if Interstate 40 had been a city street, plaintiff could have
recovered had he been able to prove the allegations in this case. Nevertheless, the court extended the State's broader immunity shield to

cover a city that contracts with the State to maintain State roads. Plaintiff was foreclosed merely because the road, though maintained as a
city street, was technically part of the State highway system.
The only theory considered by the majority in Matternes was a
third-party beneficiary contract action. As suggested by Justice Huskins' dissent, most courts recognize an alternative tort theory. A promisor who undertakes a course of action must exercise reasonable care
State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority .... ."
25. 286 N.C. at 11, 209 S.E.2d at 487.
26. 244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956).
27. Id. at 620, 94 S.E.2d at 573.
28. Mabe v. City of Winston-Salem, 190 N.C. 486, 130 S.E. 169 (1925).
29. Mclhenney v. City of Wilmington, 127 N.C. 146, 37 S.E. 187 (1900).
30. Seibold v. Kinston-Lenoir County Pub. Library, 264 N.C. 360, 141 S,E.2d 519
(1965).
31. See W. PIossmi, supra note 18, § 133.
32. Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 31 N.C. 73 (1848). See also
Ferrell, Civil Liability of North CarolinaCities and Towns for PersonalInjury and Property Damage Arising from the Construction, Maintenance,and Repair of Public Streets,
7 WAKE FoRsT L. REv. 143 (1971).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-296(1) (1974) imposes a duty to keep streets, side.
walks, and bridges in proper repair. See, e.g., Waters v. City of Roanoke Rapids, 270
N.C. 43, 153 S.E.2d 783 (1967); Mosseller v. City of Asheville, 267 N.C. 104, 147
S.E.2d 558 (1966); Faw v. Town of North Wilkesboro, 253 N.C. 406, 117 S.E.2d 14
(1960).
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toward foreseeable plaintiffs. 3 While the course of conduct arises
from the contract, the duty owed to third parties is one of law-the
promisor cannot substitute a contractual standard of conduct for a duty
of reasonable care. 35 For example, in Jones v. Otis Elevator Co.38 de-

fendant was negligent in performing a maintenance contract causing
injury to a third party. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
where a dangerous instrumentality is involved or where "the act...
is . . . dangerous to . . . others," a person not a party to the contract

may sue for its breach. 7
The water company cases 38 also support a tort action for third parties based on breach of contract. The early cases were based entirely
on third-party beneficiary concepts, but in Morton v. Washington Light
& Water Co.3 9 and Powell & Powell, Inc. v. Wake Water Co.40 the
North Carolina Supreme Court allowed recovery under a tort theory.
Finally, in Potter v. Carolina Water Co.,41 the court held that a third

party injured by a negligent breach of contract could sue in tort or as
a third-party beneficiary of the contract.
The principal limitation on the third-party tort recovery is the requirement of misperformance rather than nonperformance.
[A] company contracting with a city to . . . supply water

may fail to commence performance. Its contractual obligations
are then with the city only, which may recover damages, but merely
for breach of contract There would be no tort, no negligence, in
the total failure on the part of the company.... 0B]ut if the
company proceeds under its contract . . . it enters upon a public
calling . . . and a neglect by it in the discharge of its obligations
. . .may be regarded as breach of absolute duty ....
The action, however, is not one 'for breach
of
contract,
but
for
negligence,
43
. . . and is an action for a tort.
The distinction between misperformance and nonperformance is
flexible and can be used to justify a result desired by the court. 4 1 In
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See W. PnossER, supranote 18, § 92.
Toone v. Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 407, 137 S.E.2d 132, 135 (1964).
231 N.C. 285, 56 S.E.2d 684 (1949).
Id. at 289, 56 S.E.2d at 688.
See text accompanying notes 11-21 supra.
168 N.C. 582, 84 S.E. 1019 (1915).
171 N.C. 290, 88 S.. 426 (1916).
253 N.C. 112, 116 S.E.2d 374 (1960).
See W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 92.
Guardian Trust & Deposit Co. v. Fisher, 200 U.S. 57, 68 (1906).
See Byrd, Recent Developments in North Carolina Tort Law, 48 N.C.L. REV.

791, 795-96 (1970).
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construing the Tort Claims Act, the North Carolina courts have interpreted the word "act" narrowly.45 In a water company case, however,
the court allowed tort recovery even where there was a "total failure
to furnish water." 46 In Council v. Dickerson's, Inc.4 7 plaintiff was injured by the negligent failure of the defendant paving contractor to provide warning lights and flags as specified in the contract with the State.
Although the injury was caused by omissions, defendant was found to
be involved in an "affirmative course of conduct '48 and plaintiff was
allowed to recover.
The reason Matternes failed to discuss the possibility of tort recovery may stem from the court's perception of the issue involved:
"Can an individual user of a street.
city which contracted. . . to repair.

. .

maintain an action against a
and then did nothing what-

. .

soever about it?" 49 The record showed, however, that the city had
crews on duty and that snow and ice were removed later in the day.50
What transpired was not a total failure to perform, but a negligent manner of performance.
The Matternes court had two opportunities, 51 both well supported
by previous decisons, to find for the plaintiff. Under the Gorrell precedent, it could have held that plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary
of the contract. Under the tort theory, it could have held the city liable for negligence. The court has instead overruled well established
and well regarded North Carolina precedent. No policy grounds were
stated, but the Moch decision, quoted approvingly, was based on a fear
of catastrophic liability5 This policy does not apply here, however,
since North Carolina cities have always been liable for maintaining
their own streets without catastrophic results.
JAMES GALBRAITH
45. Flynn v. North Carolina State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 244 N.C. 617,
94 S.E.2d 571 (1956). See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
46. Potter v. Carolina Water Co., 253 N.C. 112, 119, 116 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1960).
47. 233 N.C. 472, 64 S.E.2d 551 (1951).
48. Id. at 474-75, 64 S.E.2d at 552-53.
49. 286 N.C. at 12, 209 S.E.2d at 487 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 19, 209 S.E.2d at 492 (dissenting opinion).
51. The court ignored precedent for a related but separate ground for recovery.
According to dictum in Michaux v. City of Rocky Mount, 193 N.C. 550, 555, 137 S.E.2d
663 (1927), a city has a duty to warn of dangerous conditions on city streets which
are part of the State highway system even if it has no duty to repair them.
52. 247 N.Y. at 168, 159 N.E. at 899.

